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ABSTRACT
An integral component of modern computing is the ability to outsource data and
computation to powerful remote servers, for instance, in the context of cloud com-
puting or remote file storage. While participants can benefit from this interaction, a
fundamental security issue that arises is that of integrity of computation: How can
the end-user be certain that the result of a computation over the outsourced data
has not been tampered with (not even by a compromised or adversarial server)?
Cryptographic schemes for verifiable computation address this problem by ac-
companying each result with a proof that can be used to check the correctness of
the performed computation. Recent advances in the field have led to the first imple-
mentations of schemes that can verify arbitrary computations. However, in practice
the overhead of these general-purpose constructions remains prohibitive for most ap-
plications, with proof computation times (at the server) in the order of minutes or
even hours for real-world problem instances. A different approach for designing such
schemes targets specific types of computation and builds custom-made protocols, sac-
viii
rificing generality for efficiency. An important representative of this function-specific
approach is an authenticated data structure (ADS), where a specialized protocol is
designed that supports query types associated with a particular outsourced dataset.
This thesis presents three novel ADS constructions for the important query types
of set operations, multi-dimensional range search, and pattern matching, and proves
their security under cryptographic assumptions over bilinear groups. The scheme
for set operations can support nested queries (e.g., two unions followed by an in-
tersection of the results), extending previous works that only accommodate a single
operation. The range search ADS provides an exponential (in the number of at-
tributes in the dataset) asymptotic improvement from previous schemes for storage
and computation costs. Finally, the pattern matching ADS supports text pattern
and XML path queries with minimal cost, e.g., the overhead at the server is less
than 4% compared to simply computing the result, for all our tested settings. The
experimental evaluation of all three constructions shows significant improvements in
proof-computation time over general-purpose schemes.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
An integral component of modern computing is the ability to outsource data and
computation to powerful remote servers. Individuals frequently outsource their data
to hosting services such as Dropbox and Google Drive, or have their e-mails stored
remotely at Gmail servers, in order to be able to access them from everywhere.
Following the Database-as-a-Service paradigm, enterprises can utilize cloud services
like Amazon EC2 and S3, in order to benefit in terms of storage, computation, and
elasticity of resources.
On one hand, all participants stand to gain from this model of interaction. Data
owners avoid the need for building a sophisticated and potentially costly infrastruc-
ture since storage and computationally intensive tasks are offloaded to a cloud server.
Moreover, the server can benefit financially from accommodating a large number of
datasets from different parties. On the other hand, new security issues arise in this
setting where one’s data no longer resides within their “zone-of-trust”. One par-
ticular such issue is that of integrity of computation, i.e, how can an end-user be
certain that the result of a query, executed at the remote server, has not been tam-
pered with—even if the server itself is compromised or behaves adversarially (e.g.,
to bias the competition among rival serviced companies). Ensuring that information
remains intact in the lifetime of an outsourced dataset and that query processing is
handled correctly, producing correct and up-to-date answers, lies at the foundation
of secure cloud services.
1
2In this thesis, we consider a data owner that outsources a dataset D to a server.
The latter is then responsible for responding to informational queries issued by mul-
tiple clients, answered according to D. This model captures a variety of real-world
applications such as outsourced SQL queries, streaming datasets, and outsourced
file systems. Furthermore, the owner may choose to modify D, e.g., by inserting or
deleting elements, and the server is notified for such changes. In practice, the clients
may be collaborators or customers of the data owner, or even the owner himself ac-
cessing D from a different device via the server. In this setting clients may want to
verify the integrity of the server’s answers to protect themselves against servers that
behave maliciously, are compromised by an external attacker, or simply provide false
data due to bugs. Informally, the clients should, somehow, get a guarantee that the
computation is as good as if it was performed by the trusted owner himself. Here,
we present cryptographic solutions that provide such a guarantee for three types of
computations over outsourced databases. In particular, we construct solutions that
allow the clients to check the correctness of remotely executed: (i) nested set opera-
tions, (ii) multi-dimensional range queries, and (iii) text and XML pattern matching
queries. These three types of computation capture numerous applications in prac-
tice. We elaborate more on this in Section 1.3. However, before we can proceed with
this, we first need to discuss what are the existing solutions for this problem in the
literature, in order to better present our contributions and how our constructions are
related to prior works.
In the security literature, researchers have studied three (loosely defined) alter-
native approaches for achieving such an integrity property. One approach relies on
trusted hardware, (e.g., [SZJvD04, PMP11, SLS+05, SSW10]), which requires that
the owner can install a secure module at the infrastructure of the server. Another
line of works relies on replication (e.g., [CS06, CL02b, CRR13]) and assumes mul-
3tiple servers, which makes detection of adversarial behavior possible in a straight
forward manner (as long as the compromised servers do not collaborate). However,
both of the above approaches require modifications in the setting and the mode of
interaction among the parties; while they are applicable to many cases, a solution
that remains faithful to the model would be more attractive in general.
A cryptographic solution to the problem requires that when answering a client
query, the server also computes a proof of integrity for the data used to compute
the answer as well as the integrity of the computation itself. This solution is purely
software-based and prohibits adversarial behavior in a very strong sense: Convincing
a client of a false result becomes as hard as breaking a cryptographic assumption.
For this purpose, we allow the owner to perform some preprocessing on D before
outsourcing it to the server, and to compute and publish a small verification state,
hereafter referred to as digest, that is used by clients to verify the server’s responses.
When issuing an update query, the owner needs to also update the digest. If the
digest can be made public we say that the server’s proofs are publicly verifiable, (i.e.,
any party can issue queries and check the integrity of the result).
In this setting, it is important to minimize the performance overhead, that comes
from deploying a cryptographic solution, (e.g., in terms of computation time, com-
munication bandwidth, storage, etc.) in order to avoid negating the aimed benefit
from outsourcing in the first place. Several different measures of efficiency need to
be considered. First, we would like that the time it takes for the client to verify a
proof is short, ideally, some fixed polynomial in the security parameter that is inde-
pendent of the size of server’s computation cost and the size of D. Second, we would
like the server’s computational overhead for computing proofs to be minimal. Addi-
tional efficiency considerations include the proof size and the efficiency of updates.
The number of communication rounds should also be minimized. In this thesis, we
4concentrate on non-interactive solutions where the client sends a query and receives
back an answer and a proof in one round of interaction (i.e., remaining faithful to
the existing mode of interaction).
1.1 General-purpose verifiable computation
In the cryptographic literature, the problem of provably checking the integrity of
arbitrary delegated computations has been formalized under the notion of verifiable
computation (VC). The starting point in the area has been the concept of non-
interactive arguments (computationally sound proofs) [Mic00] that builds upon the
earlier literature on interactive proofs [GMR89] and interactive arguments [BCC88,
Kil92], and provides a solution in the random oracle model [BR93]. Since then, a
series of works in the cryptographic literature (e.g., [GGP10, BCCT12, CKLR11,
GGPR13, PST13]) have revisited the problem with various definitional extensions
and improved constructions.1
In the setting of verifiable computation, a computationally weak client holds
input x and wishes to compute the output of function f on it, by outsourcing the
computation to a server. A VC scheme requires that the server accompanies each
query result y with a cryptographic proof-of-correctness, that can be efficiently (i.e.,
much faster than computing f(x)) verified by the client. Notice that the above
formulation only targets delegation of computation and not of data. The client is
assumed to hold the input dataset and simply wishes to avoid the (possibly large)
computation cost. However, this is not a limiting factor when it comes to delegations
of storage. A folklore result from the literature shows that the client can outsource his
input x ahead of time, and maintain only a succinct collision-resistant representation
c, e.g., the hash h(x) under a collision-resistant hash function h. If the function that
1We refer interested readers to [WB15] for an introduction to the concept and for an extensive
overview of the existing techniques and literature.
5the client wishes to have computed by the server over his input x is f , then let f ′
be defined as the function that upon input values x, c outputs f(x) only if c = h(x).
Then the client can keep locally c = h(x) as his digest and deploy a VC scheme for
the function f ′ instead of f . Indeed, existing works further explore this technique
(e.g., [CKLR11, WSR+15, sBFR15]) to outsource data.
This approach requires a VC scheme that can accommodate the class of NP
(since, computing f ′(x) without access to x—as is the case for the client—belongs
to this class). The first such scheme was [Mic00] which utilized probabilisti-
cally checkable proofs, a fact that would significantly impact its performance in
practice. One approach for designing a more efficient protocol is based on re-
placing computationally sound proofs with succinct non-interactive arguments of
knowledge (SNARK). Good candidates for such a SNARK include the works
of [BCCT12, PHGR13, BCG+13, Gro16] that provide constructions with very small
asymptotic overhead.2
Although the problem was originally studied from a theoretical perspective,
the first VC implementations for arbitrary computations, were presented re-
cently [WSR+15, VSBW13, PHGR13, BFR+13b, BCG+13, BCG+14, BCG+14,
BCTV14, CFH+15]. However, the concrete overhead of the above implementations,
when applied for outsourcing of datasets, remains well beyond the realm of real-
ity, with proof computation times (at the cloud server) in the order of minutes or
even hours for real-world problem instances (particularly as the size of the dataset
grows). This overhead comes largely from the generality of existing schemes. In
order to be able to accommodate large classes of functions (e.g., every function in
P), a generic function representation is necessary. Existing implementations, have
to rely on (Boolean or arithmetic) circuit representation, or probabilistically check-
2We do not make the distinction between a SNARK with or without a long pre-processing
phase since, in our setting, the owner anyhow performs a preprocessing over the entire dataset
before outsourcing it.
6able proofs, and both approaches may come with significant costs, heavily depending
on the particular type of computation that is outsourced. For example, [PHGR13]
shows that for computing a matrix by vector multiplication the proof computation
for 1000 dimensions is close to 0.9ms, which is definitely not prohibitive. This type
of computation, however, has a naturally “good” arithmetic circuit representation.
For other computations, this cost scales much worse, e.g., [ZPK14] reports a cost off
approximately 19,000 hours for performing a BFS traversal over a graph with 9,000
edges using the same system, and approximately 52 hours using the optimized VC
scheme of [BCG+13]. This costs stems, to a large extent, from the fact that this
type of computation does not have a nice arithmetic circuit representation. In the
context of set operations (a problem we address in Chapter 3), the transformation
from formulas of set operations to circuits can be extremely wasteful as the number
of sets participating in every query and the set sizes (including the size of the answer)
may vary dramatically between queries.
1.2 Function-specific schemes for verifiable computation
There is a large number of works in the literature that take a function-specific ap-
proach for verifiable computation, i.e., they target specific types of computation
and try to build more efficient schemes tailored for the problem at hand. This
line of literature has evolved largely independently of the general-purpose schemes,
motivated by particular real-world problems and proposing solutions with great po-
tential for deployment in practice. As an example, some of the earliest works in
the area (e.g., [NN00]) solved the problem of authenticated certificate management
and revocation. Other interesting examples from the literature include solutions
for matrix multiplication [FG12], polynomial arithmetic [BGV11, BFR13a], set op-
erations [PTT11], relational database queries [YPPK09a, ZKP15], pattern match-
7ing [MND+04], polynomial differentiation [PST13], and many more.
1.2.1 Authenticated data structures
One particular line of work that follows this approach is authenticated data structures
(ADS) [Tam03], where a specific type of data structure is targeted and a customized
protocol is built, that supports all query types associated with this data structure
(e.g., lookups and insertions for the case of hash tables). ADS schemes can be seen as
an alternative to general-purpose VC that sacrifices generality for efficiency, but they
also impose additional realistic requirements such as, support for efficient updates in
the dataset, and public verifiability (i.e., once the data has been outsourced, anyone
can verify the integrity of an operation). The challenge then lies in identifying
classes of databases and query types that are relevant in practice, and developing
cryptographic protocols specifically for them, that are much faster than general-
purpose VC.
Slightly more formally, an authenticated data structure (ADS) is a protocol for
secure data outsourcing involving the owner of a dataset (also referred to as the
source), an untrusted server and multiple clients that issue queries over the dataset.
The interaction model is depicted in Figure 1·1. The protocol consists of a pre-
processing phase where the source uses a secret key to compute some authentication
information over the dataset D, outsources D along with this information to the
server and publishes some public digest d related to the current state of D. Subse-
quently, the source can issue update queries for D (which depend on the data type of
D), in which case the source updates the digest and both the source and the server
update the authentication information to correspond consistently with the updated
dataset state. Moreover, multiple clients (including the source itself), issue queries
q addressed to the server, which responds with appropriate answer α and proof of
correctness Π. Responses can be verified both for integrity of computation of q and
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Figure 1·1: The interaction model of authenticated data structures.
Initially, the data owner computes a digest d of his dataset D which
he publishes. Subsequently he outsources D to a server who is respon-
sible for handling queries q issued by multiple clients. The server is
considered untrusted and is required to respond to q with the answer
α together with a proof Π which is used by the clients alongside d to
verify the integrity of α.
integrity of data used (i.e., that the correct query was run on the correct dataset
D) with access only to public key information and digest d. From a security per-
spective, the service offered to clients is that the received answers are “as-good-as”
being directly computed by the trusted source. A restricted version of this setting is
a two-party model where the owner of D outsources it to a server and issues updates
and queries, benefiting in both storage and computation cost.
ADS constructions exist for many popular data structure types, such as,
lists [NN00], trees [MND+04, NN00, PP15], hash tables [PTT15], skip lists [GTS01],
inverted index data structures [PTT11], and graph databases [ZPK14]. The earlier
of these constructions roughly follow the general blueprint of [MND+04] that applies
for data structures, where the query evaluation can be modeled as a search process
among predefined elements (e.g., a tree traversal from its root). For each step of
the search, an atomic proof must be produced by the server that validates that the
correct choice at that step was made. Security in this setting is achieved by employ-
ing a cryptographic hash function to encode each link in the data structure (e.g., a
9parent-child node relation). This concept has been revisited recently in [MHKS14]
that provides an automated compiler that can take any such data structure and pro-
vide its authenticated version. However, this approach comes with some downsides,
namely that the verification cost at the client is as high as the proof construction
cost at the server, and the type of computations that can be supported are limited to
whatever can be expressed a search process. A different approach for building ADS
schemes was proposed in [TT10], where the authentication of general query results
is reduced to the certification of set membership relations among predefined (and
constructed in a way related to specific problem) sets, which —through careful use
of cryptographic primitives such as accumulators [BdM93, CL02a, Ngu05]— allows
for faster verification and supports more general query types.
1.3 Three novel ADS constructions
In this dissertation, we present three novel ADS constructions for the cases of set
operations, multi-dimensional range search, and pattern matching. The main mo-
tivation for these types of computation comes from the numerous applications they
find in real-life, ranging from filtered keyword search (in the case of set operations),
to SQL queries (a fundamental type of which is a range query) and problems as-
sociated with computational biology and intrusion detection (in the case of pattern
matching).
Our constructions extend the known literature of function-specific VC schemes
both in terms of expressiveness (for set operations) and efficiency (for range queries
and pattern matching). Next, we present a brief overview of the three constructions.
1.3.1 Nested set operations
The focus of the first part of the dissertation is the problem of verifiable nested
set operations in an outsourced setting. The results discussed were originally pre-
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sented in [CPPT14]. The motivation for set operations comes naturally due to the
numerous computations that can be mapped by them, such as a wide class of SQL
database queries, authenticated keyword search with elaborate queries, access control
management, and similarity measurement.
We consider a dataset that consists of multiple sets, where the clients’ queries
are arbitrary set operations among them, represented as formulas of nested unions,
intersections, and set difference. The verification cost is asymptotically optimal,
i.e., the same as simply parsing the query and the answer, whereas the server only
suffers a poly-logarithmic overhead. The scheme also supports two types of efficient
updates: source updates and server-assisted updates. The former assumes that the
owner stores the dataset locally (i.e., only benefits from delegating handling the
query load to the server). This greatly simplifies the update process, as the owner
can simply compute the new digest himself and publish it for everyone to access, as
well as notify the server for any modifications. The latter assume that the owner
does not store the dataset locally; the only copy of the data resides at the server.
Therefore the update process is a little more involved. First, the owner (and only
him) requests an update from the server. Then, the latter performs the update and
responds with a “candidate” new digest that he computed using only public key
information. Subsequently, the owner runs a verification process on the new digest
and either accepts it (in which case he signs and publishes it) or rejects it (in which
case he suspects that the server tried to cheat).
The construction extends that of [PTT11] which can only support a single op-
eration at a time. A trivial way to accommodate a nested query (e.g., two unions
followed by an intersection) with [PTT11] would be to separately verify each inter-
mediate result; however, this would require that all these results (the unions in the
above example) are sent to the client, which increases verification cost and com-
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munication accordingly. Our result achieves verification of the validity of the final
result in a way that is entirely independent of the sizes of intermediate sets. The
security of our construction relies on a modified version of the extractable collision-
resistant hash function (ECRH) construction, introduced in [BCCT12], that can be
used to succinctly hash univariate polynomials. Finally, our experimental evaluation
demonstrates the low verification cost of our scheme (less than 1 second for sets of a
few thousand elements), as well as an up to three orders of magnitude improvement
for the server’s overhead, compared to the only other alternative approach that can
accommodate this class of computation (i.e., general purpose VC).
1.3.2 Multi-dimensional range queries
The second part of the dissertation focuses on the verification of multidimensional
range queries and contains results originally presented in [PPT14]. Here, the out-
sourced database is a table that contains tuples with multiple attribute values. A
range query is defined over a choice of these attributes (referred to as query dimen-
sions) and it is expressed as a series of pairs of minimum and maximum values,
each along a certain dimension. Its result includes all the tuples whose value on
all of these dimensions is within the range specified by the query. This query ex-
ists in most predominant database architectures; in relational databases this is a
SELECT...FROM...WHERE query, whereas in scientific databases, such as SciDB, it is
a part of the core SUBARRAY query.
Our constructions are the first where all costs (i.e., setup, storage, update, proof
construction, verification, and proof size) grow only linearly with the number of
dimensions. For comparison, in all existing works with provable non-trivial bounds,
all these costs scaled exponentially with the number of dimensions. Our core idea
is the reduction of a multidimensional range query to multiple 1-dimensional ones,
in a way that allows the final result to be expressed as a combination of each of the
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simpler range queries. This is achieved via a fusion of existing and novel proof tools,
based on bilinear accumulators. Moreover, we show how our construction can be
modified to achieve faster updates (from linear in the size of the database to order
of square root of the size of the database, in the worst case). Our experimental
evaluation demonstrates the very low verification cost (less than 3 seconds for all
our tested settings) and the corresponding proof construction cost at the server
that is considerable but not prohibitive (ranging from order of milliseconds to a few
minutes), even for arguably “large” queries.
1.3.3 Pattern matching
The third part of this dissertation focuses on verifiable pattern matching queries,
a problem with potential applications in a wide range of topics including intrusion
detection, spam filtering, web search engines, molecular biology, and natural language
processing. The presented results originally appeared in [PPTT15]. The problem
setting involves an outsourced textual database, a query containing a text pattern,
and an answer regarding the presence or absence of the pattern in the database. In its
simplest form, the database consists of a single text from an alphabet where a query
for a specific pattern results in answer “match at position i”, or “mismatch”. More
elaborate models involve queries expressed as regular expressions, and databases
allowing search over (semi-)structured data (e.g., XML data).
Our ADS construction is based on an authenticated version of the suffix tree
data structure and it provides precomputed (thus, fast to retrieve), constant-size
proofs for any basic form of pattern matching query, at no asymptotic increase of
storage. Moreover, the proof size is optimal (i.e., the total communication cost is
asymptotically the same as simply transmitting the answer) and entirely independent
of the size of the text, the queried pattern, or the underlying alphabet, and the
verification cost is very small, and it scales quasi-linearly with the query size. Finally,
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the proof construction time is asymptotically the same as the time it takes to compute
the result, i.e., there is no asymptotic overhead. On top of that, our experimental
evaluation demonstrates that the concrete cost for poof construction is very small in
practice, for all our tested problem instances. For example, it takes less than 90µs
to respond to a query of size 100 characters: 80µs to simply find the (mis)match and
less than 10µs to assemble the proof. As additional contribution, we show how our
scheme can be modified to accommodate queries over collections of text documents,
and exact path queries over XML documents, with similar efficiency properties.
1.4 Thesis outline
Chapter 2 provides some cryptographic preliminaries and establishes notation that
will be used in the rest of the dissertation. Chapters 3 - 5 contain our three ADS
constructions for the cases of set operations, range queries, and pattern matching
respectively. Each chapter begins with an overview of the problem formulation,
the main result and techniques used, and a comparison with previous works that
address the problem. We then provide the main results with proofs of security
and experimental evaluation. Finally, Chapter 6 reviews the main results of this
thesis and discusses interesting open problems, such as the selective combination of
function-specific and general-purpose VC schemes.
Chapter 2
Cryptographic Preliminaries
In this section, we present notation and cryptographic background that will be used
in all of the following chapters. Additional definitions that are only used in the
context of a particular scheme only, are included in the corresponding chapter.
We denote with λ the security parameter and with ν(λ) a negligible function.
A function f(λ) is negligible if for each polynomial function poly(λ) and all large
enough values of λ, f(λ) < 1/(poly(λ). We say that an event can occur with neg-
ligible probability if its probability of occurrence is upper bound by a negligible
function. Respectively, an event takes place with overwhelming probability if its
complement takes place with negligible probability. In our technical exposition, we
adopt the access complexity model: Used mainly in the memory checking litera-
ture [BEG+94, DNRV09], this model allows us to measure complexity expressed in
the number of primitive cryptographic operations made by an algorithm without
considering the related security parameter. For example, an algorithm making k
modular multiplications over a group of size O(n) where n is O(exp(λ)) for a secu-
rity parameter λ, runs in time O(k log n). In the access complexity model, this is
O(k) ignoring the “representation” cost for each group element
Collision-resistant hash functions. A collision-resistant hash function h is a
function randomly sampled from a function ensemble, such that no poly-size algo-
rithm can output x, x′, such that h(x) = h(x′) and x 6= x′, except with probability
ν(λ). More formally:
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Definition 1 (Collision-resistant hash function ensemble (CRH)). Let d(λ), t(λ) be
polynomial functions of λ. A function ensemble H = {Hλ}λ∈N from {0, 1}d(λ) to
{0, 1}t(λ) is a CRH if:
Collision-resistance For any poly-size adversary A:
Pr
h←Hλ
[
x, x′ ← A(1λ, h) s.t. h(x) = h(x′) ∧ x 6= x′
]
≤ ν(λ) .
2.1 Authenticated data structures
An authenticated data structure (ADS) is a cryptographic primitive for proving the
correctness of the result of a query on a remote dataset. The interaction model
assumes three types of parties: an owner holding a data structure D who wishes
to outsource it to a server who is, in turn, responsible for answering queries issued
by multiple clients. The owner runs a pre-processing step over D, producing some
cryptographic authentication information auth(D) and a succinct digest d of D, and
signs d. The server is untrusted, i.e., it may modify the returned answer, hence it is
required to provide a proof of the answer, generated using auth(D), and the signed
digest d. A client with access to the public key of the owner can subsequently check
the proof and verify the integrity of the answer. More formally, an authenticated
data structure scheme is a collection of the following six polynomial-time algorithms:
1. {sk, pk} ← genkey(1λ). Outputs secret and public keys sk and pk, given the
security parameter l.
2. {auth(D0), d0} ← setup(D0, sk, pk): Computes the authenticated data struc-
ture auth(D0) and its respective digest, d0, given data structure D0, the secret
key sk and the public key pk.
3. {Dh+1, auth(Dh+1), dh+1, upd} ← update(u,Dh, auth(Dh), dh, sk, pk): On in-
put update u on data structure Dh, the authenticated data structure auth(Dh)
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and the digest dh, it outputs the updated data structure Dh+1 along with
auth(Dh+1), the updated digest dh+1 and some relative information upd. It
requires the secret key for execution.
4. {Dh+1, auth(Dh+1)dh+1} ← refresh(u,Dh, auth(Dh), dh, upd, pk): On input
update u on data structure Dh, the authenticated data structure auth(Dh),
the digest dh and relative information upd output by update, it outputs the
updated data structure Dh+1 along with auth(Dh+1) and the updated digest
dh+1, without access to the secret key.
5. {a(q),Π(q)} ← query(q,Dh, auth(Dh), pk): On input query q on data struc-
ture Dh and auth(Dh) it returns the answer to the query a(q), along with a
proof Π(q).
6. {accept/reject} ← verify(q, a(q),Π(q), dh, pk): On input query q, an answer
a(q), a proof Π(q), a digest dh and pk, it outputs either “accept” or “reject”.
The notation a(q),Π(q) symbolizes that the answer and proof are a function of
the particular query q. When it is clear from the context, we will drop this notation
and refer simply to a,Π. Let {accept, reject} = check(q, a(q), Dh) be a method
that decides whether a(q) is a correct answer for query q on data structure Dh (this
method is not part of the scheme but only introduced for ease of notation.) Then
an authenticated data structure scheme ADS should satisfy the following:
Correctness. We say that an ADS is correct if, for all λ ∈ N, for all (sk, pk)
output by algorithm genkey, for all (Dh, auth(Dh), dh) output by one invocation
of setup followed by polynomially-many invocations of refresh, where h ≥ 0,
for all queries q and for all a(q),Π(q) output by query(q,Dh, auth(Dh), pk), with
all but negligible probability, whenever check(q, a(q), Dh) accepts, so does ver-
ify(q, a(q),Π(q), dh, pk).
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Security. Let λ ∈ N be a security parameter and (sk, pk) ← genkey(1λ) and A be
a poly-size adversary that is only given pk and has access to the algorithms of the
ADS via an oracle Oλ,ADS that accepts queries in the following model: The adversary
picks an initial state of the data structure D0 and computes D0, auth(D0), d0 through
an oracle call to algorithm setup. Then, for i = 0, ..., h = poly(λ), A issues an
update ui for the data structure Di and outputs Di+1, auth(Di+1) and di+1 through
an oracle call to algorithm update. At any point during these update queries, he
can make polynomially many oracle calls to algorithms query and verify. Finally,
the adversary picks an index 0 ≤ t ≤ h + 1, a query q, an answer a(q) and a proof
Π(q). We say that an ADS is secure if for all large enough λ ∈ N, for all poly-size
adversaries A it holds that:
Pr
 (q, a(q),Π(q), t)← AOλ,ADS(1λ, pk) s.t.
accept ← verify(q, a(q),Π(q), dt, pk) ∧ reject ← check(q, a(q), Dt)]
 ≤ ν(λ),
where the probability is taken over the randomness of genkey and the coins of A.
The above security game captures the fact that an adversary (playing the role of
a corrupted server) that interacts with the trusted owner and is given oracle access
to all the algorithms of the scheme, cannot come up with a fake result even if he is
allowed to chose the contents of the database and the type of query himself. Observe
that the only limitation of the adversary is that the digest that will be used for the
verification of his final challenge, and the corresponding state of the dataset and
authentication information is honestly computed, which maps the way the trusted
owner would compute them in the real world.
An ADS is static if there is no efficient way to handle updates, i.e., the best way to
accommodate such changes is to re-execute setup from scratch. A static ADS consists
of only four algorithms {genkey,setup,query,verify}. In the security game above
the calls to update are replaced by calls to setup.
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2.2 Bilinear groups
Let G be a cyclic multiplicative group of prime order p, generated by g. Let also GT
be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order p and e : G × G → GT be a
bilinear pairing with the following properties: (1) Bilinearity: e(P a, Qb) = e(P,Q)ab
for all P,Q ∈ G and a, b ∈ Zp; (2) Non-degeneracy: e(g, g) 6= 1; (3) Computability:
There is an efficient algorithm to compute e(P,Q) for all P,Q ∈ G. We denote
with pub := (p,G,GT , e, g) the bilinear pairings parameters, output by a randomized
polynomial-time algorithm GenBilinear on input 1λ.
For cleaner presentation, in what follows we generally assume a symmetric (Type
1) pairing e. All of our constructions can be shown secure in the more efficient
asymmetric group case (without a group homomorphism), with small modifications.
For example, in Section 3.6 we discuss the modifications needed to implement our
construction from Chapter 3, in the asymmetric pairing case (see [CM11] for a general
discussion of the importance of difference types of pairings).
Our security analysis makes use of the following two assumptions over groups
with bilinear pairings:
Assumption 1 (q-Strong Bilinear Diffie-Hellman [BB08]). For any poly-size adver-
sary A, for q being a parameter of size poly(λ), and for all large enough λ, the
following holds:
Pr
[
pub← GenBilinear(1λ); s←R Z∗p;
(z, γ) ∈ Z∗p ×GT ← A(pub, (g, gs, ..., gsq)) s.t. γ = e(g, g)1/(z+s))
]
≤ ν(λ)] .
Assumption 2 (q-Power Knowledge of Exponent [Gro10]). For any poly-size ad-
versary A, and for all large enough λ, there exists a poly-size extractor E such that:
Pr

pub← GenBilinear(1λ); a, s←R Z∗p;σ = (g, gs, ..., gs
q
, ga, gas, ..., gas
q
)
(c, c˜)← A(pub, σ); (a0, ..., an)← E(pub, σ)
s.t. e(c˜, g) = e(c, ga) ∧ c 6=
n∏
i=0
gais
i
for n ≤ q
 ≤ ν(λ) .
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In the following, we will refer to these two assumptions as q-SBDH and q-PKE,
respectively. It should be pointed out that q-PKE (originally introduced by Groth
in [Gro10]) is a non-standard assumption, extending the knowledge-of-exponent as-
sumption of [Dam91]. It falls within the classification of non-falsifiable assump-
tions [Nao03], which has been shown to be necessary in order to construct succinct
non-interactive argument systems that are secure in the standard model in [GW11],
or equivalently (as shown in [BCCT12]) extractable collision-resistant hash functions
such our construction from Section 3.2. In practice, this means that an assumption
of this type is necessary for our construction of Section 3.2. More recently, there
have appeared impossibility results for knowledge assumptions with arbitrary aux-
iliary inputs [BCPR14, BP04]. The above formulation of q-PKE is not disallowed
by these results, as stated (i.e., versus uniform poly-size adversaries) which means
that our construction from Section 3 does not suffer from the above impossibility
results. Alternatively, we could have defined it with separate auxiliary inputs for
the adversary and the extractor, of bounded sizes and coming from specific benign
distributions. However, in the context of proving the security of our construction
from Chapter 3, we do not need auxiliary input for extraction, therefore we chose
this version.
2.3 Bilinear accumulator
A bilinear accumulator [Ngu05] succinctly and securely represents a set of elements
from Zp, operating in the setting of bilinear groups. It represents any set A of n
elements from Zp by its accumulation value, namely
acc(A) = g
∏
a∈A(s+a) ∈ G ,
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i.e., a single element in G, where s ∈ Zp is trapdoor information that is kept secret.
Note that, given values g, gs, . . . , gs
n
(and without revealing the trapdoor s), acc(A)
can be computed in time O(n log n) with polynomial interpolation.
Under the q-SBDH assumption, the bilinear accumulator provides two security
properties: (1) The accumulation function acc(·) is collision resistant [Ngu05] (i.e.,
it is computationally hard to find different sets with equal accumulation values);
and (2) it allows for reliable verification of subset containment [PTT11] using short
computational proofs; namely, subject to acc(A), the proof for relation B ⊆ A is
defined as the subset witness WB,A = g
∏
a∈A\B(s+a). That is, the relation B ⊆ A can
be efficiently validated via checking the equality e(WB,A, g
∏
b∈B(s+b))
?
= e(acc(A), g)
given accumulation value acc(A), set B and public values g, gs, . . . , gs
`
, where q is
an upper bound on A’s size n. However, it is hard to produce a fake subset witness
that is verifiable when B ⊆ A is false.
The following lemma formally captures the security property of the bilinear ac-
cumulator that will be crucial for the security of our schemes.
Lemma 1 (Security of bilinear accumulator [Ngu05, PTT11]). Let pub ←
GenBilinear(1λ) be a tuple of bilinear pairing parameters and s ∈ Z∗p chosen uniformly
at random. Under the q-SBDH assumption, no poly-size adversary can, upon input
(pub, g, gs, . . . , gs
q
) output sets A,B with elements in Zp and W ∈ G, such that: (i)
B * A, and (ii) e(W, acc(B)) = e(acc(A), g), except with negligible probability.
Chapter 3
Verifiable Set Operations
3.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the problem of general set operations in the outsourced
setting. We consider a dataset D that consists of m sets S1, ..., Sm, where the
clients’ queries are arbitrary set operations over D represented as formulas of union,
intersection, and set difference gates over some selection of the sets S1, ..., Sm.
The motivation for set operations comes from their great expressiveness and the
range of computations that can be mapped by them. Real-world applications of
general set operations include a wide class of SQL database queries, authenticated
keyword search with elaborate queries, access control management, and similarity
measurement, hence an efficient protocol would be of great importance.
3.1.1 Overview of result
We construct a scheme for publicly verifiable secure delegation of set operations. The
main advantage of our scheme over general-purpose VC is that it does not involve
translating the problem to an arithmetic or boolean circuit, which greatly limits all
overheads. This especially important for set operations as a circuit that computes
such an operation (e.g., a union of two sets) must either perform a quadratic in the
input size number of equality tests, or incorporate a sorting network that first sorts
the input sets and then compares the element. The latter approach entails a large
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concrete cost as such a sorting network requires many gates for its implementation.
On the other hand, during roof construction in our scheme the server will need
to perform only 4N exponentiations in a group with a symmetric bilinear pairing,
where N is the sum of the sizes of all the intermediate sets in the evaluation of the
set formula. Keep in mind that the cost to simply compute the result is O(N), which
highlights that our scheme not only introduces a very small asymptotic overhead,
but the hidden constants are particularly small. Moreover, the verification state
is of constant size, and the proof verification time is O(δ + t) where t is the size
of the query formula and δ is the answer set size. The dependence on the answer
size is inherent since the client must receive the answer set from the server, i.e., the
achieved overheads is, in a sense, optimal. We stress that the verification time (and
proof length) do not grow with the sizes of all other sets involved in the computation.
Our scheme also supports two types of updates: source updates and server-
assisted updates. In a source update, the data owner maintains an an additional
update state of length O(m) (m is the number of sets in the dataset) and it can add
or remove a single element to a set in constant time. He then updates the server and
all other clients with a new verification state. A source update does not require any
party to compute any proofs. Server-assisted updates are used to perform updates
that change a large number of elements in the dataset and are discussed in more
detail in Section 3.5. The basic idea is for the owner to delegate the update to the
server (as in [CKLR11]). The owner can set the value of every set by applying a
set operation formula to the current state of the dataset. The answer to a server-
assisted update query includes a new verification state and a proof that the update
was performed correctly. Verifying this proof with the old verification state requires
the same time as verifying informational queries and the owner does not need to
store any update state (indeed, the owner does not even need to store the dataset).
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While this is a more involved process compared to source updates, it has the big
benefit of allowing the owner to delegate the storage of the dataset entirely to the
server, i.e., he does not need to maintain a local copy anymore.
3.1.2 Overview of techniques
The starting point for the construction is the scheme of Papamanthou, Tamassia
and Triandopoulos [PTT11] that supports a single set operation (one union or one
intersection). For a query consisting of a single union or intersection over t sets, where
the answer set is of size δ, the proof verification time in the scheme of [PTT11] is
O(t + δ). The “naive” way to extend the scheme of [PTT11] to support general set
operation formulas is to have the server provide a separate proof for each intermediate
set produced in the evaluation of the formula. However, proving the security of this
construction is problematic. The problem is that in the scheme of [PTT11] the
proofs do not necessarily compose. In particular, it might be easy for a malicious
server to come up with a false proof corresponding to an incorrect answer set without
“knowing” what this incorrect answer is (if the malicious server would be able to also
find the answer set, the scheme of [PTT11] would not have been secure). Therefore,
to make the security proof of the naive scheme go through, the server would also
have to prove to the client that he “knows” all the intermediate sets produced in the
evaluation of the query formula. One way for the server to prove knowledge of these
sets is to send them to the client, however, this will result in a proof that is as long
as the entire server computation.
Knowledge accumulators. To solve this problem we need to further understand
the structure of the proofs in [PTT11]. The construction of [PTT11] is based on the
notion of a bilinear accumulator [Ngu05]. We can think of a bilinear accumulator
as a succinct hash of a large set that makes use of a representation of a set by its
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characteristic polynomial (i.e., a polynomial that has as roots the set elements). Ac-
cumulators have homomorphic properties that allow verifying relations between sets
via checking arithmetic relations between their accumulators. The main idea in this
work is to use a different type of accumulator that has “knowledge” properties. That
is, the only way for an algorithm to produce a valid accumulation value is to “know”
the set that corresponds to that value. The knowledge property of our accumula-
tor together with the soundness of the proof for every single operation (one union,
intersection, or set difference) allows us to prove the soundness of the composed
scheme. Our construction of knowledge accumulators is very similar to previous
constructions of knowledge commitments in [BCCT12, Gro10]. The construction is
based on the q-PKE assumption which is a variant of knowledge-of-exponent as-
sumption [Dam91]. We capture the knowledge properties of our accumulator by
using the notion of an extractable collision-resistant hash function (ECRH), origi-
nally introduced in [BCCT12].3
We also need to modify the way a single set operation is proven. For example,
in [PTT11], a proof for a single union of sets requires one accumulation value for
every element in the union. This will again result in a proof that is as long as the
entire server computation. Instead, we change the proof for union so it only involves
a constant number of accumulation values.
The verification state and accumulation trees. In order to verify a proof in
our scheme, a client only needs to know the accumulation values for the sets that
participate in the computation. Instead of containing the accumulation values of all
sets in the dataset, the digest contains a single special hash of these accumulation
values, making it of constant size. To produce this digest, we hash the accumulation
3We follow the weaker definition of ECRH with respect to auxiliary input, for which the recent
negative evidence presented in [BCPR14] does not apply and the distributions we consider here are
not captured by the negative result of [BP15] either.
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values of the sets in the dataset using an accumulation tree, introduced in [PTT08].
This primitive can be thought of as a special “tree hash” that makes use of the
algebraic structure of the accumulators to gain in efficiency(authentication paths are
of constant length).
3.1.3 Prior work
The work of [BFR13a] also considers a practical secure database delegation scheme
supporting a restricted class of queries. They consider functions expressed by arith-
metic circuits of degree up to 2. Their construction is based on homomorphic MAC’s
and their protocol has reasonable performance (e.g., if the computation is described
as an arithmetic circuit, the proof computation is less that 3 ms per gate), how-
ever their solution is only privately verifiable and it does not support deletions from
the dataset. Additionally, we note that the security proof in [BFR13a] is not based
on non-falsifiable assumptions. In a sense, that work is complementary to ours, as
arithmetic and set operations are two desirable classes of computations for a database
outsourcing scheme.
With respect to set operations, previous works focused mostly on the aspect of
privacy and less on the aspect of integrity [FNP04, ACT11, KS05, BW07]. There
exists a number of works from the database community that address this problem
[MND+04, YPPK09a], but to the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that
directly addresses the case of nested operations.
Characteristic polynomials for set representation have been used before in the
cryptography literature (see for example [PTT11, Ngu05]) and this directly relates
this work with a line of publications coming from the cryptographic accumulators
literature [CL02a, Ngu05]. Indeed our ECRH construction, viewed as a mathematical
object, is identical to a pair of bilinear accumulators (introduced in [Ngu05]) with
related secret key values. Our ECRH can be viewed as an extractable extension to
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the bilinear accumulator that allows an adversarial party to prove knowledge of a
subset to an accumulated set (without explicitly providing said subset). Indeed, this
idea is central to all of our proofs for validity of set operation computations. It also
allows us to use the notion of accumulation trees which was originally defined for
bilinear accumulators.
Our work also highlights the relation between bilinear accumulators and com-
mitment schemes originally captured in [KZG10]. In that work, commitments for
polynomials over Zp[x] are constructed, by essentially the same mathematical op-
eration used to compute accumulation values. Moreover, in [Gro10] a commitment
scheme for polynomially many values is presented, again using essentially the same
mathematical operation (with an additional blinding factor). An inherent distinc-
tion between the two primitives comes from the different frameworks. In the case
of polynomial commitment schemes, a committer wishes to produce a commitment
which he will later open to a receiver, whereas accumulation values operate as “con-
tinuous” commitments to a particular set, for which a prover wishes to prove subset
and set membership relations. In particular, there is no explicit hiding property re-
quired by an accumulator. However, there is an interesting duality between the two
primitives at a mathematical construction level, which we believe can be exploited
further. In a sense, polynomial commitments are commitments to the coefficients of
a polynomial, whereas accumulation values operate as commitments to the roots of
the characteristic polynomial of a set.
3.2 Extractable collision-resistant hash functions
These functions (or ECRH for short) were introduced in [BCCT12] as a strengthening
of the notion of collision-resistant hash functions. The key property implied by an
ECRH, on top of collision-resistance, is the hardness of oblivious sampling from the
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image space. Informally, for a function h, sampled from an ECRH function ensemble,
any adversary producing a hash value η must have knowledge of a value x ∈ Dom(h)
s.t. h(x) = η. Formally, an ECRH function is defined as follows:
Definition 2 (Extractable collision-resistant hash function ensemble
(ECRH) [BCCT12]). Let d(λ), t(λ) be polynomial functions of λ. A function
ensemble H = {Hλ}λ∈N from {0, 1}d(λ) to {0, 1}t(λ) is an ECRH if:
Collision-resistance For any poly-size adversary A:
Pr
h←Hλ
[
x, x′ ← A(1λ, h) s.t. h(x) = h(x′) ∧ x 6= x′
]
≤ ν(λ) .
Extractability For any poly-size adversary A, there exists poly-size extractor E
such that:
Pr
h←Hλ
[
y ← A(1λ, h);x′ ← E(1λ, h)
s.t. ∃x : h(x) = y ∧ h(x′) 6= y
]
≤ ν(λ) .
An ECRH construction from q-PKE. We next provide an ECRH construction
from the q-PKE assumption defined above. In [BCCT12] the authors provide an
ECRH construction from an assumption that is conceptually similar and can be
viewed as a simplified version of q-PKE and acknowledge that an ECRH can be
constructed directly from q-PKE (without explicitly providing the construction).
Here we present the detailed construction and a proof of the required properties
with respect to q-PKE for extractability and q-SBDH for collision-resistance.4
• To sample from Hl, choose q ∈ O(poly(λ)), run algorithm GenBilinear(1λ) to
generate bilinear pairing parameters pub = (p,G,GT , e, g) and sample a, s←R
Z∗p × Z∗p s.t. a 6= s. Output public key pk = (pub, gs, ..., gsq , ga, gas, ..., gasq)
and trapdoor information sk = (s, a). It should be noted that the pk fully
describes the chosen function h. Trapdoor sk can be used for a more efficient
computation of hash values, by the party initializing the ECRH .
4It should be noted that while the construction from [BCCT12] is conceptually similar, its
collision resistance cannot be proven by a reduction to q-SBDH; it is instead provable with a
direct reduction to the computation of discrete logarithms in G.
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• To compute a hash value on x = (x1, ..., xq), output h(x) =(∏
i∈[q] g
xis
i
,
∏
i∈[q] g
axis
i
)
.
Lemma 2. If the q-SBDH and q-PKE assumptions hold, the above is a (2(q+ 1) ·
λ, 4λ+ 2)-compressing ECRH.
Proof: Extractability follows directly from the q-PKE assumption. To argue about
collision-resistance, assume there exists adversary A outputting with probability ,
(x,y) such that there exists i ∈ [q] with xi 6= yi and h(x) = h(y). We denote
with P (r) the q-degree polynomial from Zp[r],
∑
i∈[q](xi − yi)ri. From the above, it
follows that
∑
i∈[q] xis
i =
∑
i∈[q] yis
i. Hence, while P (r) is not the 0-polynomial, the
evaluation of P (r) at point s is P (s) = 0 and s is a root of P (r). By applying a
randomized polynomial factorization algorithm as in [Ber71], one can extract the (up
to q) roots of P (r) with overwhelming probability, thus computing s. By randomly
selecting c ∈ Z∗p and computing β = g1/(c+s) one can output (c, e(g, β)), breaking the
q-SBDH with probability (1 − ′) where ′ is the negligible probability of error in
the polynomial factoring algorithm. Therefore any poly-size A can find a collision
only with negligible probability. For a security parameter λ, the input length is q+1
elements from Z∗p, each of which can be written with 2λ bits, whereas the output
is two elements in G, each of which can be represented in a compressed format by
its abscissa plus one bit to indicate the sign of the root of its ordinate, for a total of
4λ+ 2 bits. 2
One natural application for the above ECRH construction would be the compact
computational representation of polynomials from Zp[r] of degree ≤ q. A polyno-
mial P (r) with coefficients p0, ..., pq can be succinctly represented by the hash value
h(P ) = (f, f ′) =
(∏
i∈[q] g
pis
i
,
∏
i∈[q] g
apis
i
)
.
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3.3 Set representation with polynomials
Sets can be represented with polynomials, using the notion of characteristic polyno-
mial, e.g., as introduced in [FNP04, Ngu05, PTT11]. Given a setX = {x1, .., xm}, the
polynomial CX(r) =
∏m
i=1(xi+r) from Zp[r], where r is a formal variable, is called the
characteristic polynomial of X (when possible we will denote this polynomial simply
by CX). Characteristic polynomials constitute representations of sets by polynomials
that have the additive inverses of their set elements as roots. What is of particular
importance to us is that characteristic polynomials enjoy a number of homomorphic
properties w.r.t. set operations. For example, given sets A,B with A ⊆ B, it must
hold that CB|CA and given sets X, Y with I = X ∩ Y , CI = gcd(CX , CY ).
The following lemma characterizes the efficiency of computing the characteristic
polynomial of a set.
Lemma 3 ([PSaUCCSL76]). Given set X = x1, ..., xn with elements from Zp, char-
acteristic polynomial CX(r) :=
∑n
i=0 cir
i ∈ Zp[r] can be computed with O(n log n)
operations with FFT interpolation.
Note that, while the notion of a unique characteristic polynomial for a given set
is well-defined, from elementary algebra it is known that there exist many distinct
polynomials having as roots the additive inverses of the elements in this set. In
particular, recall that multiplication of a polynomial in Zp[r] with an invertible unit
in Z∗p (a scalar) leaves the roots of the resulting polynomial unaltered. We define the
following:
Definition 3. Given polynomials P (r), Q(r) ∈ Zp[r] with degree n, we say that they
are associates (denoted as P (r) ≈a Q(r)) iff P (r)|Q(r) and Q(r)|P (r).
Thus, associativity can be equivalently expressed by requesting that P (r) =
βQ(r) for some β ∈ Z∗p.
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Note that although polynomial-based set representation provides a way to verify
the correctness of set operations by employing corresponding properties of the char-
acteristic polynomials, it does not provide any computational speedup for this veri-
fication process. Intuitively, verifying operations over sets of cardinality n, involves
dealing with polynomials of degree n with associated cost that is proportional to
performing operations directly over the sets themselves. We overcome this obstacle,
by applying our ECRH construction (which can be naturally defined over univariate
polynomials with coefficients in Zp, as already discussed) to the characteristic polyno-
mial CX : Set X will be succinctly represented by hash value h(CX) =
(
gCX(s), gaCX(s)
)
(parameter q is an upper bound on the cardinality of sets that can be hashed), and
an operation of sets X and Y will be optimally verified by computing only on hash
values h(CX) and h(CY ).
A note on extractability. In the above, we are essentially using a pre-processing
step representing sets as polynomials, before applying the extractable hash function
on the polynomial representations. We cannot define the ECRH directly for sets
since, while every set has a uniquely defined characteristic polynomial, not every
polynomial is a characteristic polynomial of some set. Hence extractability of sets
(using only public key information) is not guaranteed. For example, an adversary
can compute an irreducible polynomial Y ∈ Zp[r], of degree > 1, and output h(Y ).
Since Y has no roots, no extractor (without access to the secret key) can output a
set for which Y is the characteristic polynomial (it can, however, extract polynomial
Y with overwhelming probability). In fact, defined directly over sets with elements
from Zp, the function ensemble {Hl}l with an internal computation of the char-
acteristic polynomial, can be shown to be extractable collision-resistant under the
ECRH2 definition recently introduced in [DFH12]. In the context of a cryptographic
protocol for sets, additional mechanisms need to be deployed in order to guarantee
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that a given hash value corresponds to the characteristic polynomial of some set. For
our ADS construction, we will combine the use of the ECRH construction for sets,
with an authentication mechanism deployed by the source in a pre-processing phase.
This will allow any client to verify the authenticity and freshness of the hash values
corresponding to sets that are input to its query.
3.4 An ADS for hierarchical set operations
Here we present an ADS supporting hierarchical set operations. We assume a data
structure D consisting of m sorted sets S1, ..., Sm, consisting of elements from Zp,5
where sets can change under element insertions and deletions; here, p is a λ-bit
prime number and λ is a security parameter. If M =
∑m
i=1 |Si|, then the total space
complexity needed to store D is O(m+M). The supported class of queries is any set
operation formula over a subset of the sets Si, consisting of unions and intersections.
The basic idea is to use the ECRH construction from Section 3.2 to represent
sets Si by the hash values h(CSi) of their characteristic polynomials. For the rest
of the paper, we will refer to value h(CSi) as hi, implying the hash value of the
characteristic polynomial of the i-th set of D or the i-th set involved in a query,
when it is obvious in the context. Recall that a hash value h consists of two group
elements, h = (f, f ′). We will refer to the first element of hi as fi, i.e., for a set
Si = (x1, ..., xn), fi = g
∏n
j=1(xj+s) and likewise for f ′i . For the authenticity of these
values, an authentication mechanism similar to Merkle trees (but allowing more
efficient updates) will be deployed by the source.
Each answer provided by the server is accompanied by a proof that includes a
number of hash values for all sets computed during answer computation, the exact
structure of which depends on the type of operations. The verification process is
5Actually elements must come from Z\{s, 1, ...,m}, because s is the secret key in our construc-
tion and the m smallest integers modulo p will be used for numbering the sets.
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essentially split into two parts. First, the client verifies the validity of the hash
values of the sets used as input by the answer computation process (i.e., the validity
of sets specified in q) and subsequently that the hash values included in the proof
respect the relations corresponding to the operations in q, all the way from the input
hash values to the hash value of the returned answer α. The key technique is that by
using our ECRH construction we can map relations between input and output sets in
a set operation, to similar relations in their hash values. This allows the verification
process to run in time independent of the cardinality of involved sets and only linear
to the length of q and α making it asymptotically as fast as simply reading the input
and output. In the following sections, we present the algorithms of our construction.
3.4.1 Setup and updates
During the setup phase, the source computes the m hash values h(CSi) of sets Si
and then deploys an authentication mechanism over them, that will provide proofs
of integrity for these values under some public digest that corresponds to the current
state of D. This mechanism should be able to provide proofs for statements of the
form “hi is hash of the i-th set of the current version of D.”
There is a wide variety of such mechanisms that can be deployed by the owner
of D and the choice must be made with optimization of a number of parameters in
mind, including digest size, proof size and verification time, setup and update cost
and storage size. For example, using a standard collision resistant hash function, the
owner can compute the hash of the string h1||...||hm as a single hash value. However,
a single update in D will require O(m) work in order to compute the updated digest
from scratch. On the other hand, the owner can use a digital signature scheme to
sign a hash representation of each set. This yields an update cost of O(1) (a single
signature computation) but the digest consists of m signatures.
Another popular authentication mechanism for proofs of membership are Merkle
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hash trees [Mer89] that provide logarithmic size proofs, constant time updates, and
a single value digest. Such a mechanism, allows the server to provide proofs that
a value hi belongs in the set of hash values of the sets in D. An alternative to
Merkle trees, introduced in [PTT08] (and specifically in the bilinear group setting
in [PTT11]) are accumulation trees. The difference between them is that their secu-
rity is based on different cryptographic assumptions (secure hashing versus bilinear
group assumptions) and, arguably more importantly, accumulation trees yield con-
stant size proofs (independently of the number of elements in the tree) and constant
time updates. Another useful property of the accumulation tree is that it can be
computed using the same ECRH construction we will be using for the rest of the
algorithms of our scheme. Thus, we can avoid the cost of additional public/secret
key generation and maintenance. In our construction, we use the accumulation tree
to verify the correctness of hash values for the sets involved in a particular query.
On a high level, the public tree digest guarantees the integrity of the hash values
and in turn the hash values validate the elements of the sets.
An accumulation tree AT is a tree with d1/e levels, where 0 <  < 1 is a
parameter chosen upon setup, and m leaves. Each internal node of T has degree
O(m) and T has constant height for a fixed . Intuitively, it can be seen as a “flat”
version of Merkle trees. Each leaf node contains the (first half of the) hash value of a
set Si and each internal node contains the (first half of the) hash of the values of its
children. Since, under our ECRH construction, hash values are elements in G we will
need to map these bilinear group elements to values in Z∗p at each level of the tree
before they can be used as inputs for the computation of hash values of higher level
nodes. This can be achieved by a function φ that outputs a bit level description of
hash values under some canonical representation of G (see below). The accumulation
tree primitive we are using here has been used in [PTT08, PTT11, PTT15] where
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the corresponding “hashing” function used was the bilinear accumulator construction
from [Ngu05]. We are implicitly making use of the fact that the outputs of our ECRH
construction can be interpreted as pairs of accumulation values of sets.
Now we present the setup and update algorithms or our ADS construction:
Algorithm {sk, pk} ←genkey(1l). The owner of D runs the sampling algorithm
for our ECRH construction, chooses an injective6 function φ : G \ {1G} → Z∗p, and
outputs {φ, pk, sk}.
Algorithm {auth(D0), d0} ← setup(D0, sk, pk). The owner of D computes values
fi = g
∏
x∈Si (xi+s) for sets Si. Following that, he constructs an accumulation tree AT
over values fi. A parameter 0 <  < 1 is chosen. For each node v of the tree, its
value d(v) is computed as follows. If v is a leaf corresponding to fi then d(v) = f
(i+s)
i
where the number i is used to denote that this is the i-th set in D (recall that,
by definition, sets Si contain elements in [m + 1, ..., p − 1]). Otherwise, if N(v) is
the set of children of v, then d(v) = g
∏
u∈N(v)(φ(d(u)+s) (note that the exponent is the
characteristic polynomial of the set containing the elements φ(d(u)) for all u ∈ N(v)).
Finally, the owner outputs {auth(D0) = f1, ..., ft, d(v) ∀v ∈ AT , d0 = d(r)} where r
is the root of AT .
Algorithm{auth(Dh+1), dh+1, upd} ← update(u, auth(Dh), dh, sk, pk). For the
case of insertion of element x in the i-th set, the owner computes x + s and
η = fx+si . For deletion of element x from Si, the owner computes (x + s)
−1 and
η = f
(x+s)−1
i . Let v0 be the leaf of AT that corresponds to the i -th set and
v1, ..., vd1/e the node path from v0 to r. Then, the owner sets d′(v0) = η and for
j = 1, ..., d1/e he sets d′(vj) = d(vj)(φ(d′(vj−1))+s)(φ(d(vj−1))+s)−1 . He replaces node val-
ues in auth(Dh) with the corresponding computed ones to produce auth(Dh+1). He
6The restriction that φ is injective is in fact too strong. In practice, it suffices that it is collision-
resistant. A good candidate for φ is a function that uses a CRHF to hash the bit-level description
of an element of G to Z∗p.
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then sets upd = d(v0), ..., d(r), x, i, b where b is a bit denoting the type of operation
and sends upd to server. Finally, he publishes updated digest dh+1 = d
′(r).
Algorithm {Dh+1, auth(Dh+1), dh+1} ← refresh(u,Dh, auth(Dh), dh, upd, pk). The
server replaces values in auth(Dh) with the corresponding ones in upd, dh with dh+1
and updates set Si accordingly.
The runtime of setup is O(m + M) as computation of the hash values using
the secret key takes O(M) and the tree construction has access complexity O(m)
for post-order traversal of the tree as it has constant height and it has m leaves.
Similarly, update and refresh have access complexity of O(1).
Remark 1. Observe that the only algorithms that make use of the trapdoor s are
update and setup when computing hash values. Note though, that both algorithms
can be efficiently executed without s (given only the public key).
3.4.2 Query responding and verification
As mentioned before, we wish to achieve two verification properties: integrity-of-
data and integrity-of-computation. We begin with our algorithms for achieving the
first property, and then present two protocols for achieving the second one, i.e., for
validating the correctness of a single set operation (union or intersection). These
algorithms will be used as subroutines by our final query responding and verification
processes.
Authenticity of hash values
We present two algorithms that make use of the accumulation tree deployed over the
hash values of Si in order to prove and verify that the sets used for answering are
the ones specified by the query description.
Algorithm pi ← QueryTree(pk, d, i, auth(D)) The algorithm computes proof of
membership for value xi validating that it is the i-th leaf of the accumulation tree.
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Let v0 be the i-th node of the tree an v1, ..., vd1/e be the node path from v0 to the root
r. For j = 1, ..., d1/e let γj = g
∏
u∈N(vj)\{vj−1}(φ(d(u))+s) (note that the exponent is the
characteristic polynomial of the set containing the elements φ(d(u)) for all u ∈ N(v)
except for node vj−1). The algorithm outputs pi := (d(v0), γ1), ..., (d(vd1/e−1), γd1/e).
Algorithm {0, 1} ← VerifyTree(pk, d, i, x, pi). The algorithm verifies member-
ship of x as the i-th leaf of the tree by checking the equalities: (i) e(d(v1), g) =
e(x, gigs); (ii) for j = 1, ..., d1/e − 1, e(d(vj), g) = e(γj, gφ(d(vj−1))gs); (iii) e(d, g) =
e(γd1/e, gφ(d(vd1/e−1))gs). If none of them fails, it output accept.
The above algorithms make use of the property that for any two polynomials
A(r), B(r) with C(r) := A(r) · B(r), for our ECRH construction it must be that
e(f(C), g) = e(f(A), f(B)). In particular for sets, this allows the construction of a
single-element proof for set membership (or subset more generally). For example,
for element x1 ∈ X = {x1, ..., xn) this witness is the value g
∏n
i=2(xi+s). Intuitively,
for the integrity of a hash value, the proof consists of such set membership proofs
starting from the desired hash value all the way to the root of the tree, using the
sets of children of each node. The following lemma (from [PTT11]; slightly informal
here) states the security of an accumulation tree:
Lemma 4 ([PTT11]). Under the q-SBDH assumption, for any adversarially chosen
proof pi s.t. {j, x∗, pi) s.t. VerifyTree(pk, d, j, x∗, pi)→ 1, it must be that x∗ is the j-th
element of the tree except for negligible probability. Algorithm QueryTree has access
complexity O(m logm) and outputs a proof of O(1) group elements and algorithm
VerifyTree has access complexity O(1).
Algorithms for the single operation case
The algorithms presented here are used to verify that a set operation was performed
correctly, by checking a number of relations between the hash values of the input and
output hash values, that are related to the type of set operation. The authenticity
of these hash values is not necessarily established. Since these algorithms will be
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called as sub-routines by the general proof construction and verification algorithms,
this property should be handled at that level.
Intersection. Let I = S1∩ ...∩St be the wanted operation. Set I is uniquely identi-
fied by the following two properties: (Subset) I ⊆ Si for all Si and (Complement
Disjointness) ∩ti=1(Si \ I) = ∅. The first captures that all elements of I appear in
all of Si and the second that no elements are left out.
Regarding the subset property, we argue as follows. Let X,S be sets s.t. S ⊆ X
and |X| = n. Observe that CS|CX , i.e. CX can be written as CX = CS(r)Q(r) where
Q(r) ∈ Zp[r] is CX\S. The above can be verified by checking the equality:
e(fS,W ) = e(fX , g) ,
where W = gQ(s). If we denote with Wi the values g
CSi\I(s), the subset property can
be verified by checking the above relation for I w.r.t each of Si.
For the second property, we make use of the property that CSi\I(r) are disjoint
for i = 1, ..., t if and only if there exist polynomials qi(r) s.t.
∑t
i=1 CSi\I(r)qi(r) = 1,
i.e. the gcd of the characteristic polynomials of the the complements of I w.r.t Si
should be 1. Based on the above, we propose the algorithms in Figure 3·1 for the
case of a single intersection.
Union. Now we want to provide a similar method for proving the validity of a
union operation of some sets. Again we denote set U = S1 ∪ ... ∪ St and let hi be
the corresponding hash values as above. The union set U is uniquely characterized
by the following two properties: (Superset) Si ⊆ U for all Si and (Membership)
For each element xi ∈ U , ∃j ∈ [t] s.t. xi ∈ Sj. These properties can be verified, with
values Wi, wj for i = 1, ...t and j = 1, ..., |U | defined as above checking the following
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Algorithm{Π, fI} ← proveIntersection(S1, ..., St, I, h1, ..., ht, hI , pk).
1. Compute values Wi = g
CSi\I(s).
2. Compute polynomials qi(r) s.t.
∑t
i=1 CSi\I(r)qi(r) = 1 and values Fi = gqi(s).
3. Let Π = {(W1, F1), ..., (Wt, Ft)} and output {Π, fI}.
Algorithm{accept,reject} ← verifyIntersection(f1, ..., ft,Π, fI , pk).
1. Check the following equalities. If any of them fails output reject, otherwise accept:
• e(fI ,Wi) = e(fi, g) ∀i = 1, ..., t
• ∏ti=1 e(Wi, Fi) = e(g, g)
Figure 3·1: Algorithms for proving and verifying a single intersection
equalities (assuming hU is the hash value of U):
e(fi,Wi) = e(fU , g) ∀i = 1, ..., t
e(gxjgs, wj) = e(fU , g) ∀j = 1, ..., |U | .
The problem with this approach is that the number of equalities to be checked for
the union case is linear to the number of elements in the output set. Such an ap-
proach would lead to an inefficient scheme for general operations (each intermediate
union operation the verification procedure would be at least as costly as computing
that intermediate result). Therefore, we are interested in restricting the number of
necessary checks. In the following we provide a union argument that achieves this.
Our approach stems from the fundamental inclusion-exclusion principle of set
theory. Namely for set U = A ∪ B it holds that U = (A + B) \ (A ∩ B) where
A+B is a simple concatenation of elements from sets A,B (allowing for multisets),
or equivalently, A + B = U ∪ (A ∩ B). Given the hash values hA, hB the above can
be checked by the bilinear equality e(fA, fB) = e(fU , fA∩B). Thus one can verify the
correctness of hU by checking a number of equalities independent of the size of U by
checking that the above equality holds. In practice, our protocol for the union of two
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sets consists of a proof for their intersection, followed by a check for this relation.
Due to the extractability property of our ECRH, the fact that hI is included in the
proof acts as a proof-of-knowledge by the prover for the set I, hence we can remove
the necessity to explicitly include I in the answer.
There is another issue to be dealt with. namely that this approach does not scale
well with the number of input sets for the union operation. To this end, we will
recursively apply our construction for two sets in pairs of sets until finally we have a
single union output. Let us describe the semantics of a set union operation over t sets.
For the rest of the section, without loss of generality, we assume ∃k ∈ N s.t. 2k = t,
i.e., t is a power of 2. Let us define as U
(1)
1 , ..., U
(1)
t/2 the sets (S1 ∪ S2), ..., (St−1 ∪ St).
For set U is holds that U = U1 ∪ ... ∪ Ut/2 due to the commutativity of the union
operation.
All intermediate results U
(j)
i will be represented by their hash values hU(j)i
yield-
ing a proof that is of size independent of their cardinality. One can use the intuition
explained above, based on the inclusion-exclusion principle, in order to prove the
correctness of (candidate) hash values h
U
(1)
i
corresponding to sets Ui and, following
that, apply repeatedly pairwise union operations and provide corresponding argu-
ments, until set U is reached. Semantically this corresponds to a binary tree T of
height k with the original sets Si at the t leafs (level 0), sets U
(1)
i as defined above
at level 1, and so on, with set U at the root at level k. Each internal node of the
tree corresponds to a set resulting from the union operation over the sets of its two
children nodes. In general we denote by U
(j)
1 , ..., U
(j)
t/2j
the sets appearing at level j.
We propose the algorithms in Figure 3·2 for proof construction and verification
for a single union.
Set difference. Finally, we present a protocol for the set difference operation. We
denote set X = S1 \ S2 and let h1, h2, hX be the corresponding hash values. For
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For ease of notation we denote by A,B the two sets corresponding to the children nodes of each
non-leaf node of T , by U, I their union and intersection respectively and by F the final union
output.
Algorithm{Π, fF } ←proveUnion(S1, ..., St, U, h1, ..., ht, hU , pk).
1. Initialize Π = ∅.
2. For each U
(j)
i of level j = 1, ..., k, corresponding to sets U, I as defined above, compute
U, I and values hU , hI . Append values hU , hI to Π.
3. For each U
(j)
i of level j = 1, ..., k, run algorithm proveIntersection(A,B, hA, hB , pk) to
receive (ΠI , fI) and append ΠI to Π. Observe that sets A,B and their hash values have
been computed in the previous step.
4. Output {Π, fF }. (hF has already been computed at step (2) but is provided explicitly
for ease of notation).
Algorithm{accept,reject} ← verifyUnion(f1, ..., ft,Π, fF , pk).
1. For each intersection argument {ΠI , fI} ∈ Π run verifyIntersection(fA, fB ,ΠI , fI , pk).
If for any them it outputs reject, output reject.
2. For each node of T check the equality e(fA, fB) = e(fU , fI). If any check fails, output
reject.
3. For each hash value hU ∈ Π check e(fU , ga) = e(f ′U , g) and likewise for values hI . If any
check fails output reject, otherwise accept.
Figure 3·2: Algorithms for proving and verifying a single union
characterizing the set difference X we use the following two properties: X ⊆ S1 and
X + (S1 ∩ S2) = S1. The former states that X is a subset of S1 whereas the latter
states that the X is the complement of the intersection of the two sets, with respect
to S1.
To prove these properties we take a similar approach as for the case of set union
above. Namely, we first provide a proof for the hash value hI of the intersection I of
the two sets. Given hI , the authenticated h1 and the claimed set difference hX , the
client can verify the correctness of the result by a checking a single pairing equation,
in a very similar manner as for the case of a union of two sets, discussed above. We
propose the algorithms in Figure 3·3 for proving and verifying a single set difference.
Complexity analysis of the algorithms. Let N =
∑t
i=1 |Si| and δ = |I| or |F |
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Algorithm{Π, fD} ← proveDifference(S1, S2, D, h1, h2, hD, pk).
1. Run algorithm proveDifference(S1, S2, h1, h2, pk) to receive (ΠI , fI). Append ΠI to Π.
2. Compute hI and append it to Π.
3. Output (Π, fD).
Algorithm{accept,reject} ← verifyDifference(f1, f2,Π, fD, pk).
1. Parse Π = ΠI , hI .
2. Run algorithm verifyIntersection(f1, f2,ΠI , fI , pk). If it outputs reject, output reject.
3. Check the following equalities. If any of them fails output reject, otherwise accept:
• e(fI , gα) = e(f ′I , g)
• e(fD, fI) = e(f1, g)
Figure 3·3: Algorithms for proving and verifying a single set differ-
ence
respectively, depending on the type of operations. For both cases, the runtimes of
the algorithms are O(N log2N log logN log t) for proof construction and O(t + δ)
for verification and the proofs contain O(t) bilinear group elements. A proof of the
complexity analysis for these algorithms can be found in Section 3.4.4.
It can be shown that these algorithms, along with appropriately selected proofs-
of-validity for their input hash values can be used to form a complete ADS scheme
for the case of a single set operation. Here however, these algorithms will be executed
as subroutines of the general proof construction and verification process for our ADS
construction for more general queries, presented in the next section.
Hierarchical sets operation queries
We now use the algorithms we presented in the previous subsection to define appro-
priate algorithms query, verify for our ADS scheme. A hierarchical set operations
computation can be abstracted as a tree, the nodes of which contain sets of elements.
For a query q over t sets S1, ..., St, corresponding to such a computation, each leaf
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of the tree T contains an input set for q and each internal node is related to a set
operation (union or intersection) and contains the set that results to applying this
set operation on its children nodes. Finally, the root of the tree contains the output
set of q. In order to maintain the semantics of a tree, we assume that each input
is treated as a distinct set, i.e., t is not the number of different sets that appear
in q, but the total number of involved sets counting multiples. An alternative way
to visualize this would be to interpret t as the length of the set operations formula
corresponding to q.7
Without loss of generality, assume q is defined over the t first sets of D. For
reasons of simplicity we describe the mode of operation of our algorithms for the
case where all sets Si are at the same level of the computation, i.e., all leafs of T
are at the same level. The necessary modifications in order to explicitly cover the
case where original sets occur higher in T , are implied in a straight forward manner
from the following analysis, since any set Si encountered at an advanced stage of
the process can be treated in the exact same manner as the sets residing at the tree
leafs. The algorithms for query processing and verification of our ADS scheme are
described in Figures 3·4 and 3·5.
Intuitively, with the algorithms from the previous section a verifier can, by check-
ing a small number of bilinear equations, gain trust on the hash value of a set com-
puted by a single set operation. Observe that, each prover’s algorithm “binds” some
bilinear group elements (the first parts of the input hash values) to a single bilinear
group element (the first part of the hash value of the output set). We made explicit
use of that, in order to create a proof of union for more than two sets in the previous
7More generally q can be seen as a DAG. Here, for simplicity of presentation we assume that
all sets Si participate only once in q hence it corresponds to a tree. This is not a limitation of our
model but to simplify the execution of the algorithms, every set encountered is treated uniquely.
This can incur a redundant overhead in the analysis, that is avoidable in practice (e.g., by not
including duplicate values in proofs).
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D is the most recent version of the data structure and auth(D), d be the corresponding au-
thenticated values and public digest. Let q be a set operation formula with nested unions,
intersections, and differences and T be the corresponding semantics tree. For each internal
node v ∈ T let R1, ..., Rtv denote the sets corresponding to its children nodes (tv = 2 for the
set difference case )and O be the set that is produced by executing the operation in v (union,
intersection, or difference) over Ri. Finally, denote by α = x1, ..., xδ the output set of the root
of T .
Algorithm {α,Π} ← query(q,D, auth(D), pk).
1. Initialize Π = ∅.
2. Compute proof-of-membership pii for value fi by running QueryTree(pk, d, i, auth(D))
for i ∈ [t] and append pii, fi to Π.
3. For each internal node v ∈ T (as parsed with a DFS traversal):
• Compute set O and its hash value hO = h(CO).
• If v corresponds to a set intersection, obtain Πv by running proveIntersec-
tion(R1, ..., Rt, h1, ..., ht, O, hO, pk). For each subset witness Wi ∈ Π corresponding
to polynomial CRi\O, compute values W˜i = gaCRi\O(s). Let Wv = {W1, ...,Wtv}.
Append Πv,Wv, hO to Π.
• If v corresponds to a set union, obtain Πv by running proveU-
nion(R1, ..., Rt, h1, ..., ht, O, hO, pk). Append Πv, hO to Π.
• If v corresponds to a set difference, obtain Πv by running proveDiffer-
ence(R1, R2, h1, h2, O, hO, pk). Append Πv, hO to Π.
4. Append to Π the coefficients (c0, ..., cδ) of the polynomial Cα (already computed at step
3 and output {α,Π)}.
Figure 3·4: Algorithm for proving general set operations
section. Here we generalize it, to be able to obtain similar proofs for hierarchical
queries containing intersections and unions. The proof for q is constructed by putting
together smaller proofs for all the internal nodes in T . Let Π be a concatenation of
single union and single intersection proofs that respect q, i.e., each node in T corre-
sponds to an appropriate type of proof in Π. The hash value of each intermediate
result will also be included in the proof and these values at level i will serve as inputs
for the verification process at level i+ 1. The reason the above strategy will yield a
secure scheme is that the presence of the hash values serves as a proof by a cheating
adversary that he has “knowledge” of the sets corresponding to these partial results.
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Let d be the latest public digest. Let q be a set operation formula with nested unions, intersec-
tions, and differences and T be the corresponding semantics tree. For each internal node v ∈ T
let R1, ..., Rtv denote the sets corresponding to its children nodes (tv = 2 for the set difference
case ), and let α = x1, ..., xδ denote the claimed answer set for q. Finally, for internal node
v ∈ T , let η1, ..., ηtv denote the hash values of its children node sets (η1, η2 for the set difference
case) ∈ Π (for internal nodes at level 1, the values ηi are the values fi).
Algorithm {accept,reject} ← verify(q, α,Π, d, pk).
1. Verify the validity of values fi. For each value fi ∈ Π run VerifyTree(pk, d, i, fi, pii). If
it outputs reject for any of them, output reject and halt.
2. For each internal node v ∈ T (as parsed with a DFS traversal):
• Check the equality e(fO, ga) = e(g, f ′O). If it does not hold, reject and halt.
• If v corresponds to a set intersection:
(a) Run verifyIntersection(η1, ..., ηtv ,Πv, fO, pk), If it outputs reject, output re-
ject and halt.
(b) For each pair Wi, W˜i ∈ Πv, check the equality e(Wi, ga) = e(W˜i, g). If any of
the checks fails, output reject and halt.
• If v corresponds to a set union, run verifyUnion(η1, ..., ηtv ,Πv, fO, pk). If it outputs
reject, output reject and halt.
• If v corresponds to a set difference, run verifyDifference(η1, η2,Πv, fO, pk). If it
outputs reject, output reject and halt.
3. Validate the correctness of coefficients c. Choose z ←R Z∗p and compare the values
δ∑
i=0
ciz
i and
δ∏
i=1
(xi + z). If they are not equivalent, output reject and halt.
4. Check the equality e(
δ∏
i=0
gcis
i
, g) = e(fα, g). If it holds output accept, otherwise reject.
Figure 3·5: Algorithm for verifying general set operations
If one of these sets is not honestly computed, the extractability property allows an
adversary to either attack the collision-resistance of the ECRH or break the q-SBDH
assumption directly, depending on the format of the polynomial used to cheat.
Observe that the size of the proof Π is O(t+ δ). This follows from the fact that
the t proofs pii consist of a constant number of group elements and Π is of size O(t)
since each of the O(|T |) = O(t) nodes participates in a single operation. Also, there
are δ coefficients bi therefore the total size of Π is O(t + δ). The runtime of the
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verification algorithm is O(t + δ) as steps 2,3 takes O(t) operations and steps 4,5
take O(δ). A detailed proof of the complexity analysis for these algorithms can be
found in Section 3.4.4.
3.4.3 Main result
We can now state the following theorem that is our main result.
Theorem 1. The scheme AHSO = {genkey, setup, query, verify, update, re-
fresh} is an ADS for queries q from the class of hierarchical set operations formulas
involving unions, intersections and set differences, of length polynomial in λ. It is
correct and secure under the q-SBDH and the q-PKE assumptions.
Proof: Correctness follows by close inspection of the algorithms above. We proceed
to prove the security of our scheme via a series of intermediate results. Let AADS
be an adversary for the AHSO scheme. Recall the AADS is given a public key
generated by genkey containing a description of an ECRH h. AADS then calls
setup with the parameter D0 and subsequently makes additional oracle calls to
the algorithms update, refresh, verify, proof, of AHSO. Finally, AADS outputs
{α,Π, q,Dk, auth(Dk), dk} where Π is a proof that contains images of the hash h.
We show that there exists an extractor E that except with negligible probability over
the choice of h, when E is given h, outputs a pre-image for every valid image of h in
Π. We cannot directly use the extraction property of the ECRH since the adversary
AADS is getting access to oracles for the algorithms of AHSO and we do not have
access to the code of these oracles. The idea of this proof is to use the fact that all the
algorithms of AHSO (except genkey) can be executed over the initial database D0
in polynomial time given only the public key h (see Remark 1), and therefore there
exists an adversary A′ADS that internally emulates A′ADS together with its oracles
and outputs the same as AADS. Let A′i be the adversary that emulates A′ADS and
outputs the i’th hash value hi in proof Π contained in the output of A′ADS. It follows
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from the properties of the ECRH that there exists an extractor Ei for A′i that outputs
a pre-image of hi whenever hi is indeed in the image of h. Therefore there exists a
single extractor E that outputs the pre-images for all valid hi’s with overwhelming
probability. Finally, observe that hash values hi are efficiently recognizable as pairs
of elements of G, and can be efficiently checked for validity by checking the equation
in GT , e(f, gα) = e(f ′, g).
As a building block for our proof, we prove the following lemma:
Lemma 5. If the q-SBDH assumption holds, then for any poly-size
adversary A that upon input pk outputs (S1, ..., St, O,Π, fO) s.t. (i)
verifyIntersection(f(CS1), ..., f(CSt),Π, fI , pk) (resp. verifyUnion,VerifyDifference)
accepts and (ii) f(CO) = fO, O = ∩ti=1Si (resp. O = ∪ti=1Si, it must be that
O = S1 \ S2) with all but negligible probability.
Proof: We examine the three cases separately.
Intersection. Let us assume that there exists A that outputs S1, ..., St, O,Π, fO s.t.
verifyIntersection accepts and O 6= I := ∩ti=1Si, with non-negligible probability. We
will construct an adversary A′ that breaks the q-SBDH assumption. For ease of
notation we denote CSi = Qi(r) and CO = P (r).
Since O 6= I, either it contains an element x s.t. x 6∈ I, or there exists element
x ∈ I s.t. x 6∈ O (or both happen at the same time). Let us deal with the first
case. Since x ∈ O ∧ x 6∈ I, there must exist set Sj s.t. x 6∈ Sj. Therefore for the
term (x + r) it is true that (x + r) 6 |Qj(r) and (x + r)|P (r). It follows that there
exist efficiently computable F (r), κ s.t. Qj(r) = (x + r)F (r) + κ. Also let H(r) be
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polynomial s.t. (x+ r)H(r) = P (r). The following equalities must hold:
e(fO,Wj) = e(fj, g)
e(g,Wj)
P (s) = e(g, g)Qj(s)
e(g,Wj)
(x+s)H(s) = e(g, g)(x+s)Qj(s)+κ(
e(g,W )H(s)e(g, g)−Qj(s)
)κ−1
= e(g, g)
1
x+s .
It follows that A′ can, by outputting the above value break the q-SBDH for point
x. Hence, this case can happen only with negligible probability.
It remains to deal with the second case, conditioned on the first not happening.
Namely, there exists x ∈ I that is omitted by answer O, i.e. O is a common subset
of Si but not the maximal one. There must exist x ∈ I s.t. x /∈ O therefore it must
be that x ∈ (Si \O) for all i = 1, ..., t. Let polynomials Ri(r) = CSi\O. Observe that
because the verifier accepts, it must be that e(g,Wi) = e(g, g)
Qi(s), hence Wi = g
Ri(s).
From the above it must hold that Ri(r) = (x + r)R
′
i(r) for some R
′
i(r) ∈ Z[r]. The
following must be true:
t∏
i=1
e(Wi, Fi) = e(g, g)(
t∏
i=1
e(gR
′
i(s), Fi)
)x+s
= e(g, g)
t∏
i=1
e(gR
′
i(s), Fi) = e(g, g)
1
x+s .
From the above, A′ can break the q-SBDH assumption for point x. It follows that
O is the maximal common subset of Si’s with all but negligible probability.
If we denote the two cases as E1, E2, we showed that Pr[E1],Pr[E2|Ec1] are negli-
gible probabilities. Since E1, E2 cover all possible cheating adversary strategies, the
claim follows by a simple union bound.
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Union. Let us assume that there exists A that outputs S1, ..., St, O,Π, fO s.t. ver-
ifyUnion accepts and O 6= U := ∩ti=1Si, with non-negligible probability. We will
construct an adversary A′ that either finds a collision in h, or breaks the q-SBDH
assumption. For ease of notation we denote CSi = Qi(r) and CO = P (r). We begin
by providing a proof for t = 2, i.e., a union of two sets A ∪B.
Upon receiving the output from A, adversary A′ runs the extractor EA (the
existence of which is guaranteed by our analysis in the start of the proof of Theorem 1)
for value hI∗ ∈ Π to receive polynomial R(r) s.t. gR(s) = hI∗ with overwhelming
probability.
Claim 1. R(r) ≈a CI where I = A ∩B, with all but negligible probability.
Proof of Claim. The following two relations must hold:
e(g,WA)
R(s) = e(g, g)QA(s)
e(g, g)QA(s)·QB(s) = e(g, g)R(s)·P (s).
First we will prove that R(r) can be written as a product of degree 1 polynomials.
Assume there exists irreducible polynomial R′(r) of degree> 1 and polynomial J(r)
s.t. R(r) = R′(r)J(r). It follows that R(r)P (r) 6= QA(r)QB(r) (since only one of
them has irreducible terms of degree greater than 1), however from the above equality
h(R(r)P (r)) = h(QA(r)QB(r)) therefore by outputting R(r) ·P (r), QA(r) ·QB(r) (in
coefficient form), A′ finds a collision in the ECRH. This can happen with negligible
probability hence R(r) can be written as a product of degree 1 polynomials with all
but negligible probability.
From this it follows that A′ can, by running a probabilistic polynomial factoriza-
tion algorithm, find roots xi s.t. R(r) = β
∏
i∈[deg(R)](xi + r). Note that upon input
polynomial R(r), value β can be efficiently computed correctly by a polynomial fac-
torization algorithm, with all but negligible probability, and the value β−1 is also
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computable efficiently since p is a prime.
Let X be the set containing the additive inverses of the roots xi
8 and ob-
serve that CX = β
∏
i∈[deg(R)](xi + r). If X 6= I, A′ can output {A,B,X, P i∗ =
(hβ
−1
X ,W
β
A,W
β
B, F
β−1
A , F
β−1
B )}. It is easy to verify that the above is satisfying proof
for the claim that X = A ∩ B (i.e., verifyIntersection accepts), while X 6= I. By
our previous analysis for the intersection case, this can only happen with negligible
probability. This concludes the proof of the claim. 
Consequently, the following must be true:
e(g, g)QA(s)QB(s) = e(g, g)R(s)P (s)
e(g, g)
∏
x∈A(x+s)
∏
x∈B(x+s) = e(g, g)P (s)β
∏
x∈A∩B(x+s)
e(g, g)
∏
x∈A∪B(x+s) = e(g, g)βP (s).
In case polynomials CA∪B and βP (r) are not equivalent, due to the above equality A
can by outputting them find a collision in the ECRH. Therefore it must be that with
overwhelming probability βP (r) = CU . Again, if β 6= 1 then the two polynomials
form a collision for the ECRH, therefore with all but negligible probability, O = U .
Let us now turn our attention to the case of a generalized union over k sets
(assume wlog that k is a power of 2). Consider the binary tree T that captures this
union operation as described in Section 3.4.2. Observe that this tree consists only
of O(poly(λ)) nodes (2t − 1 in practice) hence A′ can efficiently run an extractor
for all intermediate hash values corresponding to internal nodes of T (as per our
former analysis) to compute the related polynomials correctly, with overwhelming
probability.
8The case where X has a root that is also a root of I but with cardinality > 1 can easily be
dealt with as follows. Since the term (x+ s) appears in the exponent in both sides of the bilinear
relation, A′ can remove it from both hands, until at the end it remains only in one of them. After
that happens, the consequent analysis holds. Similar argument can be made for the union case thus
in the following we skip this part of the analysis.
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We will prove that the polynomial CO(r), corresponding to hO, is an associate
of CU by showing that this is true for all intermediate polynomials and their corre-
sponding sets. We will do this by an induction on the levels of T .
level-1 Let P
(1)
i (r) be the extracted polynomials for all first level nodes. Let us
assume that there exists node v in the first level such that P (r) := P
(1)
v (r) 6≈a
C
U
(1)
i
where U
(1)
i is the corresponding correct union of its two children nodes.
With a similar argument as above, P (r) can be written as a product of de-
gree 1 polynomials with all but negligible probability (otherwise a collision
in the ECRH can be found). Let X be the set containing the additive in-
verses of the roots xi of P (r). It follows that P (r) = βCX for some effi-
ciently computable β ∈ Z∗p. Similar as above, if X 6= U (1)i , A′ can output
{A,B,X,Π∗ = (hβ−1X , hβI ,W β
−1
A ,W
β−1
B , F
β
A, F
β
B)}. It is easy to verify that this
consists a satisfying proof for the claim A ∪ B = X, which by our previous
analysis can happen with negligible probability and the claim follows.
level-j Assuming that this holds for the polynomials on level j we will show that
it also holds for level j + 1. Let us assume that this not the case. It follows
that there must exist node v of the tree on level j + 1 the children of which
have extracted polynomials QA(r), QB(r), the corresponding extracted output
polynomial is P (r) and the corresponding extracted polynomial for the inter-
section be H(r). Assuming P (r) is not an associate of CU we will construct an
adversary that finds a collision in the ECRH similar to above.
By assumption, QA(r) = βA
∏
i∈[|A|](xi + r) and likely for QB(r) (recall that
these are associate polynomials of the correctly computed corresponding set at
level j) for sets A,B. If P (r) contains an irreducible factor of degree > 1, our
previous analysis shows that a collision for the ECRH is found.
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Therefore P (r) can be written as a product of degree 1 polynomials and
a scalar and there exist an efficiently computable set X and β ∈ Z∗p s.t.
P (r) = βCX . Similar as above, if X 6= A ∪ B, A′ can output {A,B,X,Π∗ =
(hβ
−1
X , h
β/βA·βB
I ,W
βB
A ,W
βA
B , F
β−1B
A , F
β−1A
B )}. It is easy to verify that this consists
a satisfying proof for the claim A∪B = X, which by our previous analysis can
happen with negligible probability and the claim follows.
Since this holds for every node of level j+1, this concludes our induction proof.
Hence with all but negligible probability, the claim holds for the value hO. As per
the intersection case, it must be that with all but negligible probability O = U .
Set Difference. The argumentation for this case follows in a relatively straight
forward manner from our treatment for the union case. Let us assume that there
exists A that outputs S1, S2, O,Π, fO s.t. verifyDifference accepts and O 6= X :=
S1\S2, with non-negligible probability. We will construct an adversary A′ that either
finds a collision in h, or breaks the q-SBDH assumption. For ease of notation we
denote CSi = Qi(r) for i = 1, 2 and CO = P (r).
Upon receiving the output from A, adversary A′ runs the extractor EA for value
hI∗ ∈ Π to receive polynomial R(r) s.t. gR(s) = hI∗ with overwhelming probability.
From Claim 1 above, it follows that, with all but negligible probability, R(r) ≈a CI
where I = S1 ∩ S2.
Since verifyDifference accepts, the following must hold:
e(g, g)P (s)R(s) = e(g, g)Q1(s)
e(g, g)βP (s)
∏
x∈S1∩S2 (x+s) = e(g, g)
∏
x∈S1 (x+s)
e(g, g)βP (s) = e(g, g)
∏
x∈S1\S2 (x+s).
In case polynomials CS1\S2 and βP (r) are not equivalent, due to the above equality A
can by outputting them find a collision in the ECRH. Therefore it must be that with
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overwhelming probability βP (r) = CX . Again, if β 6= 1 then the two polynomials
form a collision for the ECRH, therefore with all but negligible probability, O = X. 2
For the proof of our main result we make use of Lemmas 5 and 4. Let AADS be a
poly-size adversary that upon input the public key pk of our ECRH construction, is
given oracle access to all algorithms of AHSO. AADS picks initial state D0 for the
data structure and computes auth(D0), d0 through oracle access to setup. Conse-
quently he chooses a polynomial number of updates and with oracle access to update
computes Di+1, auth(D0), di+1 for i = 0, ..., h. Also, he receives oracle access to al-
gorithms query,verify,refresh. Finally, AADS outputs {α′,Π, q,Dk, auth(Dk), dk}
where k is between 0 and h + 1 and denotes the snapshot of the data structure
to which the query q is to be applied. We want to measure the probability that
verify(α′,Π, q, pk, dk) outputs accept and algorithm check(Dk, q, α′) outputs reject
(i.e., α′ is not equal to the set produced by applying operations in q on dataset Dk).
Assuming AADS can succeed in the above game with non-negligible probability
, we will use him to construct A′ that finds a collision in the ECRH with non-
negligible probability. A′ works as follows. Upon input pk of ECRH, he sends
it to AADS. Following that, he provides oracle interface to A. Finally, he receives
{α′,Π, q,Dk, auth(Dk), dk} fromA and runs corresponding extractor EAADS to receive
hash pre-images for all hash vales in Π.
Let S1, ..., St be the sets in Dk over which q is defined (t = 2 for the case of set
difference). First A′ computes honestly q over Si, and receives the correct output α
and all intermediate sets. Then he runs verify on the received tuple and checks if
α 6= α. If verification fails or α = α′ he aborts (i.e. he only proceeds if AADS wins
the ADS game). Following that, A′ checks if f(CSi) = fi for i = 1, ..., t. If any of the
checks fails, he aborts. Then A′ compares the correctly computed set for each node
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v ∈ T and the corresponding extracted polynomial which we denote by Pv(r). Given
polynomial Pv(r) for each node, A′ checks if it is an associate polynomial of the
characteristic polynomial of the corresponding honestly computed set. If this does
not hold for some node v, he aborts. Finally, he outputs the pair of polynomials
Proot(r), Cα′ .
First, note that A′ runs in time polynomial in the security parameter, since
both AADS and EAADS run in polynomial time, the set computations can be done in
polynomial time and polynomial associativity is also decidable in polynomial time
by long division. Regarding, his success probability in finding a collision we argue
as follows.
Let E ′ be the event that A′ succeeds in finding a collision and B the event that
AADS wins the ADS game. By assumption Pr[B] >  for non-negligible , a function
of λ. Observe that, conditioned on not aborting, the probability of A′ to find a
collision is at least (1 − ν∗(λ)) where ν∗(λ) is the sum of the negligible errors in
the output of the extractor and the randomized factorization algorithm, which by a
union bound is an upper bound for the total error probability. This holds because,
since A′ did not abort, the verification succeeded and AADS provided a false answer
which implies that the polynomials output are not equivalent yet they have the same
hash values. Overall Pr[E ′] = Pr[E ′|¬abort] Pr[¬abort] ≥ (1− ν∗(λ)) Pr[¬abort].
Let EV be the event that verify accepts during the first step of A′ and α 6= α′.
Also, let E1 be the event that all f(CSi) = fi for i = 1, ..., t given that verify accepts
and E2 be the event that all extracted polynomials are of the form Pv(r) ≈a CO also
given that verify accepts. Also, let E3 be the event that the polynomials Cα∗(r) and∑δ−1
i=0 cir
i are equivalent given that verify accepts. By Lemma 4, Pr[E1] > 1− ν1(λ)
and Pr[E3] > 1− ν3(λ) since, by the Schwartz-Zippel lemma [Sch80], the probability
that two non-equivalent polynomials of degree δ agree on a point chosen uniformly
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at random is ≤ d/2l in this case, which is negligible in λ. Also, by assumption
Pr[EV ] ≥ .
We argue about Pr[E2] as follows:
Claim 2. Pr[E2] > 1− ν2(λ) .
Proof of Claim. Equivalently, we will prove that for all internal nodes v ∈ T , with
corresponding extracted polynomial Pv(r), it must be that Pv(r) ≈a CO where O is
the correctly computed set corresponding to v when computing q over Si, with all
but negligible probability.
As in the proof of Lemma 5, we will prove this by an induction on the levels of
T (in fact, since T is not a balanced tree, the induction is over the nodes themselves
in the order they are accessed by a DFS traversal).
level-1 If the operation for v is an intersection, then if Pv(r) has a factor that is an
irreducible polynomial of degree > 1, then let Ri(r), R˜i(r) be the corresponding
extracted polynomials for the pair of values Wi, W˜i in the proof. Since the
verification process succeeds, it follows that e(fO,Wi) = e(fi, g). Since by
assumption, f(CRi) = fi, (slightly abusing the notation, we assume that Si =
Ri) it follows that the polynomials CRi(r), Pv(r) · R(r) form a collision for the
ECRH for some index i. On the other hand, if Pv(R) can be written as a
product of degree 1 polynomials, it follows that it can be written as βCX for
some set X and A′ could output appropriate proof for the claim ∩tvi=1Ri = X,
in the exact same manner as we demonstrated in proof of Lemma 5, which can
only happen with negligible probability and this concludes the base case of the
induction.
If the operation for v is a union, the claim immediately holds from our treatment
for the union case above, for the tree Tv corresponding to the union operations
defined in v over its children.
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Likewise, if v is a set difference immediately holds from our treatment for the
set difference case above.
general step Let us assume that the statement holds for all the children of node v,
we show it also holds for v. Assuming there exists such node v, we can separate
into two cases.
If the operation at v is an intersection, then letQ1(r), ..., Qtv(r) be the extracted
polynomials corresponding to its children nodes. By assumption Qi(r) = βiCOi
where Oi are the correctly computed sets up to that point according to q.
Similar as for the case for level-1, if Pv(r) contains a factor that is an irreducible
polynomial of degree > 1, A′ can find a collision in the ECRH. Therefore, with
all but negligible probability, Pv(r) can be written as βCX for some efficiently
computable set X = {x1, ..., x|X|)}. Hence A′ can output {O1, ..., Otv , X,Π∗ =
(hβ
−1
X ,W
β/βi
i , F
βi/β
i ; i = 1, ..., tv)}. It is easy to verify that the above is a
satisfying proof for the claim X = ∩tvi=1Oi which by Lemma 5 can happen with
negligible probability.
If the operation at v is a union, then we argue as follows. Let Tv be the tree
corresponding to the union operations defined in v over its children. Observe
that the only difference between this case and the case analyzed previously
in the proof of Lemma 5 is that the polynomials at the leafs of tree Tv are
not characteristic polynomials necessarily. However, by assumption, they are
polynomials of the form βiCOi where Oi are the correctly computed sets up to
that point according to q. A′ can produce a satisfying proof for an incorrect
set, in the exact same manner as described in the general step of our induction
proof for Claim 1 above. Hence, with all but negligible probability, Pv(r) ≈a CO,
which concludes our induction proof.
A similar treatment can be used if v is a set difference. Again, the extracted
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polynomials Q1(r), Q2(r) are, by the inductive assumption, of the form βiCOi
where Oi are the correctly computed sets up to that point according to q.
Similar to our treatment for the intersection case, if Pv(r) contains a factor
that is an irreducible polynomial of degree > 1, A′ can find a collision in the
ECRH. Therefore, with all but negligible probability, Pv(r) can be written as
βC ′X for some efficiently computable set X ′ = {x1, ..., x|X′|)}. Hence A′ can
output {O1, O2, X ′,Π∗ = (h′β−1X ,W β/βi1 , F βi/β1 ; i = 1, 2}. which is a satisfying
proof for the claim X ′ = S1 \S2 which by Lemma 5 can happen with negligible
probability.
Therefore, the claim follows. 
It follows by the way we defined these events that the overall abort probability
of A′ is (using a union bound) Pr[abort] ≤ Pr[EcV ] + Pr[Ec1] + Pr[Ec2] + Pr[Ec3] =
1 −  + ν ′(λ) where ν(λ)′ is the sum of the three negligible probabilities. Hence
Pr[¬abort] ≥ 1 − 1 −  + ν ′(λ) =  − ν ′(λ). We showed above that Pr[E ′] ≥
(1−ν∗(λ)) Pr[¬abort] ≥ (1−ν(λ)) (for an appropriately defined negligible function
ν(λ)) which is non-negligible. This contradicts the collision resistance of the ECRH
h and the security of AHSO follows. 2
Corollary 1. If the server maintains a list of m fresh proofs pi1, ..., pim for the validity
of values fi, refresh has complexity O(m
2 logm), in order to update the m proofs
pii affected by an update, and query has complexity O(N log
2N log logN log t+ t).
Corollary 2. In a two-party setting, where only the source issues queries, proofs
consist of O(t) elements.
For Corollary 1 the following modifications are made to the scheme:
• The server upon receiving D, authD, d, pk computes and stores m proofs
pi1, .., pim by running the algorithm VerifyTree for each value fi correspond-
ing to Si. These values are computed in time m
1+ logm.
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• Upon receiving a query request, the server performs t lookups to find the
corresponding proofs pii (instead of computing them on-the-fly) and includes
them in the proof.
• Upon receiving an update, modifying fi → f ∗i , let pi1, ..., pim) be the proofs
that corresponds to the value fi and its m
 − 1 siblings in the accumulation
tree. The server computes updated proofs pi∗1, ..., pi
∗
m by running QueryTree
m, hence this takes overall time m2 logm.
Likewise for Corollary 2:
• Upon receiving query q, the server runs query skipping step (4).
• Upon receiving α,Π, the source computes ∏δi=1(xi + s) in time O(δ) using the
secret key s. He then runs verify replacing steps (3),(4) with a single check of
the equality e(g
∏δ
i=1(xi+s), g) = e(fa, g).
3.4.4 Complexity analysis for the algorithms of the scheme
Recall that we are using the access complexity model and we are measuring primitive
operations in Z∗p ignoring a poly-logarithmic in λ cost for element representation and
group operations.
Intersection
This is the most complicated argument in terms of asymptotic analysis and it will
be useful for the consecutive ones, therefore we will provide an elaborate analysis.
The algorithm proveIntersection consists of the following steps:
1. Compute values Wi for i = 1, ..., t.
2. Compute polynomials qi(r).
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3. Compute values Fi.
For simplicity of presentation, we will assume without loss of generality that all t
sets have cardinality n and we denote N = tn. From Lemma 3 step (1) can be done
with
∑
i∈[t] n log n operations which can be bound by O(N logN).
9
For the greatest common divisor computation, we will be making use of the
extended Euclidean algorithm presented in [vzGG03] which, for two polynomials
a(r), b(r) of degree n runs in time O(n log2 n log log n). The algorithms outputs
three polynomials u(r), v(r), g(r) s.t. u(r)a(r) + v(r)b(r) = g(r) and g(r) is the
gcd(a(r), b(r)) and u, v are known as Be´zout coefficients of a, b. Observe that g(r) can
be at most of degree n and by the analysis of the algorithm, deg(u) < deg(b)−deg(g)
and deg(v) < deg(a) − deg(g). In our case, it is thus true that the degrees of poly-
nomials u, v, g are all upper bounded by n.
The gcd(P1, ..., Pt) can be recursively computed as
gcd(gcd(P1, ..., Pt/2), gcd(Pt/2+1, ..., P (t)) and this can be applied repeatedly all
the way to first computing the pairwise gcd of all consecutive pairs of polynomials
and following that the gcd of each pair of gcd′s all the way to the top. In order to
better analyze the complexity of step (2), let us introduce the following conceptual
construction that captures exactly this recursive approach. Let T be a binary tree
with polynomials CSi\I at the t leafs. Each internal node is associated with one
major polynomial which is the gcd of the major polynomials of its two children
nodes, and two minor polynomials, which are the corresponding Be´zout coefficients.
The tree must be populated (all polynomials of internal nodes computed) as follows.
For the nodes that are parents of leafs, compute the gcd of their children nodes
and the corresponding Be´zout coefficients. Following that, for each level of the tree
9A tighter bound would be O(N log n). However we do not wish to capitalize on the fact that
we assumed all sets are of the same size, since this is an assumption for ease of notation. Hence we
provide this more general bound.
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all the way up to the root, the nodes are populated by computing the gcd of the
gcd’s stored in their two children nodes. It follows that the root of T stores the
gcd(CS1\I , ..., CSt\I).
Let us now analyze how long it takes to populate the nodes of T . By the analysis
of the extended Euclidean algorithm, it follows that each of the nodes that are
parents of leafs can be populated in time O(n log2 n log log n). Since the degrees
of the gcd polynomials higher in T can only be lower, it follows that the same
bound holds for all nodes. Since there exist O(t) nodes, T can be populated in time
O(N log2N log logN).
Following that, we need to compute polynomials qi(r). Observe that each such
polynomial can be computed after populating T as the product of exactly O(log t)
polynomials each of which can be at most of degree n. We start by proving the
following.
Claim 3. Having populated T , all the polynomials qi(t) for i = 1, ..., t can be com-
puted by 2t− 2 polynomial multiplications.
Proof of Claim. We will prove the above by induction on the number of sets t.
For t = 2, having populated the tree, polynomials q1(r), q2(r) are already stored at
the root. Hence we need 2 · t− 2 = 0 multiplications. If this is true for t = j we will
show it is true for 2j. Observe that for two sibling sets, the polynomials qi(r), qi+1(r)
can be written as qi = h(r)u(r) an qi+1 = h(r)v(r) where u, v are the corresponding
Be´zout coefficients stored in their parent. The polynomials hk(r) for k = 1, ..., j (each
associated with one grand-parent node of the leafs in T ) can be computed with 2j−2
multiplications by the assumption. Hence each polynomial qi(r) can be computed
with one additional multiplication for a total of 2j additional multiplications. Thus
the overall number of multiplications to compute q1(r), ..., q2j(r) is 4j − 2 = 2t− 2,
which concludes our proof of the claim. 
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Since each of qi(r) can be at most of degree O(n log t), an upper bound on the
complexity of each of these multiplications is O((n log t) log(n log t)), by using fast
multiplication with FFT interpolation. By the above claim, there are O(t) such mul-
tiplications, therefore, the overall complexity for the computation of the polynomials
qi(r) is O(N logN log t log log t). Finally, the output of this procedure is the polyno-
mial coefficients of the qi’s hence the values Fi can be computed in time O(N log t)
since each qi has degree at most n log t. Since t ≤ N , from the above analysis the
overall complexity of proveIntersection is O(N log2N log logN).
Algorithm verifyIntersection consists of O(t) bilinear pairings. Finally, the size
of the proof Π is O(t) group elements (in practice 2t elements).
Union
We begin with the proof Π for a union of two sets A,B with cardinalities nA, nB
(denote N = nA+nB). The intersection argument for I = A∩B can be computed in
time O(N log2N log logN) from the above analysis. The value hU can be computed
in time O(N logN) from Lemma 3, hence the algorithm proveUnion for two sets
runs is time O(N log2N log logN).
For the general case, let us denote with ni the cardinality of each set Si and let
N =
∑
i∈[t] ni. Finally, we denote with Nv the sum of the cardinalities of the sets of
the children nodes of each node v ∈ T . Each of the first level nodes is related to value
Ni for i = 1, ..., t/2 s.t.
∑t/2
i=1Ni ≤ N). Hence computing the proofs for all first level
nodes of T can be done in time ∑t/2i=1Ni log2Ni log logNi which can be upper bound
by O(N log2N log logN). Moreover, this bound is true for all levels of T since due to
the commutativity of the union operation, no elements will be left out (in the worst
case the sets are disjoint, hence |U | = N) and since we have exactly log t levels in the
tree, the algorithm proveUnion in general runs in time O(N log2N log logN log t).
Each proof for a pair of sets can be verified by checking O(1) bilinear equalities
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and since there are exactly t−1 such arguments, the runtime of verifyUnion is O(t).
The proof for each node v consists of 8 group elements and there are t − 1 such
arguments, hence the size of the argument is O(t) (in practice, 8(t− 1) elements).
Set difference
Let Π be the proof for the set difference S1 \ S2 with cardinalities n1, n2 (denote
N = n1 + n2). The intersection argument for I = S1 ∩ S2 can be computed in time
O(N log2N log logN) from the previous analysis. The value hD can be computed in
time O(N logN) from Lemma 3, hence the algorithm proveDifference runs is time
O(N log2N log logN).
The overall runtime of verifyDifference is O(1) as it consists of checking 4 bilinear
equations. Likewise, the proof size is O(1) and it consists of 6 group elements.
Hierarchical set operations
Observe that (similar to the generalized union case) the proof construction and ver-
ification consists of constructing (and verifying) a series of proofs as dictated by the
structure of T . Hence the complexity of the algorithms will be characterized by the
complexity of the algorithms for the single operation case. As before we denote Nv
for each node v ∈ T as the sum of the cardinalities of the sets of its children nodes
and tv as the number of its children nodes. Also let N =
∑
v∈T NV . The construction
of the argument for each node can be made in time O(Nv log
2Nv log logNv log tv). If
t is the length of the set operation formula corresponding to q, it follows that tv ≤ t
hence the above can be also bound as O(Nv log
2Nv log logNv log t). Finally, the cost
to compute Π is equal to the sum of computing all of the respective proofs, which
can be written as O(N log2N log logN log t). Also, each of the proofs pii is computed
in time O(m logm) and since there are t of them, the overall complexity for query
is O(N log2N log logN log t+ tm logm).
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Each proof can be verified by checking O(tv) bilinear equalities. Since each node
has a single parent it follows that the runtime of verify is O(|T |). However, |T | ≤ 2t
since all operations are defined over at least two sets, hence verify consists of O(t)
operations. Each atomic proof in Π consists of O(tv) group elements and therefore
the total size of Π is O(t+ δ).
3.5 Server-assisted updates
The standard ADS model presented in Chapter 2 requires that the data owner main-
tains a copy of D and auth(D) in order to be able to perform updates. One extension
to this is a scenario where not even the owner needs to store the data: All updates
can be performed by the server (upon request by the owner) who sends to the owner
a new digest d′ and a proof that the update was executed honestly. Observe that
this can always happen naively, if the owner downloads all of D and performs the
update locally. However, we are interested in more efficient solutions. This closely
resembles the two-party ADS model introduced in [Pap11], where a property is iden-
tified that is sufficient to turn a standard ADS into a two-party one (i.e., one that
supports server-assisted updates). In practice, this model introduces two new algo-
rithms serverUpdate and verifyUpdate, that replace the previous update and
refresh process associated with an update. In this section, we provide appropriate
correctness and security definitions for an ADS that supports server-assisted updates
and show how our construction can be accordingly modified.
First, we define the two new algorithms that are necessary and replace update
and refresh from the ADS definition. The other four algorithms of the scheme
remain the same, as presented in Chapter 2.
1. {Dh+1, auth(Dh+1), dh+1,Π(u), upd} ← serverUpdate(u, auth(Dh), dh, pk):
On input update u on data structure Dh, the authenticated data structure
63
auth(Dh) and the digest dh, it outputs the updated data structure Dh+1 along
with auth(Dh+1), and the new digest dh+1 with (possibly) some update-relevant
information upd, and a proof Π(u) that the update was executed correctly. This
is executed by the server upon a request by the owner.
2. {accept/reject} ← verifyUpdate(u,Π(u), dh+1, upd, dh, sk, pk): On input up-
date u, a proof Π(u), claimed new digest dh+1 with (possibly) some update-
relevant information upd, and the existing digest dh it outputs either “accept”
or “reject”. If the answer is “accept”, then is sets dh+1 as the new digest.
Let {Dh+1} = applyUpdate(u,Dh) be a method for applying an update u at data
structure Dh (this method is not part of the scheme but only introduced for ease
of notation), and check a method for checking the validity of an answer, as defined
in 2. By applyUpdate((u1, . . . , ut, Dh), we denote the data structure Dh+t that results
from sequentially applying updates ui for 1, . . . , t to Dh.
Then an authenticated data structure scheme with server-assisted updates, should
satisfy the following:
Correctness. We say that an ADS with server-aided updates is correct if, for
all λ ∈ N, for all (sk, pk) output by algorithm genkey, for all (Dh, auth(Dh), dh)
output by one invocation of setup followed by polynomially-many invocations
of serverUpdate where h ≥ 0, for all queries q and for all a(q),Π(q) out-
put by query(q,Dh, auth(Dh), pk), with all but negligible probability, when-
ever check(q, a(q), Dh) accepts, so does verify(q, a(q),Π(q), dh, pk) and verifyUp-
date(ui,Π(ui), dh+i, updi, dhi , sk, pk) outputs “accept” for i = 1, . . . , h.
Security. Let λ ∈ N be a security parameter and (sk, pk) ← genkey(1λ) and A be
a poly-size adversary that is only given pk and has access to the algorithms of the
ADS via an oracle Oλ,ADS that accepts queries in the following model: The adversary
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picks an initial state of the data structure D0 and computes D0, auth(D0), d0 through
an oracle call to algorithm setup. Following this, he is given free oracle access to
all algorithms of the ADS. We say that an ADS with server-aided is secure if for all
large enough λ ∈ N, for all poly-size adversaries A it holds that:
Pr

(q, a(q),Π(q), (ui, updi,Π(ui), di)
t
i=1)← AOλ,ADS(1λ, pk) s.t.
accept ← verify(q, a(q),Π(q), dt, pk) ∧
reject ← check(q, a(q), applyUpdate(u1, . . . , ut, D0)) ∧
accept ← verifyUpdate(ui,Π(ui), di+1, updi, di, sk, pk)
for i = 0, . . . , t− 1

≤ ν(λ),
where the probability is taken over the randomness of genkey and the coins of A.
Next. we propose an ADS for nested set operations, with support for server-
assisted updates. This construction builds upon our previous scheme. We model
updates u as a set operation that needs to be evaluated over some of the existing
sets. That is, an update is a combination of query q, as defined above, with an index
j, that can be described as “perform query q and set Sj = α”, whereα is the output
set of q.
The setup, query, and verify algorithms remain exactly the same. Moreover,
we introduce the following two algorithms:
Algorithm{Dh+1, auth(Dh+1), dh+1,Π(u), upd} ← serverUpdate (u,Dhauth(Dh),
dh, pk): Parse u as q, j and run query(q,Dh, auth(Dh), pk) to receive α,Π. Run
QueryTree(pk, dh, j, auth(Dj)) to get proof of membership pij for current value fj.
Set upd = {h(α), fj, pij}. Update Dh to Dh+1 by setting Sj = α and fj = g
∏
x∈α(x+s).
Then update the AT as follows. Let v0 be the corresponding node for the j-the
set in AT , with value d(v0). Set d(v0) = f j+sj . Let v1, ..., vd1/e the node path
from v0 to root r For k = 1, ..., d1/e let Nvk be the set of children of vk, and
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set d(vk) = g
∏
u∈N(vk)(φ(d(u)+s), i.e., after updating the value d(vk−1), recompute the
accumulation value and the corresponding value at the next level. Set auth(Dh+1)
to the updated version of AT , and dh+1 = d(r) where r is the new computed root.
Send {Dh+1, auth(Dh+1), dh+1,Π(u), upd} to the owner.
Algorithm {accept/reject} ← verifyUpdate(uΠ(u), dh+1, upd, dh, sk, pk): Parse u
as q, j and run verify(q, ∅,Π, dh, pk), omitting steps 3 and 4. If the output of verify
is reject, output reject and halt. Check that for the values fα, f˜α contained in upd,
it holds that e(fα, g
α) = e(f˜α, g) and if the check fails, output reject and halt. Run
V erifyTree(pk, dh, j, fj, pij) and, if it outputs reject, output reject and halt. Finally,
let d1, . . . , dd1/e−1 be the corresponding node values from proof pij and dd1/e = dh.
Set d′0 = fα and d0 = fj. Then for k = 1, ..., d1/e, set d′k = d
(φ(d′k−1)+s)(φ(dk−1))+s)
−1
k .
If d′k 6= dh+1 output reject and halt, otherwise output reject and halt.
The algorithm executed at the server essentially consists of three steps. First,
the server evaluates the query q but instead of returning the result α, he computes
its hash value hα. Then he computes an accumulation tree proof for the old accumu-
lation value of the previous set Sj and then replaces Sj with α and its accumulation
value fj with the accumulation value of α. Finally, he performs the necessary mod-
ifications to the accumulation tree AT , by updating all the nodes in the path from
the j-th leaf to the root, a process that results in computing the new root dh+1. The
only difference of this last step, compared with the update algorithm of our previous
construction, is that, without access to sk, the server needs to re-compute all these
node values from scratch.
The update verification process at the owner similarly consists of three steps.
First, the owner checks that the returned hash value is truly the hash value of the
honestly computed result for q. This consists of the same process as the one for
verify, omitting the last two steps that validate that pre-image correctness of the
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hash value. Then, he checks the validity of the previous hash j-th accumulation
value with respect to the old digest dh. Finally, using the node values of the previous
version of AT contained in pij, he recomputes himself the values of all nodes from
the j-th leaf upwards, using as a starting point the verified accumulation value for
the new result. At each level k, using sk he efficiently removes the old value of the
previous level dk−1, and inserts the new value d′k−1. At the end of this process, he
checks that the value he computed for level d1/e. is equivalent to the claimed new
digest dh+1 received by the server.
Now we can state and prove the following result.
Theorem 2. The scheme {genkey, setup, query, verify, serverUpdate, veri-
fyUpdate} is an ADS with support for server-assisted updates, for queries q from
the class of hierarchical set operations formulas involving unions, intersections and
set differences, of length polynomial in λ. It is correct and secure under the q-SBDH
and the q-PKE assumptions.
Proof: Correctness follows by close inspection of the algorithms above. We will prove
security by reducing to the security of AHSO, i.e., we will show how a successful
adversary for this scheme can be used to break the security of our previous one. We
begin with the key observation that all algorithms of our scheme can be efficiently
executed with access to pk alone and, with the exception of genkey, they are all
fully deterministic. In particular, for a given pk,D, there exists a single pair of
authentication information and digest values auth(D), d.
Let now (q, a(q),Π(q), (ui, updi,Π(ui), d
∗
i )i=1,...,t) be the tuple output by the ad-
versary, and let Di be the result of running applyUpdate(ui, Di−1) starting from D0,
and let di be the digest received by running setup on input Di. Let us distinguish
between two cases. Either there exists index i ∈ [t] such that it holds that d∗i 6= di, or
not. In the latter case, all updates have been performed honestly, therefore it is easy
to see that the tuple (q, a(q),Π(q), t) can be used to break the security of AHSO.
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In the former case, let i′ be the smallest such index. Then it must be that the
result value f ∗αi′ ∈ Π(ui′) is different than fαi′ where αi′ is the honestly computed
accumulation value corresponding to ui executed on Di′−1. This holds because, the
digest is computed in deterministic way from the set accumulation values and all
values except for the one modified by the i′-th query are correctly computed at this
point. Since the proof Pi(ui′) contains the pair of values f
∗
αi′
, f˜ ∗αi′ , from the properties
of the ECRH there exists an extractor E that outputs a corresponding pre-image with
overwhelming probability. By the analysis used in the proof of Theorem 1, with all
but negligible probability, this pre-image is the characteristic polynomial of a set α∗.
Since verifyUpdate accepts, it follows that the tuple (q′, α∗,Π(ui′), i′), where q′ is
the query involved in ui′ , can again be used to break the security of AHSO. 2
Complexity analysis of the algorithms. Updates at the server consist of
running query which, as discussed previously, takes O(N log2N log logN log t +
tm logm). Subsequently, the hash value of the result is computed, the complex-
ity of which is subsumed by the above term. Then QueryTree takes O(m logm)
from Lemma 4, whereas computing each d(vk) value with the public key takes
O(m logm), as it requires hashing a set of m values. Finally 1/ such values
are computed, therefore the overall time for serverUpdate is the same as query,
i.e., O(N log2N log logN log t+ tm logm). For verifyUpdate, we argue as follows.
Running verify, omitting steps 3,4, takes O(t) where t is the number of operations
in u. Checking the validity of the final hash value and running VerifyTree takes O(1)
as they both involve a constant number of operations. Finally, computing the new
root takes 1/ operations (the owner has sk and does not recompute the values from
scratch), hence the total cost is O(t).
Expressiveness of server-assisted updates. The way we described server-
assisted updates above, each u is expressed as an arbitrary combination of set op-
68
erations among existing sets. While this is a large class of operations, it does not
cover all possible updates and, in particular, it does not cover the simple case of
element insertion-to/deletion-from an existing set, i.e., the updates supported by
AHSO. However, this is not a real limitation of our construction; we simply chose
this style of presentation for u to facilitate notation. In fact, with very small modi-
fications, our construction can support server-assisted updates where u is expressed
as q, j, R1, . . . , Rt where q is a query and j is an index, same as before. Moreover
R1, . . . , Rt are (external) sets of elements that will be used (possibly in conjunction
with some of the set Si in D, as specified by q) that will participate in the evaluation
of the query. Note that, this already includes element insertion/deletion as a special
case. The only significant change in the construction is that for the hash values h(Ri)
there is no need to provide or verify accumulation tree proofs; instead, the owner
computes these values himself, making verification much simpler.
3.6 Extensions and implementation decisions
Reducing the proof size. The size of proof Π can be reduced to being independent
of the size of the final answer α. Observe that what makes the proof be of size O(t+δ)
is the presence of coefficients c. However, given α itself, coefficients c = (c0, ..., cδ−1)
can be computed using an FFT algorithm in time O(δ log δ). An alternative to the
above scheme would be to omit c from the proof and let the verifier upon input α
compute the coefficients by himself to run the last step of verify. That would give
a proof size of O(t) and verification time of O(t + δ log δ). Since in most real world
applications δ  t, a proof that has size independent of δ is useful, especially if one
considers that the additional overhead for verification is logarithmic only. Of course
the communication bandwidth is still O(t+δ) because of the answer size, but it does
not extend to the proof size.
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A note on the public key size. A downside of our construction -and all other
constructions that are provably secure under a q-type assumption- is the large public
key size. More specifically, the public key pk is of size linear to the parameter q where
q is an upper bound on the size of the sets that can be hashed. This holds not only
for the original sets S1, ..., Sm but for any set that can result from hierarchical set
operations among them thus a natural practical bound for q is |D|. While computing
this public key cannot be avoided and it is necessary for proof computation at the
server, a client that needs to verify the correctness of query q with corresponding
answer α of size δ, only needs the first max{t, δ} elements of the public key. By
deploying an appropriate authentication mechanism (digital signatures, Merkle trees,
accumulation trees etc.) to validate the elements of pk, a scheme that relieves clients
from the necessity to store a long public key can be constructed. Ideally the necessary
public key elements should be transmitted alongside proof Π and cached or discarded
at the behest of the client.
Symmetric vs. asymmetric pairings. Throughout the presentation of our
scheme, we assumed implicitly that the pairing e(·, ·) is symmetric (i.e., Type-1
pairing). For example for the construction of the union argument for the operation
A ∪ B, the value fB appears both in term e(fA, fB and term e(fB, g) and we as-
sumed that in both cases the same value is used as input for the pairing, as is the
case if e is symmetric. However, many times asymmetric pairings are preferable for
implementation purposes since they are much faster than asymmetric ones in terms
of computation. This is not a serious problem for our scheme as there is an easy way
to circumvent it.
A pairing e : G1×G2 → GT is asymmetric if G1 6= G2 but both are of prime order
p and let g1, g2 be respective generators. Observe that e(g
P (s)
1 , g2) = e(g2, g
P (s)
2 ) is
an efficiently checkable equality that verifies that two hash values (their first parts)
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f 1 = g
P (s)
1 , f
2 = g
P (s)
2 have the same pre-image but are computed in G1 and G2
respectively. Therefore, by including both values f 1A, f
2
A in the proof, the case of an
asymmetric pairing can be accommodated. By verifying the above equality a prover
can be sure that both values refer to the same characteristic polynomial and use either
one of them selectively, as dictated by the argument verification algorithm. By using
the naive approach of including the “dual” hash value of each element in the proof,
we see that the proof size can at most double but maintains the same asymptotic
behaviour, i.e., proofs have size O(t + δ) and the same holds for the runtime of the
verification algorithm. In practice, a smarter approach can be taken where only
necessary elements are added (the ones that participate in union arguments and, of
these, half can be “routed” through G1 and the other half through G2). Another
by-product of using an asymmetric pairing it that the public key size is doubled
(g1, ..., g
sq
1 , ..., g2, ..., g
sq
2 ) and likewise for the setup phase cost for the source. Note
that no isomorphism between G2 and G1 is explicitly used in the above process,
hence our construction can work both with Type-2 and Type-3 pairings.
3.7 Experimental evaluation
In this section we present an experimental evaluation of our construction. The
scheme was written in C++, by building upon the bilinear accumulator implementa-
tion of [Tre13] and the DCLXVI [DCL16] library for bilinear pairings over a 256-bit
curve with an asymmetric pairing, in order to implement our ECRH. For modular
arithmetic we used the FLINT library [Fli16]. All experiments were run on a 64-bit
machine with Intel Core i5 CPU 2.5GHz, running Linux. The code was compiled
using g++ version 4.7.3 in C++11 mode. Our goal was to measure important quan-
tities related to the execution of our scheme, with a focus on the verification time
for the clients and the proof generation time for the server.
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Experimental setup. We used a synthetic dataset consisting of 100 sets. Each
set had 10,000 elements and each element was a 256-bit value. During the setup
phase, the owner deployed a 1-level accumulation tree (using our established notation,
 = 1). We tested two distinct types of queries, a single union over two sets, i.e.,
X ∪ Y , and a more elaborate operation over four sets expressed as the formula
(X ∪ Y ) ∩ (W \ Z), i.e., a union and a set difference followed by an intersection
over their results. For our tests, we engineered the synthetic input sets so that they
overlapped approximately on half of their elements, i.e., for the union case the final
result was of size approximately 3n/2 assuming that |X| = |Y | = n. Likewise, for
the more elaborate operation the final result was of size approximately n/4. To
measure the verification and proof construction overhead, we varied the input set
size n between 27 and 210.
Verification time. In Figure 3·6 (left) we demonstrate the verification cost at
the client for the two query types versus the size of the input sets. Observe that,
in both cases, the verification overhead grows with the size of the sets. However,
despite the fact that a single union is a conceptually simpler operation, its verification
cost is considerably larger. This is due to the fact that the verification cost is
strongly dominated by the computation of the hash value of the result (step 3 in
the verification process). As explained above, the result size for the complex query
is much smaller than that of the union. Most importantly, the overall verification
cost is below 1.2 seconds for the union and 240 milliseconds for the complex query
for inputs of size 1024 elements each. As a final comment, we stress that in our
implementation we used the technique described in Section 3.6 to reduce the proof
size. That is, the server did not send the coefficients of the characteristic polynomial
of the result; instead the client computed the characteristic polynomial himself, using
an FFT interpolation.
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Figure 3·6: Overhead for verification at the client (left) and proof
computation at the server (right) versus the cardinality of each input
set for two types of queries.
Query time. Figure 3·6 (right) shows the server’s overhead for proof generation for
our two tested queries. The overall overhead again increases with the size of the input
sets but, contrary to the verification case, proof generation takes much longer for the
complex query than for the single union. This comes as no surprise since, according
our analysis, this cost depends strongly on the sizes of the input and intermediate
sets (unlike the verification overhead that only depends on the result size and the
number of operations). For the union case, the proof construction took a little above
1 second for sets of 1024 elements each, whereas for the complex query the overhead
was approximately 7 seconds for the same input sizes This cost is dominated by the
proof construction for each atomic operation and a very small percentage (3-9%)
comes from computing the accumulation tree proof. Finally, note the exponential
growth along the x-axis; the proof generation overhead only increases quasi-linearly
with the input sizes, as predicted from our asymptotic analysis.
Other quantities. While our main goal was to measure the verification and proof
construction overheads, we discuss here some other measurements beginning with
the setup time at owner. While this is a one-time cost it is still important to keep it
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reasonable. For our tested setting (with 100 sets of 10,000 elements each) setup took
approximately 9.5 seconds. The reason this is so small is that the owner has access
to the secret key, therefore each hash value component is computed with n = 10, 000
modular multiplications and only a single exponentiation. Regarding the update
cost, we only tested source updates, namely, insertions and deletions on a single set.
For a batch update involving 100 operations (element insertions or deletions) the
cost at the owner is barely above 10 milliseconds, once again capitulating on the fact
that he has access to the secret key. Finally, regarding the proof size, in both cases it
is only dependent on the number of operations (see also our comment above for the
used techniques for proof size reduction). In particular, for the single union case the
proof consists of 7 bilinear group elements, whereas for the complex query it consists
of 21 such elements.
Discussion and comparison with alternative schemes. The above experiments
demonstrate that our scheme can be run in practice and, in some cases, the involved
overheads are far from prohibitive, particularly for verification at the client. On the
other hand, if one tries to compare this cost with the time it takes to perform the
computation itself if one downloads the original sets from the server (which is in the
order of microseconds for the given set sizes), it is clear that there is long way to
go in terms of making our schemes truly practical. Yet, our construction has the
benefit of not having to process the sets locally at the client, therefore, for the case
of very large input sets with a small final result the client can still benefit from our
approach
In order to better quantify the performance overhead of our scheme, we compared
it with a state of the art general-purpose VC scheme applied for the case of a single
union over two sets, using the libsnark library [lib16], To implement this, we created
an arithmetic circuit that upon input two sets and their (candidate) hash values
74
(using a standard cryptographic hash function), it proceeds in two steps: First, it
checks that the two sets are correct pre-images for the given hash values (by re-
computing these hashes and checking that they are the same as the ones provided)
and then returns the union of the two sets.10 For the union computation we chose
the naive “compare-all-pairs” approach. We stress that for the given input sizes
(between 27 and 210 elements for each set) this approach yields the smallest circuit
in terms of number of gates.
Regarding verification time, this general-purpose scheme behaves very similarly
to our solution. In particular, it outperforms our construction by less than 5%
for all tested input sizes. However, the big difference in performance occurs at
the proof computation overhead. There, our scheme is anywhere between 2 and 3
orders of magnitude faster than the general-purpose approach. Specifically for sets
of cardinality 1024, the circuit-based VC took approximately 17 minutes whereas our
construction took a little more than 1 second. We need to stress that more than 85%
of this overhead originates from computing the hashes of the input sets and testing
them against the provided hash values. In our implementation, we used SHA-256
which is part of the libsnark library. However, by replacing it with a more “circuit-
friendly” hash function (i.e., a function that can be represented as a circuit with
fewer arithmetic gates), such as [Ajt96] we believe that this cost can be drastically
reduced. Finally, these times were achieved using a pre-processing SNARK which
means that for each input size we had to construct (and cryptographically pre-
process) a different arithmetic circuit. On the other hand, our scheme has a single
pre-processing phase after which any possible set operation for any input cardinality
can be accommodated. Alternatively we could have used a SNARK without pre-
processing (e.g., the construction of [BCTV14]), which, however, would impose an
10More formally, the circuit takes the two sets, the two (candidate) hash values and a (candidate)
union and it checks whether the sets hash to the given values and whether their union is the same
as the one provided, outputting 1 if that is the case and 0 otherwise.
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even larger proof generation overhead.
Chapter 4
Verifiable Multi-dimensional Range
Queries
4.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we target the case where the client issues a multi-dimensional range
query. We model the owner’s database as a table T that contains n tuples with m
attribute values. A range query is defined over d out of the m attributes, which we
refer to as dimensions. It is expressed as d pairs of values li, ui, each along a certain
dimension ai. Its result includes all the tuples whose value on ai is in range [li, ui]
for all dimensions ai specified in the query.
This query is fundamental in a vast variety of applications. For instance, it is
a typical SELECT...WHERE query in conventional relational databases. Moreover, it is
a frequent query in the emerging scientific databases (e.g., it is called subarray in
SciDB [Bro10]). Relational and scientific database systems manage numerous types
of data, such as corporate, stock, astronomical, medical, etc. With the advent of
“big data”, such systems are commonly deployed by third party servers in massively
distributed architectures, in order to address the issue of scalability. Integrity as-
surance is a desirable property that serves both as a guarantee against a possibly
malicious server, but also as a tool for error detection.
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4.1.1 Prior work
The most basic authentication problem is set membership, i.e., whether an element
belongs in a data collection. Well-known example schemes include Merkle trees
[Mer89] and accumulation trees [PTT08]. At the opposite extreme, general-purpose
VC can be used to verify any possible query on outsourced data, as discussed in
Chapter 1. Although such protocols can address our problem, they incur an excessive
proof cost overhead at the server, due to their generality. Therefore, there is a large
variety of specialized constructions that have been proposed in the literature for the
problem of authenticated multi-dimensional range queries.
Martel et al. [MND+04] provide a generalization of Merkle trees, which captures
the case of multi-dimensional range queries. Chen et al. [CMH+08] proposes a so-
lution that is similar to [MND+04], based on attribute domain partition and access
control. For the restricted case of 1-dimensional queries, Li et al. [LHKR06] pro-
pose a variant of the B+-tree that incorporates hash values similarly to the Merkle
tree, for processing queries in external storage. Yang et al. [YPPK09b] extend this
idea to multiple dimensions, by transforming the R∗-tree [BKSS90] into a Merkle
R∗-tree. There are also other cryptographically augmented data structures (e.g.,
[MNT06, CT09] based on signatures instead of hashes).
The existing literature suffers from the following critical problems. On the one
hand, the schemes of [MND+04, CMH+08] that provide guaranteed (non-trivial)
complexity bounds, scale exponentially with the number of dimensions d. On the
other hand, the rest of the approaches rely on the heuristic R∗-tree and fail to ac-
commodate more than a limit of dimensions in practice (e.g., more than 8), as the
performance and effectiveness of the index deteriorate with dimensionality. Most im-
portantly, all methods require an exponential in m number of structures to support
queries on every possible combination of dimensions in the database. This is be-
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cause each structure is built on a specific set of dimensions, and different sets require
separate structures.
Finally, there is a work by Xu [Xu10] that, contrary to [MND+04, CMH+08],
scales quadratically with d. However, this scheme falls within a different model, as
it necessitates multi-round interaction between server and client (as opposed to our
non-interactive setting). Its security is based on non-falsifiable “knowledge-type”
assumptions. Moreover, this scheme makes use of functional encryption [BSW11],
considerably reducing its potential for implementation.
4.1.2 Overview of result
We introduce a new ADS for multi-dimensional range query processing. Our con-
struction offers two novel powerful properties: (i) it is the first scheme where all
costs (i.e., setup, storage, update, proof construction, verification, and proof size)
grow only linearly with the number of dimensions, a huge improvement over the cur-
rent literature, and (ii) it is the first to support an exponential in m number of range
queries with linear in m setup cost and storage. One downside of our construction
is that update cost also grows linearly (in the worst case) with the database size.
To remedy this, we also present an update-efficient version of our construction, that
significantly reduces this cost as can be seen in Figure 4·1.
In that sense, the main result of our construction is that it takes authenticated
range query processing to arbitrary dimensions, both in terms of number and choice.
Table 4·1 provides a comparison of the asymptotic complexities of both versions of
our scheme against previous works (with non-trivial bounds).
4.1.3 Overview of techniques
The central idea of our solutions is the reduction of the multi-dimensional range
query to set operations over appropriately defined sets in the database. In particu-
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lar, in a one-time setup stage, the owner builds a novel authenticated structure over
every database attribute separately, and then binds all structures using an existing
membership structure (e.g., [Mer89, PTT08]). Given a query involving any set of
dimensions, the server decomposes it into its d 1-dimensional ranges, and processes
them individually on the structure of each dimension, producing d proofs for the par-
tial results R1, . . . , Rd. The main challenge is for these d proofs to (i) be combinable
such that they verify the intersection of Ri, which is the final result R, and (ii) be
verifiable without the partial results, so that the total proof size and verification cost
are independent of their (potentially large) sizes. We address this challenge through
an elaborate fusion of existing and novel intersection, union, and set difference pro-
tocols, based on bilinear accumulators.
This particular treatment of the problem, i.e., the authentication of an arbi-
trary d-dimensional range query via the combination of d separate 1-dimensional
proofs, would not be feasible without the recent advances in set operation authen-
tication (e.g., [PTT11, CPPT14]). We anticipate that future research will substan-
tially improve the efficiency of the set operation sub-protocols. Motivated by this,
as an additional important contribution, we identify and abstract the set operation
sub-protocols needed as building blocks in our schemes, and formulate a general
framework that can integrate any future improved machinery for set operation au-
thentication.
We formally prove our construction secure under the q-Strong Bilinear Diffie-
Hellman [BB08] assumption and the security of the underlying set membership
schemes. We also provide an experimental evaluation, demonstrating the feasibil-
ity of our schemes.
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4.2 Set membership and set operations authentication
Consider that a data owner outsources a set X to an untrusted third-party server.
Clients issue queries about a single element x ∈ X. A set membership authentication
protocol (SMA) allows the server to prove to a client that x is indeed a member of
X. An SMA is a collection of algorithms KeyGen, Setup, Prove, Verify and Update.
The owner executes Keygen and Setup prior to outsourcing X. The former generates
a secret and public key pair sk, pk, whereas the latter produces a digest δ that is a
succinct cryptographic representation of X. The owner keeps sk and publishes pk
and δ. Given a client query about x ∈ X, the server runs Prove to produce a proof of
membership pi. Given pk, δ, pi and x, the client runs Verify to check the membership
of x in X. An SMA is secure, if the probability that (accept← Verify ∧ x /∈ X) is
negligible. In case the owner modifies X by inserting/deleting element, it executes
Update to produce a new digest δ about the updates X, and notifies the server about
the changes.
The most well-known SMA is the Merkle tree [Mer89], which is a binary tree
where (i) each leaf node contains an element x ∈ X, and (ii) each non-leaf node
stores the hash of the values of its children, using a CRHF H. During Setup, the
owner builds a Merkle tree on X, signs the hash value in the root, publishes it as the
digest δ, and sends the tree to the server. During Prove, the server accesses the tree
to find x, and includes in proof pi all sibling hash values along the path from the root
to the leaf storing x. In Verify, the client recursively performs the hash operations
to reconstruct the root hash value, and checks it against δ. For n elements, the
proof construction and size, verification, and update time are all O(log n), whereas
the setup is O(n). An alternative SMA is the accumulation tree [PTT08, PTT11],
which we discussed in detail in Section 3.4.1. The accumulation tree features two
main differences to the Merkle tree: (i) the fanout of each non-leaf node is n1/,
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where  ∈ (0, 1] is a user-defined parameter, and (ii) each non-leaf node stores an
accumulation value (discussed below) produced over the values of its children. This
SMA offers O(1) proof size, verification, and update time, and O(n) setup cost.
The downside is the proof construction overhead, which is now O(n log n), and the
costly operations as opposed to the Merkle tree (exponentiations vs. hashes).
Going beyond set membership, we now discuss the case of authenticating set
operations. Consider an owner of a collection of sets X = {X1, . . . , Xm}, who out-
sources them to an untrusted server. Clients issue queries describing set operations
over X , consisting of unions, intersections, and set differences. Example queries in-
clude X1∩X5, (X2∪X3)∩X1, and X1 \X2. A set operation authentication protocol
(SOA) enables the server to prove the integrity of the result. Similarly to SMA,
it is comprised of algorithms KeyGen, Setup, Prove, Verify Update, and its security
is defined as the inability of the server to present a false answer with an accepting
proof.
In the previous chapter we presented a SOA scheme that can support any com-
bination of polynomially many hierarchical set operations. For the constructions of
this chapter we will rely on the conceptually simpler scheme of [PTT11] that can
support queries expressed as a single set operation (for instance Xi∩. . .∩Xj, i.e., one
intersection over an arbitrary number of sets), at the same asymptotic complexities.
Specifically, for a query on collection XQ ⊆ X of d sets with result R, the proof has
size O(d), and is generated in time O˜(
∑
X∈XQ |X|). Note that the proof construction
incurs only a poly-logarithmic overhead compared to the result computation time,
which is Ω(
∑
X∈XQ |X|). The verification overhead is O˜(|R|) + O(d), whereas the
setup cost is O(
∑
X∈X |X|). Although our construction from Chapter 3 subsumes
[PTT11] in terms of functionality, its security relies on non-standard “knowledge-
type” assumptions.
83
We next describe the intersection scheme of [PTT11], as we utilize it in our
constructions. This scheme employs the bilinear accumulator primitive [Ngu05],
which can be seen as a simpler variant of our ECRH construction (without the
extractability property). Let X be a set with elements from Zp, and s←R Z∗p a secret.
Recall that the accumulation value of X is defined as: acc(X) = g
∏
x∈X(x+s). As
discussed in 2, this value is a succinct, collision-resistant cryptographic representation
of X under q-SBDH. It is also computable (from scratch) even without s, by having
access to the public pairing parameters pub, as well as a public key (gs, ..., gs
q
), where
q is a user-defined parameter that is an upper of bound on the cardinality of X. In
particular, we can write
∏
x∈X(x+S) = PX(S) =
∑|X|
i=0 ciS
i, where S is an undefined
variable. The coefficients c0, ..., c|X| can be computed in time O(|X| log |X|) using
FFT interpolation. One can compute acc(X) = gPX(s) =
∏|X|
i=0(g
si)ci using only
the public information. Note that, with access to s, the bilinear accumulator can
accommodate an insertion/deletion in X with O(1) operations [Ngu05]. However,
without s, the updated accumulation value must be computed from scratch.
In order to prove to a client with access to acc(X1), acc(X2) that a set I is the
intersection X1 ∩ X2, it suffices to prove that (i) I ⊆ X1 and I ⊆ X2, and (ii)
(X1 \ I)∩ (X2 \ I) = ∅. Towards (i), the server must send subset witnesses W1,W2 to
the client, where Wi = acc(Xi \ I) for i = 1, 2. To verify (i), the client first computes
acc(I), and checks the following for i = 1, 2:
e(acc(I),Wi)
?
= e(acc(Xi), g) .
For (ii), the server computes two disjointness witnesses F1, F2 as follows. Since
(X1\I)∩(X2\I) = ∅, PX1\I(S) =
∏
x∈X1\I(x+S) and PX2\I(S) =
∏
x∈X2\I(x+S) have
greatest common divisor of degree zero. Hence, there exist polynomials Q1(S), Q2(S)
such that Q1(S) ·PX1\I(S)+Q2(S) ·PX2\I(S) = 1. These polynomials (also known as
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Be´zout coefficients) are efficiently computable by the Extended Euclidean algorithm.
The server calculates the disjointness witnesses as F1 = g
Q1(s), F2 = g
Q2(s). To verify
(ii), the client simply checks
e(W1, F1) · e(W2, F2) ?= e(g, g)
This approach naturally generalizes for d > 2 sets Xi, with corresponding inter-
section proof pi∩ = {Wi, Fi}di=1. In our security proofs, we use the following lemma
from [PTT11]:
Lemma 6 ([PTT11]). Let λ be a security parameter, and pub← GenBilinear(1λ). Un-
der the q-SBDH assumption, no poly-size adversary can, on input pub and elements
(g, gs, ..., gs
q
) ∈ G for some s chosen at random from Z∗p, output sets X1, . . . , Xd, I
with elements in Zp, where d = poly(λ), and proof pi∩ = {Wi, Fi}di=1, such that
e(acc(I),Wi) = e(acc(Xi), g),
∏
i e(Wi, Fi) = e(g, g), and I 6=
⋂
iXi, for i = 1, . . . , d,
except with probability ν(λ).
4.3 Problem formulation
In this section we describe our targeted setting, formulate our authentication proto-
col, and model its security.
Setting and query. Our setting involves three types of parties; an owner, a server,
and a number of clients. The owner outsources to the server a dataset T that consists
of n tuples, each having a set A = {a1, . . . , am} of attributes. This dataset can either
be perceived as a table in traditional relational databases. It could also be a multi-
dimensional array in scientific databases (e.g., SciDB [Bro10]), where a subset of
the attributes are the array dimensions (i.e., the array indices), and the rest are the
array attributes (i.e., the array cell values). In addition, the server is responsible for
maintaining the dataset, upon receiving tuple updates (modeled as insertion/deletion
requests) from the owner.
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Clients issue multi-dimensional range queries on T to the server, which return
the tuples from T that satisfy certain range conditions over a set of attributes. More
formally, a query Q is specified over any subset of d attributes AQ ⊆ A, where
|AQ| = d ≤ m, and encoded by the set of triplets {(i, li, ui)}ai∈AQ . The result of Q
is a set R ⊆ T , denoted as R(Q, T ), that contains exactly those tuples t ∈ T that
satisfy li ≤ t.ai ≤ ui for all ai ∈ AQ. This query corresponds to a select. . .where
query in relational databases, and a subarray query in scientific databases. In our
terminology, each ai ∈ AQ represents a dimension in the multi-dimensional range
query.
In our setting, we consider that the server is untrusted, and may present to
the client a tampered result. Our goal is to construct a protocol for authenticated
multi-dimensional range queries, which allows the client to verify the integrity of the
received result.
Range-query authentication protocol. Let Tj denote the version of dataset T
after j rounds of updates. An authenticated multi-dimensional range query protocol
(AMR) consists of the following algorithms:
1. KeyGen(1λ): It outputs secret and public keys sk, pk.
2. Setup(T0, sk, pk): It computes some authentication information auth(T0) and
digest δ0, given dataset T0, sk and pk.
3. Update(upd, auth(Tj), δj, sk, pk): On input update information upd on Tj,
auth(Tj), δj and sk, it outputs an updated dataset Tj+1, along with new
auth(Tj+1), and δj+1.
4. Prove(Q,R, Tj, auth(Tj), pk): On input query Q on Tj with result R, and
auth(Tj), it returns R and proof pi.
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5. Verify(Q,R, pi, δj, pk): On input query Q, result R, proof pi, digest δj and pk,
it outputs either accept or reject.
In a pre-processing stage, the owner runs KeyGen and Setup. It publishes pub-
lic key pk and digest δ0, which is a succinct cryptographic representation of ini-
tial dataset T0. Moreover, it sends T0, auth(T0) to the server, where auth(T0) is
some authentication information on T0 that will be used by the server to construct
proofs. The owner maintains its dataset by issuing Update when changes occur at
the dataset. Specifically, an update is a tuple insertion or deletion, encoded by
upd. An update on Tj produces a new version Tj+1, as well as new digest δj+1 and
auth(Tj+1). The owner sends to the server only the modified parts necessary for com-
puting Tj+1, auth(Tj+1), δj+1. The server responds to a query Q from the client by
first computing the result R, and executes Prove that constructs the corresponding
proof pi. Finally, the client validates the integrity and freshness of R as an answer
to Q on current Tj, by running Verify.
An AMR must satisfy the following two properties:
Correctness. A AMR is correct if, for all λ ∈ N, (sk, pk) ← KeyGen(1λ), all
(T0, auth(T0), δ0) output by one invocation of Setup followed by j
′ calls to Update
on updates upd, where j′ is poly(λ), for any Q, and pi output by Prove(Q, Tj,
auth(Tj), pk), Verify(Q,R(Q, Tj), pi, δj, pk) returns accept with probability 1, for all
j ≤ j′.
Security. Let λ ∈ N be a security parameter, key pair (sk, pk)← KeyGen(1λ), and
A be a poly-size adversary that is only given pk and has access to the algorithms of
the AMR via an oracle Oλ,AMR that accepts queries in the following model: The
adversary picks an initial state of the dataset T0 and receives T0, auth(T0), δ0 through
oracle access to Setup. Then, for i = 0, ..., j′ − 1 = poly(λ), A issues an update updi
for Ti and receives Ti+1, auth(Ti+1) and δi+1 through oracle access to Update. At any
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point during these update queries, A can make polynomially many oracle calls to
algorithm Prove. Finally, A picks an index 0 ≤ j ≤ j′, a query Q, a result R∗ and
a proof pi∗. We say that a AMR is secure if for all large enough λ ∈ N and all
poly-size adversaries A, it holds that:
Pr

(Q,R∗, pi∗, j)← AOλ,AMR(1λ, pk) s.t
accept← Verify(Q,R∗, pi∗, δj, pk)
∧R∗ 6= R(Q, Tj)
 ≤ ν(λ),
where the probability is taken over the randomness of the algorithms and the coins
of A.
As an additional remark, note that the above protocol falls within the framework
of authenticated data structures, as presented in Chapter 2, rephrased for the specific
problem of range queries. We dropped the refresh algorithm as, in our construction,
its mode of operation is rather trivial, i.e., it simply consists of replacing values,
without any computational component.
4.4 Basic scheme
4.4.1 A general framework
We present our proposed framework, outline its benefits, and highlight the challenges
behind a secure and efficient instantiation.
Framework. Recall that the query result is a set of tuples, each consisting of m
attribute values, and satisfying certain range conditions. For the sake of simplicity,
we henceforth define result R of query Q on dataset T as a set containing exactly the
hash value hi = H(ti) of the binary representation of each tuple ti ∈ T that satisfies
the query conditions, under a CRHF H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp. OurAMR constructions will
focus on proving that R is the correct set of hash values corresponding to the tuples
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Figure 4·2: Illustrating the different tuple orders per attribute
satisfying the query. Then, given these hash values along with the full result tuples,
the client can validate the integrity of each result tuple ti by testing H(ti)
?
= hi.
Due to collision-resistance of H, the server cannot return a falsified t∗i such that
H(t∗i ) = hi, instead of the correct pre-image ti of hi. In the following, when clear
from the context, we use term “tuple” for a table tuple ti ∈ T and its hash value
hi = H(ti) interchangeably.
We illustrate the main idea of our framework using Figure 4·2. Let h1, . . . , hn
correspond to the hash values of the tuples t1, . . . , tn of T , respectively. We maintain
a copy of these values for every attribute ai, and sort the copy of ai according to the
values of the tuples on ai. For instance, in Figure 4·2, h3 = H(t3) appears first in
the ordering of a1 because t3 has the smallest value on attribute a1 among the tuples
in T .
A multi-dimensional range query Q is defined over an arbitrary set of dimensions
(where, recall, each dimension is an attribute). Our framework “decomposes” a d-
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dimensional range query into d separate 1-dimensional queries. More specifically, our
framework boils down to two steps:
• Step 1: (1-D proofs) For each dimension ai involved in Q, compute the set
Ri of all hash values of tuples that satisfy the condition on ai. Formally,
Ri = {hj = H(tj) | li ≤ tj.ai ≤ ui}. Also compute proof piRi for the integrity
of Ri.
• Step 2: (Combination) Compute the result R def= ⋂iRi and proof pi for its
integrity, given pairs (Ri, piRi) for every ai involved in Q.
For example, suppose in Figure 4·2 that a 2-dimensional query Q is defined over
ai and aj. Our two-step framework first dictates the computation of Ri = {h1, h3, h7}
that corresponds to the 1-dimensional result along dimension ai, and Rj = {h1, h7}
along dimension aj, as well as proofs piRi , piRj . It next requires the computation of
result R = {h1, h7} and a proof pi.
Benefits. Our view of multi-dimensional range queries as a collection of 1-
dimensional range queries offers multiple advantages over existing approaches: (i)
We aim to support range queries over any combination of attributes. Thus, there
are O(2m) possible different attribute combinations that can be involved in a query,
where m is the total number of attributes in T . In order to support all of them,
existing solutions must build O(2m) separate authenticated structures. On the con-
trary, our framework requires m such structures (one per attribute) constructed once,
which suffice to capture all O(2m) possible subsets of attributes. (ii) As discussed
in Section 5.1, the performance of all existing constructions deteriorates drastically
with d. In contrast, the separate handling of each dimension allows our framework to
scale with d gracefully. (iii) To address scalability issues that arise from the advent of
“big data”, data management systems typically employ multi-core CPU hardware,
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as well as cloud infrastructures involving multiple nodes. In our framework, the
1-dimensional sub-queries can be distributed across multiple cores/nodes, and run
in parallel. The combination step can then take place using well-known in-network
aggregation techniques (e.g., in a MapReduce fashion [DG08]).
The challenge. There are several efficient solutions for the problem of 1-dimensional
range queries (e.g., [MND+04, LHKR06]), each of which can be used to instantiate
Step 1 in our framework. The problem lies in Step 2, i.e., how to efficiently combine
the separate proofs. In particular, for all known 1-dimensional solutions, Step 2 en-
tails creating the proof pi as the concatenation of all proofs piRi and the partial results
Ri. This makes the proof size as large as the sum of the partial result cardinalities,
which can be substantially larger than the final result R. In turn, this may lead to
a prohibitive communication and verification cost for the client.
A fundamental requirement of our framework is the partial proofs piRi produced
in Step 1 to be efficiently combinable to a short proof pi in Step 2, whose size is
independent of
∑
i |Ri|. More formally:
Efficiency 1. A AMR following our framework is efficient, if it outputs proofs pi
of size o(
∑
i |Ri|).
Based on our observation above, any existing 1-dimensional solution trivially
conforms to our framework. However, no such solution satisfies the efficiency re-
quirement. Essentially, the efficiency requirement motivates the design of AMR’s
with non-trivial proof combination techniques. What has prevented the research
community from devising such AMR’s is the combination of the lack of appropriate
cryptographic tools, and the reduced need for range queries over arbitrarily many
dimensions, and large quantities of data. However, the emergence of big data prac-
tices renders the problem timely and important, whereas the recent introduction of
SOA techniques opens new directions towards efficient solutions.
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4.4.2 Construction
We first outline the main idea of our scheme and elaborate on some important imple-
mentation decisions. Subsequently, we present the instantiation of our algorithms.
Main idea. Recall that Step 2 of our framework dictates that the result R is
expressed as the intersection of sets Ri. We stress that SOA techniques appear
to solve our targeted problem trivially as follows: The owner pre-computes a proof
component piRi = acc(Ri) for each Ri, where acc(Ri) is the accumulation value of set
Ri, and signs each piRi . According to our discussion in Section 4.2, given all Ri, piRi ,
the server computes and sends to the client a combined intersection proof pi∩ for
the integrity of R, along with all piRi and their corresponding signatures. Observe
that this approach satisfies our efficiency requirement. However, there exist O(n2)
possible Ri sets per dimension that can be involved in a query, which makes the
pre-processing cost for the owner and the storage overhead for the server prohibitive.
The main idea behind our scheme is to express any possible Ri as the result of an
operation over a fixed number of “primitive sets”, given the constraint that there are
O(n) such “primitive sets”.
One possible way to derive Ri from “primitive sets” is illustrated in Figure
4·3 (top). Let us focus on ai and the ordering of the hash values hj (of tuples
tj) according to the tj.ai values. We define the prefix set Pi,j to consist of all hash
values appearing in positions 1, . . . , j in the ordering. In the figure, Pi,1 = {h3}
and Pi,2 = {h3, h1}. Similarly, we define suffix set Si,j to consist of all hash values
appearing in positions n− j + 1, . . . , n in the ordering. In our example, Si,1 = {h6}
and Si,2 = {h5, h6}. Now assume that k′i + 1, ki are the two positions in this ordering
corresponding to the first and last tuple satisfying the query on ai. Observe that, in
this case, Ri = Pi,ki∩Si,k′i+1, and, thus, there exist 2n “primitive sets” per dimension,
i.e., all prefix and suffix sets. Let piPi,ki = acc(Pi,ki) and piSi,k′i+1
= acc(Si,k′i+1). Then,
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Figure 4·3: Set representation of Ri using two different techniques.
since R =
⋂
iRi =
⋂
i(Pi,ki ∩ Si,k′i+1) can be computed with a single set intersection,
we can utilize the SOA of [PTT11] to create a proof pi (consisting of pi∩ and signa-
tures on every piPi,ki , piSi,k′i+1
) for the integrity of R, while satisfying both efficiency
and O(n) pre-processing/storage.
Unfortunately, from the complexity analysis of [PTT11] in Section 4.2, it follows
that pi∩ requires O˜(d·n) time for each query at the server, which makes this approach
impractical. The reason is that the pi∩ construction overhead is dictated by the
cardinality of the input sets, which is |Pi,ki|+ |Si,k′i+1| ∈ Ω(n), along each attribute.
Motivated by the above, we propose an alternative solution, which we demon-
strate using Figure 4·3 (bottom). We define sets Ri through set difference. In par-
93
ticular, using the notation of the previous paragraph, it holds that Ri = Pi,ki \ Pi,k′i .
Consequently, in this case the “primitive sets” are only the n prefix sets. Now
R =
⋂
iRi =
⋂
i(Pi,ki \ Pi,k′i) is no longer expressed as a single set operation. The
only known SOA that can accommodate a circuit of set operations is [CPPT14].
Briefly stated, [CPPT14] allows the construction of piRi with O(|Ri|), and pi∩ with
O(
∑
i |Ri|), exponentiations. The downside is that its security relies on non-standard
cryptographic assumptions. To circumvent this, we construct our own sub-protocol
for producing combinable proofs of set difference, customized for the special case
where the first participating set is a strict superset of the second. This particular
constraint enables our sub-protocol to prove the validity of Ri = Pi,ki \ Pi,k′i with
O(|Ri|) exponentiations, while being secure under a standard cryptographic assump-
tion.
Our algorithms are comprised of a collection of set operation sub-protocols, bun-
dled with a set membership scheme. For clarity of presentation, we will abstract the
internal mechanics of these sub-protocols, and instead use the following conventions:
• By SMA we refer to either a Merkle tree [Mer89] or an accumulation tree
[PTT08], along with all its algorithms.
• By ProveIntersection, VerifyIntersection, we refer to the corresponding algo-
rithms of the SOA of [PTT11]. The former computes an intersection proof
on its input sets, and the latter verifies this operation.
• By ProveSetDiff, VerifySetDiff, we refer to the corresponding algorithms of our
set difference construction. The former generates a set difference proof, and
the latter verifies this operation.
This presentation choice also highlights that our algorithms use elementary cryp-
tographic tools as building blocks. Therefore, the overall performance of our scheme
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Algorithm Setup(T, pk, sk)
1. For j = 1, ..., n, compute hj = H(tj)
2. For i = 1, ...,m
3. Sort hj in ascending order along tj .ai
4. For j = 1, ..., n
5. Compute piPi,j = acc(Pi,j)
6. Let vi,j be the j
th largest value on attribute ai in T
7. Construct triplet τPi,j = (vi,j , vi,j+1, piPi,j )
8. Build SMAi with digest δi over τPi,1 , ..., τPi,n
9. Build SMA with digest δ over (1, δ1), ..., (m, δm)
10. Send T, auth(T ) = (SMA,SMA1, ...,SMAm) to the server
11. Publish pk, δ
is highly dependent on that of the underlying tools, leaving potential for great im-
provement as novel tool instantiations are introduced in the literature.
Key generation. It outputs key pair pk, sk, which are simply the public and secret
keys of the underlying SMA and SOA schemes, generated by their corresponding
key generation routines.
Setup. Figure 4·4 visualizes the detailed authentication structure produced by the
setup algorithm, whose pseudo code is shown above. The owner computes the hash
value h = H(t) for every t ∈ T (Line 1). It then produces the sorted orderings of
the hash values along every attribute (Lines 2-3), and computes the prefix sets Pi,j
as explained in Figure 4·3. Next, it calculates prefix proof piPi,j for each Pi,j (Lines
4-5). For each Pi,j, it computes a triplet τPi,j = (vi,j, vv,j+1, piPi,j) in Lines 6-7. Values
vi,j, vi,j+1 indicate the j
th and (j+ 1)th largest values on attribute ai appearing in T .
These values are necessary for guaranteeing the completeness of the result, and their
purpose will become clear soon. Subsequently, it computes an SMAi over the triples
τPi,j of every attribute ai, producing digests δ1, . . . , δm (Line 8). It then constructs
a SMA over the (i, δi) pairs, and generates digest δ (Line 9). Finally, it sends the
m + 1 SMA structures to the server along with T (Line 10), and publishes pk, δ
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Figure 4·4: The authentication structure of our basic scheme
(Line 11).
Proof construction. For ease of presentation and without loss of generality, we
assume that the requested query is upon the d first attributes of T and, hence, encode
it as Q = {i, li, ui) for i = 1, ..., d. We provide the pseudo code of this algorithm
below.
Given R, the server first computes piR (Line 1), and calculates set Ri for each
attribute ai. It identifies prefixes Pi,ki , Pi,k′i such that Ri = Pi,ki \ Pi,k′i (as in Figure
4·3), and locates the corresponding triplets τPi,ki , τPi,k′i (Lines 4-5). Subsequently, it
constructs the SMAi proofs for τPi,ki , τPi,k′i (Line 6) and SMA proofs for (i, δi), for
i = 1, . . . , d (Line 7). It then invokes subroutines ProveSetDiff and ProveIntersection
as defined in our main idea paragraph, and produces proofs piR1 , . . . , piRd and pi∩
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Figure 4·5: Authentication flow
(Lines 8-9), respectively. Finally, it puts together all proof components into a single
proof pi (Line 10), and sends it to the client along with result R (Line 11). We
thoroughly describe the functionality of every proof component in pi in the next
paragraph.
Verification. We visualize the intuition in Figure 4·5, which depicts the authen-
tication flow among the various proof components of the final proof pi sent to the
client. Specifically, if a component authenticates another, we draw an arrow from
the former to the latter. Arrow labels represent information serving as “glue” be-
tween the components. The goal is to verify result R (top of the figure), but the
only trusted information (in addition to pk) is δ (bottom of the figure). Verification
proceeds bottom-up from level 0 to 5, maintaining the invariant that, at level `, the
server must have computed the components therein truthfully with respect to T and
Q.
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At level 0, δ is signed/published by the owner and, thus, it is trusted. At level 1,
given the d SMA proofs and δ, we verify the integrity of components (i, δi). Likewise,
at level 2, given the 2d SMAi proofs along with (i, δ), we verify the integrity of
2d triplets (τPi,ki , τPi,k′i
). Here, we reach a critical point in the verification process.
We must prove that these particular (τPi,ki , τPi,k′i
) correspond to the triplets for sets
Pi,ki , Pi,k′i , such that Pi,ki\Pi,k′i = Ri, where Ri is the truthful result of Q on dimension
ai. To do this, we parse Q as (i, li, ui)
d
i=1 and check vi,k′i < li ≤ vi,k′i+1 and vi,ki ≤
ui < vi,ki+1, where vi,ki , vi,ki+1, vi,k′i , vi,k′i+1 are included in τPi,ki , τPi,k′i
. This guarantees
that Pi,ki is the smallest prefix set that contains the entire Ri, and Pi,k′i is the largest
prefix set that does not intersect Ri. Therefore, we verify that (τPi,ki , τPi,k′i
) indeed
correspond to the correct Pi,ki , Pi,k′i . Next, we retrieve piPi,ki , piPi,k′i
from (τPi,ki , τPi,k′i
),
respectively, and run routine VerifySetDiff to validate the truthfulness of piRi as the
accumulation value of set Ri at level 3. Next, at level 4 we verify that piR is the
accumulation value of
⋂
iRi with VerifyIntersection, using piR, all piRi , and pi∩. Observe
that, at this point we know that piR corresponds to the accumulation of the correct
result of Q on T . At the last level 5, we verify that R is indeed this correct result by
checking if acc(R) = piR. We summarize this verification process in the pseudocode
below.
Updates. We focus on an insertion of a single tuple t (the case of deletions is
similar). The process is easier to follow by revisiting Figure 4·4. The owner first
computes h = H(t). It then inserts h in the appropriate position in the ordering of
each attribute ai, and properly updates all the prefix sets it affects. Note that, if h
is placed in position j for attribute ai, the owner must change sets Pi,j′ for all j
′ ≥ j,
and modify their corresponding proofs piPi,j′ in τPi,j′ . Furthermore, it must create a
new τPi,j , and alter vi,j in τPi,j−1 (where it appears as the second element). Finally,
it must propagate the changes of all τ triplets in all SMAi and SMA. Admittedly,
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Algorithm Prove(Q,R, pk, auth(T ))
1. Compute piR = acc(R)
2. For i = 1, ..., d
3. Compute Ri
4. Identify Pi,k and locate τPi,k = (vi,ki , vi,ki+1, piPi,ki )
5. Identify Pi,k′ and locate τPi,k′ = (vi,k′i , vi,k′i+1, piPi,k′i
)
6. Compute SMAi proofs for τPi,k , τPi,k′
7. Compute SMA proof for (i, δi)
8. piRi = ProveSetDiff(Ri, pk)
9. pi∩ = ProveIntersection(R,R1, ..., Rd, piR, piR1 , ..., piRd , pk)
10. Set pi = (piR, pi∩, (piRi , τPi,k , τPi,k′ , δi)
d
i=1, all SMA proofs)
11. Send pi,R to the client
Algorithm Verify(Q,R, pi, pk, δ)
1. Parse Q as (i, li, ui)
d
i=1
2. For i = 1, ..., d
3. Verify δi with respect to δ with SMA proof
4. Verify τPi,k , τPi,k′ with respect to δi with SMAi proofs
5. Verify vi,k′i < li ≤ vi,k′i+1 and vi,ki ≤ ui < vi,ki+1
6. Run VerifySetDiff(piPi,k , piPi,k′ , piRi , pk)
7. Run VerifyIntersection(piR, piR1 , ..., piRd , pi∩, pk)
8. Compute acc(R) and verify acc(R) = piR
9. If verification in Lines 3-8 fails, return reject, else return accept
the update process in this basic scheme can be quite expensive; in fact, it can be as
costly as re-running the setup stage. Due to this, we define algorithm Update for this
construction, as a simple call to Setup. In Section 4.5, we introduce a solution that
supports efficient updates, while maintaining all other asymptotic costs.
A set difference sub-protocol. Before we state our main result regarding our basic
scheme, we present a sub-protocol for proving the correctness of a set difference
operation between two sets X1, X2, under the constraint that the first is a proper
superset of the second. This constraint renders our sub-protocol conceptually simple
and very efficient. It consists of two routines ProveSetDiff and VerifySetDiff. The
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former takes as input set X1 \ X2 and outputs a proof for its validity as the set
difference of X1, X2. The latter receives succinct representations piX1 , piX2 , piX1\X2 of
X1, X2, X1 \X2, respectively, and returns accept if X1 \X2 is the set difference of
X1, X2, and reject otherwise. Below is the pseudo codes of the two routines.
Note that these routines are meaningful only as part of a more elaborate SOA
scheme (e.g., [PTT11, CPPT14]), which utilizes bilinear accumulators as well, and
relies on the same public key pk. More specifically, the caller SOA is enforced with
the computation of input X1 \ X2 to ProveSetDiff. Therefore, this routine simply
returns pi\ as the accumulation value of X1 \X2 in time O˜(|X1 \X2|). In addition,
the SOA must first check that inputs piX1 , piX2 of VerifySetDiff are the accumulation
values of X1, X2, such that X1 is a proper superset of X2, prior to calling the routine.
In this case, the cost of VerifySetDiff is O(1) pairings.
For example, in our scheme in Section 4.4.2, ProveSetDiff is called in algorithm
Prove for each set Ri, after Ri has been computed. Moreover, VerifySetDiff is in-
voked in Verify using as inputs the already verified accumulation values of prefix sets
Pi,ki , Pi,k′i that, by definition, satisfy the constraint Pi,ki ⊃ Pi,k′i . The following lemma
is useful in our proofs.
Lemma 7. Let λ be a security parameter, pub ← GenBilinear(1λ), and elements
(g, gs, ..., gs
q
) ∈ G, computed for some s chosen at random from Z∗p. Let X1, X2 be
sets with elements in Zp, such that X1 ⊃ X2. For an element y ∈ G, it holds that
y = acc(X1 \X2), iff e(acc(X2), y) = e(acc(X1), g).
Proof: (⇐) Let X1 = {x1, ..., xl′} and X2 = {x1, ..., xl} for l, l′ ∈ N with l < l′.
If e(acc(X2), y) = e(acc(X1), g), then we have e(g
∏l
i=1(xi+s), y) = e(g
∏l′
i=1(xi+s), g).
Hence, it holds e(y, g) = e(g
∏l′
i=l+1(xi+s), g)
def
= e(acc(X1 \ X2), g) which implies that
y = acc(X1 \X2), since e(g, g) is a generator of GT .
(⇒) If y = acc(X1 \ X2) = g
∏l′
i=l+1(xi+s), then it holds that e(g
∏l
i=1(xi+s), y) =
e(g
∏l
i=1(xi+s), g
∏l′
i=l+1(xi+s)) = e(g
∏l′
i=1(xi+s), g) = e(acc(X1), g). 2
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Algorithm ProveSetDiff(X1 \X2, pk)
1. Return pi\ = acc(X1 \X2)
Algorithm VerifySetDiff(piX1 , piX2 , pi\, pk)
1. If e(piX2 , pi\) = e(piX1 , g), return accept, else return reject
We can now state the following result.
Theorem 3. The scheme {KeyGen, Setup,Update,Prove,Verify} is a correct, effi-
cient, and secure AMR under the q-SBDH assumption.
Proof: The correctness of our scheme results from the semantics of the proof gen-
eration and verification and by close inspection of the algorithms. Moreover, since
the proof size is either O(d) or O(d log n), our construction satisfies the efficiency
requirement.
Let us assume there exists poly-size adversary A that wins the AMR security
game with non-negligible probability. Also, let Q,R∗, pi∗, j be the cheating tuple
output byA and let T denote the data structure’s state at index j, and auth(T ), δ the
corresponding authentication information and digest . In the following, we annotate
by ∗ any element of pi∗. Moreover, if an event is denoted by E , then its complement
is denoted by E ′. Consider the following events:
E1: A wins the AMR game.
E2: pi∗ contains a tuple τ ∗ or (i, δi)∗ /∈ auth(T ).
Recall that auth(T ) consists of m + 1 SMA structures; each of the m first is built
over n tuples τ containing sequential values and prefix accumulations for attribute
ai, and the last is built over m pairs of the form (i, δi), i.e., containing the attribute
index and corresponding digest. Note that, in the AMR game the values auth(T ), d
are computed correctly by the challenger for T .
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By the law of total probability, we have:
Pr[E1] = Pr[E2] Pr[E1|E2] + Pr[E ′2] Pr[E1|E ′2]
≤ Pr[E1|E2]] + Pr[E1|E ′2] .
Intuitively, the first term in the right hand of the above relation corresponds to an
adversary that wins by breaking the security of the underlying SMA and the second
term with breaking the q-SBDH.
Claim 4. Pr[E1|E2] is negligible in λ.
Proof: Let us assume it is non-negligible in λ. Without loss of generality, we will
assume that the non-existing tuple is of the form τ ∗, i.e., it should fall under some of
the first m SMA structures, e.g., SMAi. Since A wins, it follows that the AMR
verification succeeds however τ ∗ 6∈ SMAi. We now distinguish between the chosen
SMA instantiation:
• Merkle tree. We will construct adversary A′ that finds a collision in the
CRHF H used to implement the Merkle tree as follows. A′ runs BilGen(1λ)
to compute bilinear parameters pub, chooses s ←R Z∗p and q ∈ poly(λ) and
computes values gs, . . . , gs
q
. Finally, he runs A on input (pub, gs, . . . , gsq). He
then proceeds to provide oracle access for all the AMR algorithms. After the
setup and each update call from A, database Tη for η = 0, . . . , j is produced and
A′ stores all triplets (Tη, auth(Tη), δη). When A outputs his challenge tuple for
index j, A′ parses pi∗, checking for each tuple whether it appears in auth(Tj).
If any of them does not appear in auth(Tj), there must exist triplet τ in the
corresponding SMA ∈ auth(Tj) such that τ 6= τ ∗ and H(τ) = H(τ ∗) (for
the challenge sample key of H). This holds since the verification process for
τ ∗ under a Merkle tree in auth(Tj) succeeds, yet τ ∗ is not in the tree. By
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assumption this will happen with non-negligible probability, hence A′ breaks
the collision resistance of H, and the claim follows.
• Accumulation tree. The reduction proceeds in the same manner as in the
previous case. The difference is that A′ is now playing against an accumulation
tree challenger, he receives as input a public key that coincides perfectly with
the AMR game and he does not need to issue any queries to his challenger
before he sees the challenge tuple by A, since everything can be computed
with access to the public key only (this follows from the properties of the
bilinear accumulator used to build the tree). After A issues his challenge,
A′ constructs the tree SMAi by issuing consecutive update queries to his
challenger. Finally, he outputs τ ∗ and the part of pi∗ that corresponds to
proving (the false statement) that τ ∗ ∈ SMAi. By Lemma 4 this can only
happen with negligible probability, which contradicts our original assumption,
and the claim follows.
2
Now we prove that the second term of the inequality, namely Pr[E1|E ′2], is negli-
gible, by contradiction. Assume that Pr[E1|E ′2] is non-negligible. Since E2 does not
happen, all triplets τ ∗ and pairs (1, δ1), . . . , (m, δm) in pi∗ appear in auth(T ).
This immediately implies that the two values v∗i,l, v
∗
i,l+1 in each triplet are consecu-
tive along their dimension and each digest matches its corresponding dimension. By
construction, along each dimension there exist exactly two distinct τ ∗, τ ′∗ for which
verification of Q succeeds; one corresponds to the lower bound of the 1-dimensional
range of the query (li) and one for the upper (ui). Furthermore, if a triplet correctly
formed for SMA∗i of attribute ai, is used as part of the proof of an SMA∗j corre-
sponding to aj 6= ai, then it can be used to break the SMA security as shown in the
proof of Claim 4, which can only happen with negligible probability.
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From the above, it follows that, for all i, i′, the triplet τ ∗i,i′ ∈ pi∗ in dimension ai
contains the accumulation value of the correctly computed prefix set Pi,i′ with all
but negligible probability. Assuming this holds, by Lemma 7 and because verification
succeeds, it follows that pi∗Ri ∈ pi∗ is the accumulation value of the correctly computed
set Ri for query Q on T . Therefore, the values W
∗
i , F
∗
i ∈ pi∗∩, along with sets Ri and
cheating answer R∗ 6= R(Q, T ) as output by A, contradict Lemma 6, breaking the
q-SBDH assumption. Therefore, the probability Pr[E1|E ′2] must be negligible.
Since Pr[E1|E2] + Pr[E1|E ′2] is negligible, Pr[E1] must be negligible as well, contra-
dicting our original assumption that there exists poly-size adversary A that breaks
our scheme with non-negligible probability. 2
4.5 Update-efficient scheme
Here we present the necessary modifications to make our scheme handle updates in an
efficient way. As a building block for this, we also include a set union authentication
sub-protocol, for the case of union of disjoint sets.
4.5.1 Construction
Similar to our solution above, the update-efficient scheme views the query result as
a combination of “primitive set” operations. It then allows the server to compute a
small set of proof elements, which can be aggregated by the client in a bottom-up
fashion (similar to Figure 4·5). It adopts the same idea of computing proofs for
the partial Ri results along each dimension ai, and then combining them through
a set intersection protocol into a single proof that verifies the final result R. It
also adopts the idea of performing set difference operations over prefix sets. The
primary difference with the basic scheme is that we now organize the hash values
in the ordering of each dimension into buckets, and compute prefix sets over both
the buckets, as well as the hashes in each bucket. As we shall see, this twist isolates
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the effect of an update, thus, reducing the update cost complexity. It also mandates
small modifications of the overall authentication structure, proof generation, and
verification processes, and creates the need for a new set union sub-protocol. In the
following, we describe the main ideas behind the construction.
Figure 4·6 depicts the authentication structure created by the owner during the
setup stage, focusing on attribute ai. As before, the owner sorts the hash values
of the n tuples of T in ascending order of the ai values of the tuples. It then
creates b buckets, enumerated as Bi,1, . . . , Bi,b (bottom left in the figure). For clarity
of presentation, we assume that the partitioning of hashes into buckets is publicly
known (e.g., each bucket may correspond to a specific range of the domain of ai),
and that each bucket has n/b hashes.
h1
h1
Bi,1
Pi,1,1 Pi,1,n/b...
h2
SMA￿i
δ￿i
SMA
δ
...
Bi,b
Pi,1 Pi,b
(i, 1,πPi,1) (i, b,πPi,b)
...Pi,b,1 Pi,b,n/b
h2
τPi,1,1 τPi,1,n/b τPi,b,n/bτPi,b,1
SMAi,1 SMAi,b
δi,1 δi,b
SMAi
δi... ...
...
...
...
ai
...
Bucket Bi,1 Bucket Bi,b
Figure 4·6: The authentication structure for our dynamic scheme
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We define as Pi,j the prefix set over buckets Bi,1, . . . , Bi,j, i.e., the set of hashes
included in Bi,1, . . . , Bi,j (we use calligraphic P for bucket prefixes to distinguish them
from hash prefixes denoted by P ). The owner computes a proof piPi,j = acc(Pi,j) for
every Pi,j. In addition, for every bucket Bi,j, it computes prefixes Pi,j,l for the
hashes therein (bottom right in the figure), as well as proofs piPi,j,l = acc(Pi,j,l).
Subsequently, the owner creates a triplet (i, j, piPi,j) for every Pi,j, as well as tuple
τPi,j,l for every Pi,j,l. Note that τPi,j,l is similar to the case of the basic scheme (i.e., it
encompasses piPi,j,l along with two ai values), but now also incorporates the index j
of the bucket. The owner feeds (i, j, piPi,j) to the leaf level of SMA′i with digest δ′i.
It also feeds τPi,j,l to SMAi,j with digest δi,j. It then superimposes another SMAi
over digests δi,j which has digest δi. Finally, it builds SMA over all δ′i, δi with final
digest δ that is published. The various SMA’s will later allow the server to construct
proofs validating that piPi,j , piPi,j,l were indeed computed by the owner specifically for
bucket Bi,j; this is conceptually similar to their usage in the basic scheme.
We explain the proof construction and verification process using Figure 4·7, fo-
cusing on Ri. In our example, Ri fully covers buckets Bi,κ′+1, . . . , Bi,κ, and par-
tially covers buckets Bi,κ′ and Bi,k+1. Observe that we can decompose Ri into
three sets, let 1©, 2©, 3© (so that we alleviate our notation and allow an easy
reference to the figure), such that Ri = 1© ∪ 2© ∪ 3© and 1©, 2©, 3© are pair-
wise disjoint. Observe also that 1© = Pi,κ′,k \ Pi,κ′,k′ , 2© = Pi,κ \ Pi,κ′ , and
3© = Pi,κ′+1,k. Therefore, the server builds the proof pi by including proof com-
ponents piPi,κ′,k , piPi,κ′,k′ , piPi,κ , piPi,κ′ , piPi,κ′+1,k . Moreover, it adds (i, j, piPi,j), τPi,j,l ,
their proper proofs from SMA′i,SMAi,j,SMAi,SMA, as well as pi 1© = acc( 1©),
pi 2© = acc( 2©), pi 3© = acc( 3©). With all the above, the client can verify that pi 1©, pi 2©,
pi 3© are the truthful proofs for sets 1©, 2©, 3©.
The client next needs to combine pi 1©, pi 2©, pi 3© in order to verify that proof
106
h3
Bi,κ￿ Bi,κ+1
...
Bi,κ￿+1
Pi,κ￿
Pi,κ
... ...h4h5 h6... ...
Bi,κ
Pi,κ￿,k￿
Pi,κ￿,k
Pi,κ￿+1,k
Ri
1￿ 2￿ 3￿
Figure 4·7: Representation of Ri through sets
piRi = acc(Ri), also included in the final pi by the server, indeed corresponds to
the Ri that is the union of 1©, 2©, 3©. After that point, the client can proceed to
prove the final result R in an identical way to the basic scheme. For this partic-
ular task, we utilize our own customized set union sub-protocol, presented below.
This sub-protocol is motivated by similar reasons that motivated our set difference
sub-protocol previously; we need it to be executed in time O˜(|Ri|), and be secure
under standard cryptographic assumptions. What enables us to do this is the extra
constraint that the participant sets must be a priori proven pairwise disjoint. At a
high level, its ProveUnion routine outputs a proof pi∪ on input sets 1©, 2©, 3©, which
later facilitates the VerifyUnion routine invoked on pi 1©, pi 2©, pi 3©, piRi .
Consider that tuple t is inserted in bucket Bi,j (deletions are handled similarly).
This insertion affects all b bucket prefixes in the worst case, and all n/b hash prefixes
in Bi,j. It is important to observe that t does not affect any hash prefix of any
other bucket; in that sense, the buckets isolate the effect of the update within their
boundaries. Setting b =
√
n, the owner must update O(
√
n ·m) prefixes in overall,
each with a single exponentiation. Moreover, it should propagate the changes of
the corresponding proofs inside the SMA structures, whose cost is asymptotically
the same as in the case of the basic scheme. Therefore, the total update time in
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Algorithm ProveUnion(X1, X2, X3, pk)
1. Output pi∪ = acc(X1 ∪X2)
Algorithm VerifyUnion(piX1 , piX2 , piX3 , piX , pi∪, pk)
1. Verify e(piX1 , piX2) = e(pi∪, g)
2. Verify e(pi∪, piX3) = e(piX , g)
3. If verification in Lines 1-2 fails, return reject, else return accept
this construction reduces from O(n ·m) to O(√n ·m). Interestingly, the asymptotic
complexities of all other algorithms and the proof size remain unaffected. However,
the absolute costs slightly increase due to the extra bucket prefixes, as confirmed by
our experiments in Section 4.6. The proof of security for this construction follows
the exact same process as that of Theorem 3. The only difference is that instead of
set difference along each dimension, the operation performed is a union of disjoint
sets, therefore the security of the construction needs to be reduced on breaking the
soundness for such an operations. Next, we present the necessary sub-protocol for
this and prove its security.
A union sub-protocol. We present a sub-protocol for proving the correctness of
a union operation among a number of sets Xi under the constraint that they are
pairwise disjoint. We focus on the case of three input sets, as this is the way it is
utilized in Section 4.5. The sub-protocol consists of two routines, ProveUnion and
VerifyUnion. The former receives sets X1, X2, X3, and outputs a proof pi∪ for the
integrity of the union operation X = X1 ∪ X2 ∪ X3. The latter receives succinct
descriptions piX1 , piX2 , piX3 , piX of X1, X2, X3, X, respectively, as well as a proof pi∪,
and returns accept if X is the union of the three sets, and reject otherwise. We
provide the pseudo codes of the two routines below.
Similar to the set difference sub-protocol, these routines are meaningful only as
part of a SOA scheme based on bilinear accumulators. ProveUnion runs in time
O˜(|X1| + |X2| + |X3|). For VerifyUnion, it is the responsibility of the caller to check
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that piX1 , piX2 , piX3 are the accumulation values of pairwise disjoint X1, X2, and X3,
prior to calling the routine. Its cost is O(1) pairings. The following lemma is useful
in our proofs. It states the claim for the union of two disjoint sets but, it can trivially
be generalized for sets Xi for i ∈ [k], as long as Xi ∩Xj = ∅ for i, j ∈ [k] and i 6= j.
Lemma 8. Let λ be a security parameter, pub ← GenBilinear(1λ), and elements
(g, gs, ..., gs
q
) ∈ G, computed for some s chosen at random from Z∗p. Let X1, X2 be
sets with elements in Zp, such that X1∩X2 = ∅. For an element y ∈ G, it holds that
y = acc(X1 ∪X2), iff e(y, g) = e(acc(X1), acc(X2)).
Proof: (⇐) Let X1 = {x1, ..., xl′} and X2 = {x1, ..., xl} for l, l′ ∈ N with X1∩X2 = ∅.
If e(y, g) = e(acc(X1), acc(X2)), then we have e(y, g) = e(g
∏l′
i=1(xi+s), g
∏l
i=1(xi+s)).
Hence, it holds e(y, g) = e(g
∏l′
i=l+1(xi+s)·
∏l
i=1(xi+s), g)
def
= e(acc(X1 ∪ X2), g) which
implies that y = acc(X1 ∪X2), since e(g, g) is a generator of GT .
(⇒) If y = acc(X1 ∪ X2) = g
∏l′
i=1(xi+s)·
∏l
i=1(xi+s), then it holds that e(y, g) =
e(g
∏l
i=1(xi+s)·
∏l′
i=1(xi+s), g) = e(g
∏l
i=1(xi+s), g
∏l′
i=1(xi+s)) = e(acc(X1), acc(X2)). 2
4.6 Performance evaluation
We performed our experiments on a 64-bit machine with Intel Core i5 CPU 2.5GHz,
running Linux. We implemented both versions of our scheme in C++, using
the following libraries: DCLXVI [DCL16] for fast bilinear pairing computations,
Flint [Fli16] for modular arithmetic, and Crypto++ [Cry16] for SHA-256 hash op-
erations. DCLXVI employs a 256-bit BN elliptic curve and an asymmetric optimal
ate pairing, offering bit-level security of 128 bits. We represent elements of G1 with
768 bits using Jacobi coefficients, which yield faster operations. Elements in G2
are roughly twice as large as those of G1. We chose an asymmetric pairing for effi-
ciency reasons, but we note that this choice does not introduce any redundancy to
our schemes as presented with symmetric pairings. We instantiate all SMA’s with
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Operation Cost
Exp. in G1 / G2 0.55 / 0.94 ms
Mult. in Zp / GT 7 µs / 0.09 ms
SHA-256 / Bilinear pairing 5 µs / 1.41 ms
Quicksort in Zp (100/1000/10000 elems.) 0.1 / 0.9 / 4.6 ms
Acc. in G1 || 25.3 / 236 / 2, 628 ms
Acc. in G2 || 32.6 / 338 / 3, 471 ms
Polynom. Mult in Zp[r] (100/1000/10000 coeffs.) 0.4 / 7.3 / 92.9 ms
XGCD in Zp[r] || 8.4 / 599 / 108, 093 ms
Table 4.1: Costs of primitive operations
Merkle trees [Mer89] and bilinear accumulator trees [PTT08]. Table 4.1 summarizes
all primitive costs involved in our schemes.
We test four possible configurations: (i) our scheme with Merkle trees (Basic-Mer),
(ii) our basic scheme with accumulator trees (Basic-Acc), (iii) our update-efficient
scheme with Merkle trees (UpdEff-Mer), and (iv) our update-efficient scheme with
accumulator trees (UpdEff-Acc). For each configuration, we assess the performance
at the client, owner and server, varying several parameters. We run each experiment
10 times and report the average costs. Note that the performance of all schemes
does not depend on the data distribution, but rather on the table schema and result
selectivities. As such, we used synthetic datasets in our evaluation.
Client. Figure 4·8 depicts the verification cost at the client. This overhead is
mainly affected by the result size |R| and the number of query dimensions d. Figure
4·8 (left) shows the CPU time (in ms) as a function of |R|, fixing d = 32, n = 106
and m = 64. The verification cost increases with |R| in all schemes. Basic-Mer is the
fastest for |R| ≤ 1, 000. This is because the Merkle-based schemes are faster than
the accumulator-based ones, as they entail hash operations for the SMA proofs,
which are much cheaper than the pairings needed in accumulation trees. Moreover,
the overhead in the update-efficient schemes is slightly larger than that in their basic
counterparts, due to the extra proof verifications of the bucket prefixes and the taller
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Figure 4·8: Verification overhead at client
SMA hierarchy. Nevertheless, observe that, for |R| = 10, 000 the performance of
all schemes converges. The reason is that the computation of piR = acc(R) that is
common to all techniques becomes the dominant factor, which effectively hides the
costs of the SMA proofs and all set operation verifications.
Figure 4·8 (right) illustrates the CPU time versus d, when |R| = 1, 000, n = 106
and m = 64. The performance of the schemes is qualitatively similar to Figure
4·8 (left) for the same reasons. Once again, all costs increase linearly with d because
the verification overhead of the set differences and intersections is also linear in
d. However, the effect of d on the total CPU time is not as significant as that of
|R|, since the common accumulation cost for R emerges as the dominant cost when
|R| = 1, 000. In both figures, the verification time for all constructions is between 20
ms and 3.36 seconds.
Table 4.2 includes the proof sizes for the four schemes when varying d. We
make three observations. First, all sizes increase with d, since the proof includes
components for every dimension. Second, the basic schemes have smaller proofs
than their counterparts, again because of the extra bucket prefix proofs and taller
SMA hierarchy. Third, although Basic-Acc outperforms Basic-Mer , this is not true
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d 2 4 8 16 32
Basic-Mer 4.5 9.1 18.1 36.3 72.5
Basic-Acc 3.6 7.2 14.3 28.8 57.5
UpdEff-Mer 9.2 18.4 36.9 73.8 147.5
UpdEff-Acc 9.6 19.2 38.4 76.8 153.5
Table 4.2: Proof size in KB (n = 106,m = 64)
for UpdEff-Acc and UpdEff-Mer. This is because, although accumulators provide
asymptotically smaller proofs than Merkle trees, this does not hold in practice for
the database sizes we tested. In overall, the proofs for all schemes are quite succinct,
ranging from 4.5 to 153.5 KBs, which are independent of the result size that could
easily be in the order of MBs.
Owner. Figure 4·9 assesses the performance of the owner for the setup stage (which
includes the key generation), and updates. In this set of experiments, we focus
only on the Merkle-based schemes that have a clear performance advantage over the
accumulator-based, as evident also from our evaluation for the client above. Figure
4·9 (left) plots the pre-processing cost when varying n and fixing m = 64. Naturally,
the overhead increases linearly with n in both schemes. This overhead is dominated
by the computation of piPi,j for all i, j, which completely hides the sorting and hashing
costs (see also Table 4.1). As expected, UpdEff-Mer is more than twice as slow as
Basic-Mer. Although the pre-processing time can reach up to three hours for n = 106,
recall that this is a one-time cost for the owner.
Figure 4·9 (right) evaluates the update time as a function of the number of up-
dates performed in a single batch operation, where n = 105 and m = 64. Note that
we report the respective worst case in both schemes. For Basic-Mer, the CPU time is
practically unaltered and, in fact, is as bad as the setup overhead. On the contrary,
UpdEff-Mer is greatly benefited by the bucket isolation and becomes up to more than
two orders of magnitude more efficient than Basic-Mer. As the number of updates in
the batch increase, the performance gap between the two schemes closes, since the
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Figure 4·9: Setup (left) and update (right) overhead at owner.
updates in the batch are likely to affect more buckets. For the tested settings, the
update time ranges between 30 seconds and one hour.
Server. Figure 4·10 reports the proof generation time at the server. As explained
in our complexity analysis, the dominant factor here is
∑d
i=1 |Ri|. Therefore, due to
the lack of real-world data and query workloads, it suffices to vary |Ri| and fix it
across all dimensions, rather than varying d and setting an arbitrary partial result
size per dimension. Figure 4·10 depicts the CPU time at the server, when varying
|Ri| and setting n = 105, m = 64, d = 32 and |R| = 0.1 · |Ri| (i.e., 10% of a 1-
dimensional result). At every point of the curve, we also provide the percentages
of the three dominant computational costs, namely the construction of Wi, Fi (for
the intersection proof) and piRi . The performances of two schemes differ marginally.
This is because the generation of the extra set union proof of UpdEff-Mer incurs
negligible cost compared to the large burden of computing the three types of elements
mentioned above. The most interesting observation is that, for |Ri| = 10, the cost
for Wi is 51% and for Fi is 15%, whereas for |Ri| = 10, 000, the two costs become 7%
and 87%, respectively. This is because computing Fi requires running the Extended
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Figure 4·10: Proof construction cost at server
Euclidean (XGCD) algorithm, whose time increases drastically with the degree of the
polynomials (as shown in Table 4.1), dictated by |Ri|. The server’s total overhead
ranges between 650 ms and 25 minutes.
Comparison with general-purpose VC. Regarding support of range queries with
general-purpose VC schemes, [ZKP15] measures the costs for evaluating and provid-
ing a proof for a 10-dimensional query over a table with 10 attributes and just 1000
tuples, using the library of [BCTV14]. Even for this tiny dataset (much smaller
than the ones used in our previous experiments), the server needs ≈ 329 seconds, for
computing a single proof. It should be noted that this cost is fixed, i.e., independent
of the size of partial or final result. For comparison, for the same query, our scheme
takes anywhere from some milliseconds to a few seconds (depending, as discussed
above, on |Ri|). For example, for Ri set to 100, the time for proof construction is
approximately 1.1 second, i.e., more than 300x smaller. On the other hand, the proof
size produced with the library of [BCTV14] is fixed to 288 bytes which is smaller than
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what is achieved with our approach. However, we believe that an increase of proof
size to a few KB is justified (and a few KB is certainly not a prohibitive quantity)
given the significant computational gain at the server.
Summary and future improvements. Our experimental evaluation confirms the
feasibility of our schemes. Specifically, it demonstrates that the verification cost at
the client in all schemes is in the order of a few seconds in the worst case, even for
moderate result sizes, whereas the proof size is up to a few hundred of KBs. At the
owner, we illustrated the benefits of our update-efficient scheme over the basic one
in terms of updates, which come at the cost of a more expensive setup and client
verification. Finally, the server is the most impacted party in our constructions.
The proof generation cost takes from several ms to several minutes, for small and
moderate partial result sizes and dimensionality.
Nevertheless, it is important to stress that the defining costs at the server account
for exponentiations and modular polynomial arithmetic. These operations are at the
core of numerous applications and, thus, there is huge potential for improvement in
the near future. In addition, there are works (e.g., [Eme11]) that have substantially
boosted such operations with modern hardware, which we did not possess in our
experimentation. Being instantiations of a general framework, our schemes feature
the attractive property that they are easily upgradeable with future advances in such
cryptographic tools.
Chapter 5
Verifiable Pattern Matching Queries
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we design protocols for verifiable processing of pattern matching
queries. The problem setting involves an outsourced textual database, a query con-
taining a text pattern, and an answer regarding the presence or absence of the pattern
in the database. In its most basic form, the database consists of a single text T from
an alphabet Σ, where a query for pattern p, expressed as a string of characters, results
in answer “match at i”, if p occurs in T at position i, or in “mismatch” otherwise.
More elaborate models for pattern matching involve queries expressed as regular
expressions over Σ or returning multiple occurrences of p, and databases allowing
search over multiple texts or other (semi-)structured data (e.g., XML data). This
core data-processing problem has numerous applications in a wide range of topics in-
cluding intrusion detection [KS94], spam filtering [CB06], web search engines [RH02],
computational biology [AQD+02] and natural language processing [FAA+94].
5.1.1 Prior work
Previous works on authenticated pattern matching include the schemes by Martel
et al. [MND+04] for text pattern matching, and by Devanbu et al. [DGK+04] and
Bertino et al. [BCF+04] for XML search. In essence, these works adopt the same
general framework: First, by hierarchically applying a cryptographic hash function
(e.g., SHA-2) over the underlying database, a short secure description or digest of
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the data is computed. Then, the answer to a query is related to this digest via a
proof that provides step-by-step reconstruction and verification of the entire answer
computation. This approach typically leads to large proofs and, in turn, high verifi-
cation costs, proportional to the number of computational steps used to produce the
answer. In fact, for XML search, this approach offers no guarantees for the worst-case
cost of verification, since certain problem instances require that the proof includes
almost the entire XML document, or a very large part of it, in order to ensure that
no portions of the true (honest) answer were omitted from the returned (possibly
adversely altered) answer.
On the other hand, recent work on built systems for general-purpose VC (e.g.,
[PHGR13, BFR+13b, BCG+13]) allows verification of general classes of computation.
Here also, verification is based on cryptographic step-by-step processing of the entire
computation, expressed by circuits or RAM-based representations. Although special
encoding techniques allow for constant-size proofs and low verification costs, this
approach cannot yet provide practical solutions for pattern matching, as circuit-based
schemes inherently require complex encodings of all database searches, and RAM-
based schemes result in very high proof generation costs, that can range in the order
of hours for even medium database sizes (for example, see [ZPK14]). Indeed, costly
proof generation comprises the main bottleneck in all existing such implementations.
5.1.2 Overview of result
We wish to design schemes for authenticated pattern matching that have the follow-
ing two properties: (i) the validation of the correctness of the answer is based on a
proof that is succinct, having size independent of the database size and the query
description, and (ii) this proof can be quickly generated and verified. We emphasize
that our requirement to support pattern matching verification with easy-to-compute
constant-size proofs is in practice a highly desired property. First, it contributes
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to high scalability in query-intensive applications in settings where the server that
provides querying service for outsourced databases receives incoming requests by sev-
eral clients at high rates; then obviously, faster proof generation and transmission of
constant-size proofs result in faster response times and higher throughputs. But it
also promotes storage efficiency in data-intensive applications in settings where the
proof for a (mis)match of any pattern query over a database must be persistently
retained in storage for a long or even unlimited time duration; then, minimal-size
proofs result in the minimum possible storage requirements, a very useful feature in
big-data environments.
An example of a data-intensive application where pattern matching proofs might
be permanently stored, is the problem of securing the chain of custody in forensic
and intrusion detection systems used by enterprises today. Such systems often apply
big-data security analytics (e.g., [YOO+13]) over terabytes of log or network-traffic
data (collected from host machines, firewalls, proxy servers, etc.) for analysis and
detection of impending attacks. Since any data-analytics tool is only as useful as
the quality (and integrity) of its data, recent works (e.g., [YNR12, BHJT14]) focus
on the integrity of the data consumed by such tools, so that any produced security
alert carries a cryptographic proof of correctness. To support a verifiable chain
of custody,11 these proofs must be retained for long periods of time. As big-data
security analytics grow in sophistication, authenticated pattern matching queries
will be crucial for effective analytics (e.g., to match collected log data against known
high-risk signatures of attacks), hence storing only constant-size associated proofs
will be important in the fast-moving area of information-based security.
We present the first authentication schemes for pattern matching over textual
11Informally, any security alert—carrying important forensic value—can be publicly and
with non-repudiation verified—thus, carrying also legal value when brought as evidence to
court months, or even years, after the fact.
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databases that achieve the desired properties explained above. Our schemes employ
a novel authenticated version of the suffix tree data structure [GT02] that can provide
precomputed (thus, fast to retrieve), constant-size proofs for any basic-form pattern
matching query, at no asymptotic increase of storage.
Our pattern matching scheme has the following attractive properties:
• The size of the proof is O(1); specifically, it always contains at most 10 bilinear
group elements.
• The time to generate the proof that a query pattern of size m is found in κ
occurrences is O(m + κ), and very short in practice, as it involves no cryp-
tographic operations but only assembling of precomputed parts—e.g., it takes
less than 90µs to respond to a query of size 100 characters: 80µs to simply find
the (mis)match and less than 10µs to assemble the proof.
We extend our scheme to also support regular expressions with a constant number of
wildcards. Moreover, we apply our scheme for the authentication of pattern matching
queries over collections of text documents (returning the indices of documents with
positive occurrences), and exact path queries over XML documents. By design, these
schemes also achieve an asymptotically optimal communication overhead (that is, the
asymptotic communication cost is the same as simply transmitting the answer itself):
On top of the requested answer, the server provides only a constant number of bits
(modulo the security parameter)—e.g., for XML search and 128-bit security level,
proofs can be made as small as∼178 bytes. Unlike existing hash-based authentication
schemes [BCF+04, DGK+04, MND+04], our authentication schemes support fully
parallelizable setup: They can be constructed in O(log n) parallel time on O(n/ log n)
processors in the EREW model, thus maintaining the benefits of known parallel
algorithms for (non-authenticated) suffix trees [Ja´J92, MASK11]. While the use of
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precomputed proofs best matches static text databases, we also present efficient fully
or semi-dynamic extensions of our schemes.
5.1.3 Overview of techniques
Our construction is again an ADS and we follow the framework of [TT10]: Our
scheme first defines and encodes answer-specific relations that are sufficient for cer-
tifying (unconditionally) that an answer is correct and, then, cryptographically au-
thenticates these relations using optimal-size proofs. We achieve this by employing
in a novel way the bilinear accumulator over a special encoding of the database with
respect to a suffix tree, used to find the pattern (mis)match. The encoding effectively
takes advantage of the suffix tree where patterns in the database share common pre-
fixes, which in turn can be succinctly represented by an accumulator. For the XML
query application, we use the same approach, this time over a trie defined over all
possible paths in the document, and we link each path with the respective XML
query answer (i.e., all reachable XML elements).
Comparison with related works. Table 5·1 summarizes our work as compared
to [BCF+04, DGK+04, MND+04].12 In [MND+04] a general technique is applied to
the suffix tree, that authenticates every step of the search algorithm, thus obtaining
proof size proportional to the length of the pattern, which is not optimal. Moreover,
due to the use of sequential hashing, this solution is inherently not parallelizable. The
authors of [DGK+04] authenticate XPath queries over a simplified version of XML
documents by relying on the existence of a document type definition (DTD) and
applying cryptographic hashing over a trie of all possible semantically distinct path
queries in the XML document. An alternative approach is taken in [BCF+04], where
12We note that our ADS schemes operate with any accumulator, not just the accu-
mulator. In fact, using the RSA accumulator [CL02a] reduces verification cost to O(m).
However, a recent experimental comparison demonstrates that the bilinear accumulator is
more efficient in practice [Tre13].
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similar XML queries are authenticated by applying cryptographic hashing over the
XML tree structure. As discussed above, both these approaches suffer from very bad
worst-case performance, e.g., yielding verification proofs/costs that are proportional
to the size of the XML tree. However, these works are designed to support general
path queries, not only exact, as our work does. Recently, the authors of [FHV13]
presented a protocol for verifiable pattern matching that achieves security and secrecy
in a very strong model, hiding the text even from the responding server. While that
work offers security in a much more general model than ours, it has the downside
that the owner that outsourced the text is actively involved in query responding
and that it makes use of heavy cryptographic primitives, the practicality of which
remains to be determined. There is a large number of ADS schemes in the database
and cryptography literature for various classes of queries (e.g., [Mer89, CPPT14,
LHKR10]). Also related to our problem is keyword search authentication, which has
been achieved efficiently, e.g., in [PM08, YPPK09a, PTT11]. As previously discussed,
verifiable computation systems such as [PHGR13, BFR+13b] can be used for the
verification of pattern matching; although optimized to provide constant-size proofs
these constructions remain far from practical. Finally, parallel algorithms in the
context of verifiable computation have only recently been considered. In [TRMP12,
SBV+13] parallel algorithms are devised for constructing a proof for arithmetic-
circuit computations.
5.2 Pattern matching queries
The problem of pattern matching involves determining whether a pattern appears
within a given text. In its basic form, assuming an alphabet Σ of size |Σ| = σ, a
n-character text T ∈ Σn and a pattern p ∈ Σm of length m, the problem is expressed
as “is there position 1 < i ≤ n−m+1 such that T [i+j] = p[j] for j = 0, . . .m−1?”,
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where T [i] is the character at the i-th position in the text, and likewise for pattern
p. If there exists such i, the answer is “match at i”, otherwise “mismatch”.
Answering pattern matching queries is an arduous task, if done naively. For
instance, to check the occurrence of p in T , one could sequentially test if p occurs at
any position i (i.e., if it is a prefix of some suffix of T ), for all positions in T . Such
a successful test would imply a match but would require O(n) work. However, with
some preprocessing of O(n) work, one can organize patterns in a suffix tree [Wei73],
reducing the complexity of pattern matching query from O(n) to O(m). A suffix
tree is a data structure storing all the suffixes of T in a way such that any repeating
patterns (common prefixes) of these suffixes are stored once and in a hierarchical way,
so that every leaf of the suffix tree corresponds to a suffix of the text T . This allows
for (reduced) O(m) search time while maintaining (linear) O(n) space usage.13We
provide next a more detailed description of the suffix tree data structure, represented
as a directed tree G = (V,E, T ,Σ). We refer to the example of Figure 5·2 depicting
the suffix tree for the word minimize.
Each leaf of G corresponds to a distinct suffix of T , thus G has exactly n leaves.
We denote with S[i] the i-th suffix of T , that is, S[i] = T [i] . . . T [n], for i = 1, . . . , n.
Internal tree nodes store common prefixes of these n suffixes S[1], S[2], . . . , S[n],
where the leaves themselves store any “remainder” non-overlapping prefixes of T ’s
suffixes. If leaf vi corresponds to suffix S[i], then S[i] is formed by the concatenation
of the contents of all nodes in the root-to-leaf path defined by vi, where the root
conventionally stores the empty string. For instance, in Figure 5·2, S[4] = imize and
S[6] = ize, respectively associated with the paths defined by the second and fourth
most left leaves, labelled by mize and ze (having as common parent the node labelled
by i).
13This can be easily achieved by storing pointers to the text at the nodes, instead of
entire prefixes.
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Figure 5·2: Suffix tree for minimize storing suffixes minimize, inimize,
nimize, imize, mize, ize, ze, e as eight overlapping paths.
Additionally, every node v ∈ V stores the following information that will be useful
in the case of the mismatch: (a) the range rv = (sv, ev) of v, which corresponds to
the start (sv) and end (ev) position of the string stored in v in the text (we pick
an arbitrary range if v is associated with multiple ranges); (b) the depth dv of v,
which corresponds to the number of characters from the root to v, i.e., the number
of characters that are contained in the path in G that consists of the ancestors of
v; (c) the sequel Cv of v, which corresponds to the set of initial characters of the
children of v. For example in Figure 5·2, for the node v labelled mi, it is sv = 1 and
ev = 2 (or sv = 5 and ev = 6), dv = 0, Cv = {n, z}.
Traversing a suffix tree. This data structure allows for efficient searches of
any given pattern p. Since all matching patterns must be a prefix of some suffix,
the search algorithm beings from the root and traverses down the tree incrementally
matching pattern p with the node labels, until it reaches some node v where either
a mismatch or a complete match is found. We model this search on suffix tree G =
(V,E, T ,Σ) by algorithm (v, k, t) ← suffixQuery(p,G), returning: (1) the matching
node v, i.e., the node of G at which the algorithm stopped with a match or mismatch,
(2) the matching index k, sv ≤ k ≤ ev, i.e., the index (with reference to the specific
range (sv, ev)) where the last matching character occurs (for successful matching
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Figure 5·3: (Left) Pattern matching in our scheme for pattern p
(|p| = m), using suffixes S[i] and S[j], where S[i] = pS[j]. (Right)
Pattern mismatch in our scheme, using suffixes S[i] and S[j], where
S[i] = p1p2 . . . ptS[j] and t < m.
searches, k coincides with the index of the last character of p within v), and (3) the
prefix size t ≤ m, i.e., the length of maximum matching prefix of p (m in case of a
match). Figure 5·3 shows the relation of variables k and t for both cases.
Characterization of pattern matching queries. We provide here two important
lemmas that characterize the correct execution of algorithm suffixQuery, by provid-
ing necessary and sufficient conditions for checking the consistency of a match or
mismatch of p in T with the output (v, k, t) produced by suffixQuery. In the next
section, we will base the security of our construction on proving, in a cryptographic
manner, that these conditions hold for a given query-answer pair. Namely, the struc-
ture of these relations allows us to generate succinct and efficiently verifiable proofs.
In the following we denote with xy the concatenation of two strings x, y (order is
important).
Lemma 9 (Pattern match). There is a match of p in T if and only if there exist
two suffixes of T , S[i] and S[j], with i ≤ j, such that S[i] = pS[j].
Proof: (⇒) Suppose there is a match of p it T . Let i be the index where the match
starts and j be the index where the match ends. Then for the suffixes S[i] and S[j]
it holds S[i] = pS[j]. (⇐) Suppose there exist two suffixes S[i] and S[j] of a text T
for which it holds S[i] = pS[j]. Then p has to be part of the text T and therefore
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there is match of p in T . 2 2
Lemma 10 (Pattern mismatch). There is a mismatch of p in T if and only if
there exist a node v ∈ G, an integer k ∈ [sv, ev] and an integer t < m such that
S[sv − dv] = p1p2 . . . ptS[k+ 1] and pt+1 6= T [k+ 1], if k < ev, or pt+1 /∈ cv if k = ev.
Proof: (⇒) Suppose there is a mismatch of p in T . The desired triplet (v, k, t) is the
one output by the algorithm (v, k, t)← suffixQuery(p,G), where v ∈ G is the node of
the suffix tree where the mismatch is returned, k ∈ [sv, ev] is the matching index and
t < m is the prefix size. Since t is the prefix size there is a match of p1p2 . . . pt in T .
Therefore, by Lemma 9 there exist i and j with i ≤ j such that S[i] = p1p2 . . . ptS[j].
By the properties of the suffix tree, it is i = sv − dv and j = k + 1 (note that since
t = dv + k − sv + 1 ≥ 0 it is always i ≤ j, as required by Lemma 9). We distinguish
the following cases:
• k < ev. The mismatch is happening within the node v. All patterns in T
starting with p1p2 . . . pt traverse that node up to index k < ev. Therefore it has
to be pt+1 6= T [k + 1];
• k = ev. The last matching character is the last character of node v. All patterns
in T starting with p1p2 . . . pt traverse the whole node (i.e., up to index k = ev)
and continue with any of its children. Since there is a mismatch after that, it is
the case that pt+1 should not belong to the sequel of v, which implies pt+1 /∈ cv.
(⇐) By contradiction. Suppose there exist a node v ∈ G, an integer k ∈ [sv, ev) and
an integer t < m such that S[sv − dv] = p1p2 . . . ptS[k + 1] and pt+1 6= T [k + 1] and
however, there is a match of p in T . Since S[sv−dv] = p1p2 . . . ptS[k+1], all patterns
in T starting with p1p2 . . . pt traverse that node v to index k < ev. Therefore, for a
match to exist, it must be pt+1 = T [k + 1]. This is contradiction. For the second
case, the same argument holds. The contradiction is reached by deriving the false
argument pt+1 ∈ cv. This completes the proof. 2 2
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With reference to Figure 5·2, the match of the pattern p = inim, can be shown by
employing the suffixes S[2] = inimize and S[6] = ize. Note that indeed S[2] = pS[6].
This is a match (as in Lemma 9). More interestingly, observe the case of mismatch for
the string p = minia. For this input, algorithm suffixQuery returns the node v labelled
by nimize where the mismatch happens, matching index k = 4 and prefix size t = 4.
For node v, we have sv = 3 and ev = 8 and also dv = 2. To demonstrate the mismatch,
it suffices to employ suffixes S[sv− dv] = S[1] = minimize and S[k+ 1] = S[5] = mize
as well as symbols pt+1 and T [k + 1]. The concatenation of the prefix mini of p (of
size t = 4) with the suffix S[5] is S[1], and also pt+1 = a 6= T [k + 1] = m. This
is a mismatch (as the first case considered in Lemma 10, since k < ev). Finally, to
demonstrate the mismatch of the string p = mia we proceed as follows. Algorithm
suffixQuery returns the node v labelled by mi where the mismatch happens, matching
index k = 6 and prefix size t = 2. For node v, we have sv = 5 and ev = 6 (alternatively
we can also have sv = 1 and ev = 2) and also dv = 0. It suffices to employ suffixes
S[sv − dv] = S[5] = mize and S[k + 1] = S[7] = ze as well as symbol pt+1 and sequel
(set) cv. Note that indeed the concatenation of the prefix mi of p (of size t = 2) with
the suffix S[7] is S[5], and that also pt+1 = a /∈ cv = {n, z}. This is a mismatch (as
in Lemma 10, since k = ev).
5.3 Main construction
We now present our main ADS scheme for verifying answers to pattern matching
queries. Our construction is based on building a suffix tree over the outsourced text
and proving in a secure way the conditions specified in Lemmas 9 and 10 for the
cases of match and mismatch respectively. The main cryptogaphic tool employed is
the bilinear accumulator, which will be used to authenticate the contents of a suffix
tree in a structured way, allowing the server to prove the existence of appropriate
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suffixes in the text and values in the tree that satisfy the conditions in the two
lemmas. Moreover, due to the properties of the bilinear accumulator, the produced
proofs will be independent of the size of the text and the pattern, consisting only of
a constant number of bilinear group elements.
Key generation. The algorithm genkey proceeds as follows. The text owner
first runs GenBilinear(1λ) to compute bilinear parameters pub = (p,G,GT , e, g). He
then picks a random s ∈ Zp and computes g = [g, gs, . . . , gs` ]. Finally, the key pair
is defined as sk = s, pk = (pub,g).
Setup. The setup process is described in pseudo-code in Algorithm 1 and we provide
a detailed explanation of each step here. The owner first computes a suffix accumu-
lation for each suffix in the text with a linear pass. This value encodes information
about the text contents of the suffix, its starting position and its leading character. In
particular, acc(S[i]) is denoted as acci := acc(Xi1∪Xi2∪Xi3), where (a) Xi1 is the set
of position-character pairs in suffix S[i], i.e., Xi1 = {(pos, i, T [i]), . . . , (pos, n, T [n])} ;
(b) Xi2 is the first character of S[i], i.e., Xi2 = {(first, T [i])}; and (c) Xi3 is the index
of S[i], i.e., Xi3 = {(index, i)}. Also, for each suffix S[i] he computes a suffix structure
accumulation ti = acc(Xi1), i.e. it contains only the position-character pairs in the
suffix and its use will be discussed when we explain the verification process of our
scheme. Structure accumulations are a very important part for the security of our
construction. Observe that the suffix structure accumulation ti encompasses only a
subset of the information encompassed in acci. The security of the bilinear accumu-
lator makes proving a false subset relation impossible, hence no efficient adversary
can link ti with accj for j 6= i.
Following this, the owner builds a suffix tree G = (V,E, T ,Σ) over the text and
computes a node accumulation for each v ∈ G. This value encodes all the information
regarding this node in G, i.e., the range of T it encompasses, its depth in the tree
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and the leading characters of all its children nodes (taken in consecutive pairs). More
formally, for a node v with values (sv, ev), dv, cv, its accumulation is defined as accv :=
acc(Yv1 ∪ Yv2 ∪ Yv3), where: (a) Yv1 is the range of v , i.e., Yv1 = {(range, sv, ev)};
(b) Yv2 is the depth of v, i.e., Yv2 = {(depth, dv)}; and (c) Yv3 is the sequel of v
defined as the set of consecutive pairs Yv3 = {(sequel, ci, ci+1)|i = 1, . . . , `− 1} where
Cv) = {c1, c2, . . . , c`} is the alphabetic ordering of the first characters of v’s children.
He also computes a node structure accumulator tv = acc(Yv3) (similar to what we
explained for suffixes). Finally, for each sequel ci, ci+1, compute a subset witness
WP,Y (as defined in Section 2) where P = {(sequel, cj, cj+1)} and Y = Yv1∪Yv2∪Yv3.
This will serve to prove that the given sequel of characters are leading characters of
consecutive children of v.
Note that, the keywords pos, first, index, range, depth and sequel are used as
descriptors of the value that is accumulated. Without loss of generality one can view
the elements of sets Xij, Yij, j ∈ {1, 2, 3} as distinct λ-bit strings (each less than
the group’s prime order p ∈ O(2λ)), simply by applying an appropriate deterministic
encoding scheme r(·). Therefore, when we accumulate the elements of these sets,
we are in fact accumulating their numerical representation under encoding r. This
allows us to represent all accumulated values as distinct elements of Zp, achieving
the necessary domain homogeneity required by the bilinear accumulator.
At the end of this procedure, each suffix S[i] has its suffix accumulation acci and
its suffix structure accumulation ti. Also, each node v ∈ G is associated with its
node accumulation accv, its node structure accumulation tv and one subset witness
WP,C for each consecutive pair of its children. We denote with V ,S the sets of node
and suffix accumulations accv and acci, respectively. As a final step, the owner builds
two accumulation trees AT V ,AT S , using the bilinear accumulator described by the
key pair. Let dV , dS be their respective digests. He sends to the server the text
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Algorithm 1: setup(T , pk, sk)
1. For suffix i = 1, . . . , n
2. Compute suffix structure accumulation ti
3. Compute suffix accumulation acci
4. Build suffix tree G = (V,E, T ,Σ)
5. For each node v ∈ G
6. Compute node structure accumulation tv
7. Compute node accumulation accv
8. For each consecutive pair of children of v
9. Compute subset witness WP,C
10. Build accumulation trees AT V ,AT S
11. Send T , auth(T ) to the server and publish pk, dV , dS
T , as well as authentication information auth(T ) consisting of the suffix tree G, the
two accumulation trees AT V ,AT S and all values acci, accv, ti, tv,WP,C, and publishes
pk, dV , dS .
Proof generation. We next describe proof generation for pattern matching queries,
i.e., matches and mismatches. The process varies greatly for the two cases as can be
seen in Algorithm 2 below. The role of each proof component will become evident
when we discuss the verification process in the next paragraph. In both cases, let
(v, k, t) be the matching node inG, the matching index and the prefix size returned by
algorithm (v, k, t)← suffixQuery(p,G) (as described in Section 5.2 and Figure 5·3).
Proving a match. In this case the answer is α(q) = “match at i”. Let p = p1p2 . . . pm
be the queried pattern. The server computes i = sv−dv and j = i+m. By Lemma 9,
suffixes S[i] and S[j] are such that S[i] = pS[j] and i ≤ j. The corresponding indexes
are easily computable by traversing the suffix tree for p. The server returns i, j
along with characters T [i], T [j] as well as suffix structure and suffix accumulations
acci, accj, ti, tj. Finally, using accumulation tree AT S , he computes proofs pii, pij for
validating that acci, accj ∈ S.
Proving a mismatch. In this case the answer to the query q is α(q) = “mismatch”.
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Algorithm 2: query(q, T , auth(T ), pk)
1. Call suffixQuery(p,G) to receive (v, k, t)
2. Set i = sv − dv
3. If t = m Then
4. Set a(q) = “match at i” and j = i+m
5. Lookup acci, accj, ti, tj in auth(T )
6. Compute AT S proofs pii, pij for acci, accj
7. Set Π(q) = (j, T [i], T [j], acci, accj, ti, tj, pii, pij)
8. Else
9. Set a(q) = “mismatch” and j = i+ k + 1
10. Lookup accv, acci, accj, tv, ti, tj in auth(T )
11. Compute AT S proofs pii, pij for acci, accj
12. Compute AT V proof piv for accv
13. Set aux = (sv, ev, dv, i, j, k, t)
14. Set Π(q) = (aux, T [i], T [j], accv, acci, accj, tv, ti, tj, piv, pii, pij)
15. If k = ev Then
16. Traverse the sequels of v to find pair c, c′ s.t. c < pt+1 < c′
17. Let P = {(sequel, c, c′)}
18. Lookup subset witness WP,C
19. Set Π(q) ∪ {P ,WP,C}
20. Output a(q),Π(q)
Let (sv, ev), dv and cv be the range, depth and sequel of v. The server computes
i = sv − dv and j = i + k + 1 and returns sv, ev, dv, k, t, i, j, T [i], T [j] along with
accumulations accv, acci, accj with proofs piv, pii, pij and structure accumulation values
tv, ti, tj. Finally, if k = ev he also returns WP,C where P contains sequel c, c′ such
that c < pt+1 < c
′.
Verification. Here we describe the verification algorithm of our scheme. Below we
provide the pseudo-code in Algorithm 3 and an intuitive explanation for the role
of each component of the proof. In both cases, the verification serves to check the
conditions stated in Lemmas 9, 10, which suffices to validate that the answer is
correct.
Verifying a match. Recall that, by Lemma 9, it suffices to validate that there exist
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suffixes S[i], S[j] in the text, such that S[j] = pS[i]. First the client verifies that
acci, accj ∈ Π(q) are indeed the suffix accumulations of two suffixes of T using proofs
pii, pij (Line 1). Then, it checks that the corresponding structure accumulations are
indeed ti, tj (Lines 2-4). It remains to check that the “difference” between them is p
(Lines 6-7), by first computing the pattern accumulation value gp) for p =
∏m
l=1(s+
r(pos, i + l − 1, pl)). A careful observation shows that this is indeed the “missing”
value between the honestly computed structure accumulations ti, tj. This can be
cryptographically checked by a single bilinear equality testing e(ti, g) = e(tj, g
p).
This last step can be viewed as an accumulator-based alternative to chain-hashing
using a collision-resistant hash function. It follows from the above that, if all these
checks succeed, the conditions of Lemma 9 are met.
Verifying a mismatch. The case of a mismatch is initially similar to that of a match,
however, it eventually gets more complicated. The client begins by verifying the
same relations as for the case of a match for two indices i, j (Lines 1-4). In this case,
these positions correspond to two suffixes S[i], S[j] such that S[j] = p′S[i], where
p′ is a prefix of p, i.e., their difference is a beginning part of the pattern (Lines 9-
10). Unfortunately, this is not enough to validate the integrity of the answer. For
example, a cheating adversary can locate the occurrence of such a prefix of p in the
text, and falsely report its position, ignoring that the entire p appears in T as well.
We, therefore, need to prove that p′ is the maximal prefix of p appearing in the text
and here is where the properties of the suffix tree become useful. In particular, if two
characters appear consecutively within the same node of G, it must be that every
occurrence of the first one in T is followed by the second one. Hence, if the server
can prove that the part of T corresponding to the final part of p′ as well as the
consequent character, both fall within the same node and said consequent character
is not the one dictated by p, it must be that p′ truly is the maximal prefix of p ∈ T .
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Algorithm 3: verify(q, α(q),Π(q), d, pk)
1. Verify acci, accv with respect to dS , with pii, pij
2. Compute gx for x = (s+ r(first, T [i]))(s+ r(index, i))
3. Compute gy for y = (s+ r(first, T [j]))(s+ r(index, j))
4. Verify that e(ti, g
x) = e(acci, g) and e(tj, g
y) = e(accj, g)
5. If α(q) = “match at i” Then
6. Compute gp for p =
∏m
l=1(s+ r(pos, i+ l − 1, pl))
7. Verify that e(ti, g) = e(tj, g
p)
8. Else
9. Compute gp for p =
∏t
l=1(s+ r(pos, i+ l − 1, pl))
10. Verify that e(ti, g
p) = e(tj, g)
11. Verify that i = sv − dv and sv ≤ k ≤ ev and j = i+ k + 1
12. Verify accv, with respect to dV , with piv
13. Compute gz for z = (s+ r(range, sv, ev))(s+ r(depth, dv))
14. Verify that e(tv, g
z) = e(accv, g)
15. If k < ev Then verify that pt+1 6= T [j]
16. Else
17. Verify that c < pt+1 < c
′ (alphabetically)
18. Compute gw for w = s+ r(sequel, c, c′)
19. Verify that e(WP,C, gw) = e(accv, g)
20. If any check fails Then output reject, Else accept
This is done by checking the relation between the node accumulation and the node
structure accumulation of the returned node v (Lines 11-15).
This however does not cover the case where the consequent character, after p′,
falls within a child node of v (i.e., the part of T corresponding to p′, ends at the end of
the range of v). To accommodate for this case, the server needs to prove that the next
character in p, does not appear as the leading character of any of v’s children. Since
all these characters have been alphabetically ordered and accumulated in consecutive
pairs, it suffices to return the corresponding pair P that “covers” this consequent
character. The validity of this pair is guaranteed by providing the related pre-
computed witness, the relation of which to node v is tested by checking a bilinear
equality (Lines 17-19).
We can now state and prove our main result.
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Theorem 4. The scheme {genkey,setup,query,verify} is a static ADS for the
class of pattern matching queries q over a text T of size polynomial in λ. It is correct
and secure under the q-SBDH assumption.
Proof: The correctness of our scheme follows from close inspection of the algorithms.
Assume now that there exists a poly-size adversary A that outputs a winning tuple
for the ADS game. We will show that under the q-SBDH assumption this can only
happen with negligible probability.
Let T , auth(T ), dV , dS , q, α∗(q),Π(q) be the tuple output by A at the end of the
ADS game. We argue separately for the match and mismatch case specified by α∗(q):
Match In this case, A falsely claims that pattern p, specified by query appears in
T at position i. In reality however, p does not appear in T at that position.
Note that this covers both the case where p does not appear in T at all,
and the case where it appears at i′ 6= i. By Lemma 4, the values acci, accj
included in Π(q) are actual accumulation values for the suffixes at positions
i, j in T , with all but negligible probability. Assume that the value T ∗ [i]
in Π(q) is different than the character T [i] from the actual text. Let Si =
Xi1 ∪ Xi2 ∪ Xi3 be the accumulated set for acci, efficiently computable from
T . Then for the set R = {r(first, T ∗[i]), r(index, i)} it is true that R 6⊆ Si,
yet e(ti, g
(s+r(first,T ∗[i]))(s+r(index,i))) = e(ti, gR(s)) = e(acci, g). However, from
Lemma 1, this can only happen with negligible probability, therefore it must
be that T ∗[i] = T [i], and similarly for T ∗[j] = T [j]. Likewise, from the
fact that the above equation holds, as verification succeeds, it follows that
indeed the term ti from Π(q) can be written as ti = acc(Xi1), where Xi1 =
{(pos, i, T [i]), . . . , (pos, n, T [n])} is the correct set for the i-the suffix in T , and
likewise, tj = acc(Xj1).
Observe that, by construction Xi1 ⊂ Xj1. Therefore, by Lemma 7, it must
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be that the term gp is the accumulation of their set difference. Equivalently,
S[i] = pS[j], which from Lemma 9 means that p appears in T at i, which
contradicts our original assumption. From the above analysis, under the q-
SBDH, this case can occur only with negligible probability.
Mismatch In this case, A falsely claims that pattern p, specified by query q, does
not appear in T . By Lemma 4, the values accv, acci, accj included in Π(q) are
actual accumulation values for node v and for the suffixes at positions i, j in T ,
with all but negligible probability. Using the same analysis as for the match
case above, it follows that T ∗[i] = T [i] and likewise for T ∗[j], with all but
negligible probability.
Now, we need to separately inspect two sub-cases, namely whether the mis-
match occurred at the end of a node or not. For the former case, using the
same analysis as for the match case above, it follows that sv, ev, dv are the
correct values for node v with all but negligible probability. Moreover, it must
also be that S[i] = p′S[j] where p′ is the length t prefix of the queried pattern
p, i.e., p′ appears in T at position i. Since sv ≤ k ≤ ev, it follows that all
occurrences of p′ are followed by T ∗[j]. Finally, since verification succeeds,
pt+1 6= T ∗[j] = T [j]. From Lemma 10, this means that p does not appear in
T , contradicting our original assumption. From the above analysis, under the
q-SBDH, this case can occur only with negligible probability.
For the latter case, from Lemma 1 the sequel c, c′ ∈ Π(q) is a valid sequel of first
characters of children of v (i.e., r(sequel, c, c′) ∈ Yv3), with all but negligible
probability. Therefore, p′ is never followed by pt+1 in T , and from Lemma 10,
this means that p does not appear in T , contradicting our original assumption.
From our analysis, under the q-SBDH, this case can occur only with negligible
probability.
135
2
Complexity analysis. The running time of algorithm setup is O(n). This fol-
lows immediately from the following: (i) the construction of G takes O(n) and the
produced tree contains O(n) nodes, (ii) all suffix and suffix structure accumulations
can be computed with a single pass over T , (iii) node and node structure accumu-
lation values can be computed in time linear to the number of the node’s children
(using sk); since each node has a unique parent node, all node accumulations are
also computable in time O(n), and (iv) an accumulation tree over n elements can
be constructed in time O(n). The running time of algorithm query is O(m), be-
cause all proof components in Π(q) are pre-computed (including AT proofs if the
accumulation trees are of height 1), hence the only costly component is the suffix
tree traversal which takes O(m). For algorithm verify the runtime is O(m logm).
This holds because verification of AT proofs can be done with O(1) operations, ac-
cumulating a set of m elements, with pk alone, takes O(m logm) operations and only
a constant number of checks is made. The proof consists of a constant number of
bilinear group elements (at most ten, corresponding to the case of a mismatch at the
end of a node). Finally the overall storage space for auth(T ) is O(n).
Handling wildcards. Our construction can be easily extended to support pattern
matching queries expressed as limited regular expressions. In particular, it can ac-
commodate queries with patterns containing a constant number of “wildcards” (e.g.,
∗ or ?). To achieve this we proceed as follows. Partition p into segments associated
with simple patterns, with the wildcards falling between them. Proceed to run proof
generation and verification for each segment individually. For the mismatch case, it
suffices for the server to demonstrate that just one of these segments does not ap-
pear in T . For the match case, the server proves existence for all segments and the
clients verifies each one separately. He then checks that the positions of occurrence
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(expressed as the i, j indices of each segment) are “consistent”, i.e., they fall in the
correct order within the text (or they have the specified distance in case there is a
corresponding restriction in the query specification).
5.4 Applications
In this section we discuss two practical applications of our construction. We first
show how our scheme can be used to accommodate pattern matching queries over
a collection of documents and then explain how our bilinear accumulator authenti-
cation technique can be modified to support a class of queries over semi-structured
data, namely XML documents. Finally, we discuss how our construction can be
extended to efficiently handle modifications in the dataset.
5.4.1 Search on collection of text documents
We generalize our main construction to handle queries over multiple documents. By
adding some modifications in the suffix tree authentication mechanism, we build a
scheme that supports queries of the form “return all documents that contain pattern
p”. This enhancement yields a construction that is closer to real-world applications
involving querying a corpus of textual documents.
Let T1, . . . , Tτ be a collection of τ documents, with content from the same alphabet
Σ. Without loss of generality, assume each of them has length n, and let N be the
sum of the lengths of all Ti, i.e., N = τn. We assume a data structure that upon
input a query q, expressed as string pattern p from Σ, returns the index set I := {i|p
appears in Ti}, i.e., the indices of all documents that contain the pattern. Using
our construction as a starting point, one straight forward solution for authenticating
this data structure is to handle each Ti separately, building and authenticating a
corresponding suffix tree. Consequently, in order to prove the integrity of his answer,
the server replies with τ separate proofs of our main construction (one for each
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document) which are separately verified by the client. This approach is clearly not
efficient since τ can be very large in practice; shorter proofs are not possible, since a
server can cheat simply by omitting the answer for some documents and the client
has no way to capture this unless he receives a proof for all of them.
Main idea. We handle all documents as a single document T = T1 ∗ T2 ∗ . . . ∗ Tτ
expressed as their concatenation, where ∗ is a special character 6∈ Σ marking the
end of a document. We define extended alphabet Σ∗ = Σ ∪ {∗} and build a single
authenticated suffix tree G = (V,E, T ,Σ∗) as in our main construction. Observe
now that the query can be reduced to answering a single pattern matching query
for p in T , asking for all its occurrences (as opposed to our main scheme where
we were interested with a single occurrence). This can be easily achieved with the
following observation about suffix trees: for a pattern p for which suffixTree outputs
node v ∈ G, the number of occurrences of p ∈ T , is the number of children of G.
For example, in Figure 5·2, the pattern i appears three times in the text, and the
pattern mi appears twice.
Construction overview. The above relation can be incorporated in our main
construction, by encoding in each node v not a single range (sv, ev) but the indices
of all these ranges (svu, e
v
u), one for each child node u of v. In fact, the information
will consist of triples (i, svu, e
v
u) where i is the index of the document Ti within which
sv falls. This can performed in time O(n) in three steps. Initially, the owner sets
up an efficient dictionary structure with key-value pairs formed by document indices
and corresponding starting positions. Then he sets up a suffix tree G for T and
with a post-order traversal computes all ranges for each node (with lookups to the
dictionary). He finally runs the setup for our main construction with the modified
node information explained above.
Regarding proof generation and verification, we distinguish between the two cases.
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If p does not appear in T , then the proof is same as in our basic scheme and the
same holds for verification14. For the case of positive response, the server must
return a proof that consists of three parts: (i) a match proof exactly as in our
main construction, with boundaries i, j; (ii) a node accumulation accv (with its
accumulation tree proof and structure accumulation) for the node v corresponding
to p and all its ranges; (iii) the indices of all documents where p appears. With access
to all this information, the client verifies that p indeed appears in T , it corresponds
to v (because there must exist one range of v that covers position j) and that the
returned indices correspond exactly to all documents containing p. Observe that
the special character ∗ makes it impossible for an adversary to cheat by finding two
consecutive documents, the first of which ends with a prefix of p and the second of
which begins with the corresponding suffix (as long as {∗} 6∈ p).
5.4.2 Search on XML documents
We now turn our attention to queries over XML documents. We consider the stan-
dard tree-based representation of XML data: An XML document X consists of n
elements e1, . . . , en organized in a hierarchical structure, via sub-element relations,
which, in turn, imposes a well-defined representation of X as a tree XT having ele-
ments as nodes and sub-element relations expressed by edges. Each element has a
label that distinguishes its data type, attributes and corresponding attribute values
and actual textual content (which can be viewed as an additional attribute).15 We
also assume that each element of XT is associated with a unique numerical identifier
stored as an element attribute. Figure 5·4 provides one such simplified tree-based
representation.
14The node accumulations must include separately a single range for v (randomly chosen
in the case of multiple occurrences) and the collection of all ranges described above.
15We do not consider reference attributes relating elements to arbitrary nodes in XT ) or
processing instructions.
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Figure 5·4: (Left) Tree XT containing all the elements of XML
document X. Element attributes can be included as a different type
of node, directly below the corresponding element. (Right) Trie XL
containing all the distinct label paths that appear at X. Observe how
each node has pointers to all the corresponding element nodes in XT .
Each node e in XT is defined (or reachable) by a single label path that is the
concatenation of the labels of e’s ancestor nodes in the order that they must be tra-
versed starting from the root of XT in order to reach e. In general, many elements
may share the same label path. We abstract away the details of the (often elab-
orate) querying process of an XML document by considering generic path queries
that return a subset of the elements of XT (in fact, a forest of subtrees in XT ).
A path query is generally a regular expression over the alphabet L of valid labels
returning all nodes reachable by those label paths conforming to the query, along
with the subtrees in XT rooted at these nodes. An exact path query is related to
a label path L of length m, i.e., L ∈ Lm, returning the subtrees reachable in XT
by L. This abstraction fully captures the basic notion of path query as identified
in various XML query languages, e.g., XPath, XML-QL. As an example a query of
the form \bookstore\department\book will return all the books that appear in XT as
shown in Figure 5·4 with the corresponding subtree of each book element (i.e., nodes
title, author,YoP).
Main idea. Similar to the case of text pattern matching, our goal is to identify
the relations among the elements of XML document that are sufficient to succinctly
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certify the correctness of exact-path XML queries. Our main approach is to decouple
locating the queried elements from validating their contents. We achieve this through
a direct reduction to our (authenticated) suffix tree construction from the previous
section: Given an XML document X in its tree-like representation XT , we construct
a trie XL that stores all the distinct label paths that appear in XT . Compared to
our main scheme, XL can be viewed as an uncompressed suffix tree (trie) with the
alphabet being the element label space L associated with X and the “text” over
which it is defined being all label paths in XT . Each node in XL is associated with
a valid label path according to XT and also with the set of elements in XT that
are reachable by this label path, through back pointers. For example, the query
\bookstore\department\book in Figure 5·4 will reach one node in XL which points
back to the elements reachable by the queried path. We define, encode and authen-
ticate three types of certification relations (corresponding to edges in Figure 5·4):
1. Subtree contents: This relation maps nodes in XT with the elements (and their
attributes) in XT that belong in the subtrees in XT defined by these nodes.
2. Label paths: This relation maps nodes in XL with their corresponding label
paths. Here, we make direct use of our results from Section 5.3; however,
since we no longer have a tree defined over all possible suffixes of a text, suffix
accumulations are no longer relevant (instead, we use node accumulations).
3. Element mappings: This relation maps nodes in XL with the corresponding
elements in XT that are reachable by the same label path (associated with
these nodes).
We next describe how to cryptographically encode the above relations by carefully
computing accumulations or hash values over sets of data objects related to the nodes
in XL and XT .
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Notation. We denote by eid the identifier, by Ae = {(ai, βi)|i = 1, . . . , |Ae|} the
attribute values, by lb(e) the label, and by Ce = {ci|i = 1, . . . , |Ce|} the children
of element e in XT . Also, for node v ∈ XL, we denote by Lv, lb(v), Cv, and Ev its
label path, label, children set, and respectively the set of elements ei in XT that are
reachable by Lv. Finally, let d be the height of XT .
Subtree labels. Subtree contents in XT are encoded using a special type of node-
specific values. If h is a cryptographic collision-resistant hash function, then for any
e ∈ XT we let he denote the hash content of e he = h(eid‖(a1, β1)‖ . . . ‖(a|Ae|, β|Ae|)).
Then, for e ∈ XT we define two different ways for recursively computing node-
specific subtree labels sl(e) that aggregate the hash labels of all the descendant nodes
of e in XT :
1) Hash based: If e is leaf in XT then sl1(e) = he, otherwise sl1(e) =
h(he‖sl1(c1) . . . ‖sl1(c|Ce|));
2) Accumulation based: sl2 = acc(Ze) where if e is leaf then Ze = he, other-
wise Ze = {he,Zc1 , . . . ,Zc|Ce|};
Node accumulations. Label paths and element mappings in XL are encoded using
node accumulations. We associate with v ∈ XL three sets of data objects: (a) The
label path Lv of v; let Yv1 = {(label, i, li) : i = 1, . . . , |Lv|}; (b) The label sequels
of v is lb(c1), . . . , lb(c|Cv |), the sequence of the alphabetically ordered labels of v’s
children; let Yv2 = {(sequel, lb(ci), lb(ci+1)) : i = 1, . . . , |Cv| − 1}; and (c) The XML
elements hash is the hash value of the set Ev of elements of XT that correspond to
Lv; let Yv3 = {(hash, h(sl(e1), . . . , sl(e|Ev |)} (alternatively, this hash can be computed
as the accumulation of values sl(ei) using a bilinear accumulator). Then the node
accumulation for node v ∈ XL is defined as acc(Yv1 ∪ Yv2 ∪ Yv3).
Construction overview. Here we discuss the operation of the algorithms of our
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scheme. The genkey algorithm is exactly the same as the one for our main construc-
tion (plus generating a collision resistant hash function if sl1 is chosen for subtree
labels). For setup, the owner first builds XL, the trie containing all distinct paths
appearing in the XT . He then computes subtree labels sl(e) for each element e ∈ XT
in a bottom up way starting from the leaves and node accumulations accv for each
node v ∈ XL. He also computes for v, two structure accumulations tv, sv, the first
of which contains only information regarding the labels of its children nodes and the
second contains all the node information except for the label path Lv. Moreover,
he computes a subset witness for each consecutive pair of children of v (ordered al-
phabetically based on their label), exactly as in the main scheme. He finally builds
a single accumulation tree over the set V of node accumulations accv and sends all
components to the server.
With respect to query we again distinguish the two cases. If the queried path
L does not appear in XT , proof generation is identical to the mismatch case of our
main construction. The server simply needs to prove the existence of a prefix of
L, and that none of the children of the node v in XL corresponding to this prefix
has the necessary next label. This is achieved by providing the length of the prefix,
the corresponding accv (with its accumulation proof), the structure accumulation
sv, and the corresponding pair of children labels with its subset witness. The client,
first checks the validity of accv, then verifies it corresponds to the given prefix of L
using the structure accumulation and, finally checks whether the next label in L is
covered by the given label pair, as well as the fact that it is a well-formed pair using
the given witness. Observe that, in contrast to our main construction, since XL is
uncompressed, the mismatch will always happen “at the end” of a node.
If L appears in XT , the answer consists of all elements ei in the document that
have label paths corresponding to L as well as the subtrees of XT that have ei as
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roots. Note that, since the result consists of a forest of subtrees, their structure (i.e.,
the parent-children relations of elements) is also explicitly part of the answer. Proof
generation proceeds as follows. If v is the node in XL that corresponds to L, the
server only needs to provide accv (with its accumulation proof) and the structure
accumulation tv. The client first validates that accv is a correct node accumulation
and then checks that it corresponds to L and all provided elements ei using the
structure accumulation tv. To achieve the latter, he first computes subset label sl(ei)
for each element in the answer Ev and their hash value η = h(sl(e1), . . . , sl(e|Ev |)). He
then computes gx for x = (s + r(hash, η))
∏|Lv |
i=1 (s + r(label, i, li)) and finally checks
whether e(gx, tv) = e(accv, g). This simultaneously validates that v corresponds to L
and that all elements of XT (including subtrees) have been returned. For the latter,
observe that sl is a secure cryptographic representation, hence no elements may be
omitted.
5.4.3 Dynamic datasets
So far we have only dealt with the case of static datasets, where the data owner
outsources the data once, with no further changes. However, in many cases the
owner may wish to update the dataset by inserting or removing data. When this
occurs, the owner can of course run the entire setup process again, but here we
investigate more efficient updates for the two applications presented above.
Collection of text documents. For our scheme we build a single suffix tree on the
collection, hence our update efficiency will crucially depend on this data structure’s
behavior. In practice, a single modification in any of the documents may change
the suffix tree entirely and the best we can do for updates is to re-run setup, in
time O(nτ). One way to accommodate updates more efficiently is the following. We
first split the documents in
√
τ groups, each with
√
τ documents, and then run our
scheme separately for each group. A given query now decomposes into a separate
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query for each group. In this setting, an update –in the form of a document insertion
or removal– will only cause the re-computation of one of the suffix trees (and the
corresponding ADS) in time O(n
√
τ) instead of O(nτ). On the other hand, this
increases the cost for proof generation/verification and size by a multiplicative
√
τ
factor, but in settings with frequent updates, this trade-off may be favorable.
XML documents. In this setting, we discuss updates in the form of element
insertion or removal from the document, that do not change the structure of the label
trie XL (i.e. they do not introduce a new label path in the document). Otherwise,
we face the same difficulties as in the previous application. We focus on leaf element
insertions; in order to insert more than one element (building a new subtree in XT )
the process is repeated accordingly. Updates of this form can be efficiently handled
as follows: First, the new element’s subtree label is computed and the subtree labels
of all its ancestors in XT are re-computed. Second, the node accumulation value
of the corresponding node v ∈ XL is updated by inserting the subtree label of the
new element in the XML elements hash. Then, the second structure accumulation
and children witnesses for v are updated, and the accumulation tree is updated
accordingly.
Let us now calculate the efficiency of the above process. Computing the subtree
labels takes O(d) operations and recomputing the node and structure accumulations
and children witnesses requires O(|Cv|) exponentiations (assuming the XML elements
hash is computed with a bilinear accumulator). We stress that |Cv| is the number of
distinct labels the siblings of the inserted element have, and not the number of its
XML element siblings; for all practical purposes |Cv| can be viewed as a constant.
Finally, by the properties of the accumulation tree, the last step can be run in time
O(|XL|), where  ∈ (0, 1] is a chosen parameter. The same holds for the case of
element removal. Hence the overall update cost is O(d+ |Cv|+ |XL|), which is much
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less than the setup cost.
5.5 Parallel algorithms
In this section we show how to derive parallel implementations for the setup algo-
rithms of our schemes. We consider parallelism in the exclusive-read-exclusive-write
(EREW) model [Ja´J92].
Parallel bilinear accumulator setup. Given the trapdoor information s, the
accumulation acc(X ) of a set X can be computed in O(log n) parallel time using
O(n/ log n) processors in the EREW. This can be achieved using an algorithm for
summing n terms in parallel (where sum is replaced with multiplication) [Ja´J92] .
Parallel suffix products. It is easy to see that suffix accumulations can be
computed with the parallel prefix sums algorithm in O(log n) parallel time using
O(n/ log n) processors.
Parallel path prefixes. We now show how to compute prefix accumulations on the
paths of a tree. For a node v of a rooted tree T of size n, let xv denote the element
stored at v and path(v) denote the path of T between v and and the root, including
the root and v. Let prefix accumulations of tree T , be computed as accPv(T ) =
g
∏
u∈path(v) (s+xu), for v ∈ T . These prefix accumulations can be computed in O(log n)
parallel time, using O(n/ log n) processors in the EREW model by computing a
suffix accumulation over the Euler tour of T (using the previous approach), that is
appropriately refined to accumulate (s+xv) modulo p in the exponent when the tour
encounters the left side of v and (s + xv)
−1 modulo p when the tour encounters the
right side of v.
Parallel subtree products. Our authenticated XML tree in Section 5.4 also uses
subtree labels on a tree T of size n, storing element xv at node v. If these labels
are accumulation based, they can be modeled as accSv(T ) = g
∏
w∈subtree(v)(s+xw) for
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v ∈ T , where subtree(v) is the set of nodes contained in the subtree rooted on node
v (including v). Note that in order to compute accSv(T ) for all v ∈ T , it suffices
to compute the products
∏
w∈subtree(v)(s + xw) for all v ∈ T . Such a parallel algo-
rithm running in O(log n) parallel time using O(n/ log n) processors was originally
presented as an application of a method named tree contraction [MR91].
Parallel accumulation trees. Accumulation trees on a set of n elements, origi-
nally presented in [PTT15], can also be constructed in parallel. First, partition the
elements of the set in O(n/ log n) buckets of size O(log n) and then compute the
accumulations of the buckets with O(n/ log n) processors in O(log n) parallel time.
Next, for a fixed , build the accumulation tree on top of the B = n/ log n buckets.
Specifically, the accumulations (O(B1−) in total) of all internal nodes (of degree
O(B)) at a specific level can be computed independently from one another. There-
fore, by the parallel accumulation setup algorithm (presented in the beginning of this
section), the accumulation tree can be computed in O(logB) = O(log n) parallel
time using O(B1−B/ logB) = O(n/ log n) processors, similarly with a Merkle tree.
We conclude that the setup algorithm of our scheme for authenticated pattern
matching can be run in O(log n) parallel time using O(n/ log n) processors, for both
presented applications.
5.6 Performance evaluation
In this section, we present an experimental evaluation of our two authenticated pat-
tern matching applications from Section 5.4. All scheme components were written in
C++, by building on a core bilinear accumulator implementation [Tre13] developed
by Edward Tremel, as well as using library DCLXVI [DCL16] for bilinear pairings,
library FLINT [Fli16] for modular arithmetic, Crypto++ [Cry16] for implementing
SHA-2, and the pugiXML [Pug16] XML parser. The code was compiled using g++
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XML document size (MB) # of elements # of paths setup (sec)
SIGMOD 0.5 11,526 11 0.4
Mondial 1 22,423 33 0.7
NASA 23 476,646 95 8.9
XMark 100 2,840,047 514 35.2
DBLP 127 3,332,130 125 68.9
Protein sequence 683 21,305,818 85 381.5
Table 5.1: XML documents used for experiments and setup time.
version 4.7.3 in C++11 mode. Our goal is to measure important quantities related to
the execution of our scheme: verification time for the clients, proof generation time
for the server, setup time for the data owner, and the size of the produced proof.
Experimental setup. For our collection of documents application, we used the
Enron e-mail dataset [KY04] to build collections of e-mail documents (including
headers) with total size varying between 10,000 and 1,000,000 characters. We set
the public key size to be equal to 10% of the text size at all times (this can be seen
as an upper bound on the size of patterns that can be verified). For the exact path
XML application, we experimented with five XML documents of various sizes from
the University of Washington XML repository [Uow16], as well as a large synthetic
XML document generated using the XMark benchmark tool [Sch16]. A list of the
documents and their sizes can be found in Table 5.1. Special characters were es-
caped both in the e-mail documents and the text content within XML elements. For
computing subset labels and XML elements hashes within trie nodes, we used the
hash-based approach with SHA-2. In both cases, we constructed accumulation trees
of height 1 for the authentication of suffix and node accumulations. All quantities
were measured ten times and the average is reported.
Working with pairings over elliptic curves. As discussed in Section 2 the bilin-
ear accumulator employs a pairing e defined over two bilinear groups. For simplicity
of presentation, we previously defined e : G × G → GT , i.e., both its inputs come
from the same group (known in the literature as an symmetric pairing). In practice
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text size setup (sec)
100 1.4
1,000 10.7
10,000 99.6
100,000 976.5
1,000,000 10,455
(a) setup time
proof type proof (KB) optimal (B)
positive 3.4 435
negative 3.4 435
neg. end node 4 500
xml positive 1.2 178
xml negative 1.7 243
(b) proof size
Table 5.2: Setup cost for text documents and size of proofs.
however, asymmetric pairings of the form e : G1 × G2 → GT , where G1,G2 are
groups of the same prime order but G1 6= G2, are significantly faster. The DCLXVI
library we use here makes use of such a pairing over an elliptic curve of 256 bits, and
offering bit-level security of 128 bits (corresponding to the strong level of 3072-bit
RSA signatures according to NIST [BBB+12]). Elements of G2 (corresponding to
witnesses in our scheme) are defined over an extension of the field corresponding to
elements of G1(resp. accumulations). The former are twice as large as the latter and
arithmetic operations in G2 are roughly 2-3 times slower.
Setup cost. Table 5.2(a) shows the setup time versus the total length of the docu-
ments and depicts a strong linear relation between them. This is expected because
of the suffix accumulation computations and the fact that the suffix tree has linearly
many nodes. The practical cost is quite large (e.g., roughly 3 hours for a text of
1,000,000 characters). However, this operation only occurs once when the outsourc-
ing takes place. For the XML case, Table 5.1 contains the necessary setup time for
the documents we tested. The time grows with the size of the document but is quite
small in practice, even for very large documents (e.g., a little above 6 minutes for a
document of size 683MB). This happens because the crucial quantity is the number
of distinct paths in the document (that will form the nodes of XL), and not the
number of elements in the document itself.
Query time. Figures 4·8(a), (b) and (c) show the server’s overhead for answer
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Figure 5·5: Computation time for query evaluation and proof con-
struction at the server, for text pattern matching.
Figure 5·6: Overall computation time for positive (left) and negative
(right) responses at the server, for XML pattern matching.
computation and proof generation, for text and XML pattern matching. For text
pattern matching we experimented with pattern lengths of 10 to 1,000 characters
at a text of 1,000,000 characters. To test the query time at the server, we focused
on queries with negative answers and prefix matches finishing at the end of a node,
which is the most demanding scenario (e.g., a pattern that starts with a letter that
does not even appear in the text is answered by simply looking at the children of the
root node of the suffix tree). To produce such queries, we identified matches at ends
of various nodes, and “built” progressively larger patterns that ended with them.
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We plot the overall time for query evaluation and proof generation versus the size of
the found prefix. As can be seen, the cost is in the order of a few microseconds (µs)
at all times. In the case of XML queries, we present findings both for the positive
and negative case in Figures 4·8(b) and (c) respectively, for the NASA, XMark and
DBLP datasets (note the different y-axis scales). For queries with positive answers,
we tested on all existing label paths, whereas for negative ones we inserted a “junk”
label at a random point along a valid path. In the first case the plot is versus the
size of the answer; for the second case where the answer size is zero, we plotted the
times across the x-axis by simply assigning an arbitrary id (1-742) to each query.
The overhead is again very low, less than 1 millisecond for most instances in the
positive case and less than 20µs in the negative. This discrepancy occurs because
the server must compile the answer subtrees into a new pugiXML document (that will
be sent to the client) for a positive answer –which does not entail any cryptographic
operations. Finally, in both applications the plots are quite noisy. This follows
because the answer computation time varies greatly with the topology of the trees
(in both cases) and the size of node contents (for the XML case).
Comparison with query-evaluation time. In both cases, the server’s overhead for proof
generation is very low in our scheme since, once the answer is computed, he simply
performs a constant number of lookups in his local database to find the corresponding
accumulations and witnesses. This is highlighted in Figure 4·8(a) where the lower
data series corresponds to the time it takes to simply evaluate the query (without
any proof of integrity). As can be inferred, the pure cost for proof generation is less
than 10µs at all times. This is also true for the XML case, but due to the different
plot type, it was not easy to depict in a figure. In essence, in our scheme the server
only performs exactly the same operations as if there was no authentication plus a
constant number of memory look-ups, for both applications which makes it ideal for
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scenarios where a dedicated server needs to handle great workload at line-speed.
Verification time. In Figures 4·8(d),(e) and (f) we demonstrate the verification
cost for clients for the text and XML pattern matching applications. In the first
case, the time is measured as a function of the queried pattern length (or matching
prefix in the case of a negative answer) and in the second as a function of the answer
size (as before, for negative responses we plot versus an arbitrary id).
To test the verification time for our text application, we report findings for all
three possible cases (match, mismatch and mismatch at end of node). We observe a
strong linear correlation between the verification time and the length of the matched
pattern. This follows because the main component of the verification algorithm is
computing the term gz. Observe that verification for the positive case of a match
is slightly faster, which corresponds to our protocol description. In that case, the
client needs to perform operations over accumulations and witnesses related only to
suffixes, without getting involved with suffix tree nodes. On the other hand, the case
where a mismatch occurs at the end of a suffix tree node is slightly more costly than
that of a simple mismatch since the client needs to also verify a received sequel with
a corresponding witness. The verification overhead remains below 300ms even for
arguably large pattern sizes consisting of up to 1,000 characters.
For XML path matching, we report findings for answer sizes of up to 50,000 ele-
ments. Observe again the strong linear correlation between the answer size and the
verification time, for positive answers. This follows from the fact that the client per-
forms one hash operation per element in the answer, followed by a constant number
of bilinear pairings. The total overhead is very small, less than half a second even for
large answer sizes. If the answer is negative (again, note the different y-axis scale)
the overhead comes mostly from the fixed number of pairings and is much smaller.
Proof size and optimizations. With the DCLXVI library, bilinear group elements
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Figure 5·7: Computation time for verification of the three different
cases at the client, for text pattern matching.
Figure 5·8: Computation time for verification of positive (left) and
negative (right) responses at the client, for XML pattern matching.
are represented by their Jacobian coordinates, i.e., three values per element. As
described in [NNS10], each coordinate of an element in G1 is represented by a number
of double-precision floating-point variables. The total representation size is 2304 bits
for elements of G1 and 4608 bits for elements of G2. In our scheme, proofs also
contain additional structural information (e.g., position of match/mismatch in text,
depth of edge, etc.) which was less than 50 bytes for all tested configurations.
Table 5.2(b) contains the proof sizes produced by our scheme for both applica-
tions. Recall that these numbers are independent of dataset, pattern, or answer size.
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At all times the proof size is below 4Kb and as low as 1.2Kb for positive XML proofs.
While these sizes are very attractive for most applications, further improvements (not
implemented here) are possible. Elements can be instead represented by their two
affine coordinates (x, y). Moreover, there is no need to transmit y-coordinates as
all elements lie on the curve with equation y2 = x3 + 3, which is part of the public
parameters of the scheme. Given x, the y-coordinate can be inferred by a single
bit indicating which square root of x3 + 3 it corresponds to. The result of these
optimizations can be seen at the third column of the table. The proof size is as
low as 435 bytes for text pattern matching and 178 bytes for XML path search. On
the other hand, these techniques introduce a small additional overhead at the client
(for computing y and transforming to Jacobian coordinates again). When reduced
communication bandwidth is essential or proof caching occurs, this extra cost may
be acceptable.
Discussion and comparison with alternative schemes. The above results
highlight the practicality of our constructions. In particular for the server, who
would have to handle the largest workload, the fact that all proof components are
pre-computed implies only a small fixed overhead between simply evaluating a query
and authenticating the answer with a proof on top of that. Verification time is
also appealing for most real-world scenarios making our scheme ideal for settings
with “thin” clients or even mobile devices. One component of our scheme that
can be improved significantly is the one-time setup operation; pre-computing all
proof components takes its toll, especially for the text pattern matching application.
Finally, while proofs are arguably very short, they can be further compressed by the
optimization discussed above.
To the best of our knowledge, the only other known constructions to achieve
constant-size proofs rely on general verifiable computation schemes. As discussed
154
previously, state-of-the-art implementations fall under two categories: circuit or
RAM-based. For the former, (e.g., [PHGR13]) the proof generation cost is always
at least as large as parsing a circuit that has the entire document as input. The
latter are asymptotically better than the former, but still incur prohibitive costs for
the server. In particular, as shown in [ZPK14], performing a BFS over a graph of
roughly 9,000 edges takes 270 hours with [BFR+13b] and 50 hours with [BCG+13]
for proof generation. For comparison, in our text pattern matching experiment, we
tested patterns of up to 1,000 elements and an alphabet of 256 characters. Assuming
a binary search tree at each node for finding children nodes matching the pattern,
this corresponds to 8,000 memory reads in the worst case, and proof generation took
less than 10µs. A different line of work for authenticated pattern matching is based
entirely on cryptographic hashes (e.g, [DGK+04, MND+04, BCF+04]). There is no
existing built system for concrete comparison but, due to the different nature of
operations, we expect these schemes to have faster setup and slightly better verifica-
tion time than ours. However, the proofs grow with the pattern size for text pattern
matching, and with the size of the entire document (in the worst case) for XML
queries.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
This thesis studied the problem of verifying computations performed over remotely
stored data, a research direction that has received increased attention recently, espe-
cially in relation with cloud computing and remote file hosting. We presented three
novel authenticated data structures for the specific problems of verifying nested set
operations, multi-dimensional range queries, and pattern matching queries. Our con-
structions aim for efficiency while sacrificing expressiveness (each one only works for
a specific type of queries). The experimental evaluations indeed validate this claim,
demonstrating the small overhead of our constructions, especially in comparison with
existing general-purpose solutions.
For the problem of verifiable set operations, we presented the first function-
specific construction that can handle nested operations while achieving proof size
and verification cost that are entirely independent of the sizes of intermediate sets.
Our core contribution is the development of novel composable “atomic” protocols
for the cases of set intersection, union, and difference. Our experimental evaluation
highlights the low cost for verification of complex operations, while at the same time
keeping the server’s cost for proof construction low.
For the problem of multi-dimensional range queries over outsourced databases,
and contrary to existing literature, our solution can support queries on any set of
attributes with setup cost, proof construction and verification time that are each
only linear in the number of database attributes.
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The central idea of our methods is the reduction of a multi-dimensional range
query to set operations over appropriately pre-defined sets in the database. We
provided a detailed asymptotic and empirical performance evaluation, which confirms
the feasibility of our scheme.
For the problem of pattern matching queries, we presented a construction that
can accommodate queries over text and XML documents with constant-size proofs,
using careful encoding of answer-specific certification relations with cryptographic
accumulators. We demonstrated the practicality of our schemes by experimenting
on real datasets.
While introducing new more efficient constructions for the same types of prob-
lems is certainly a challenging research direction, it seems that a more interesting
problem has to do with increasing the expressiveness of supported query types. For
example, for the first two constructions one natural expansion would be to support
aggregation functions on the computed results, e.g., to return only the average of
value of a set instead of the entire set. For the pattern matching case, it is of great
interest to design a scheme that supports more general query types, such as search for
regular expressions on texts and general XPath queries for XML. These expansions
may require significant modifications to our constructions, or even development of
altogether new schemes.
6.1 Combining function-specific with general-purpose veri-
fiable computation
As discussed previously, a common theme in our solutions is the sacrifice of expres-
siveness in favor of efficiency. However, the problem with function-specific construc-
tions is that they come with no guarantee of composability. Simply put, given a
scheme for a function f1 and a scheme for a function f2 there is no known “black-
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box” way to construct a scheme for function g := f1 ◦ f2, in a way that preserves
the efficiency of the underlying schemes. To highlight the importance of such a
mechanism, imagine a nested SQL query consisting of a JOIN query over two tables,
followed by a SELECT ... WHERE query on the join result. Assuming the existing
of two schemes for the two basic query types (e.g., [YPPK09a] and our construc-
tion from Chapter 4, respectively), can we build an efficient construction for their
composition? Unfortunately, non-composability is almost inherent in this setting, as
function-specific VC schemes may utilize entirely different types of data encodings
and cryptographic tools. Therefore, it is not trivial to translate the output of one to
appropriately encoded input for another.
One way to answer this is to compose our function-specific schemes with general-
purpose schemes based on SNARKs (e.g., [PHGR13, BCG+13]). That is, we can
consider a hybrid scheme where the server proves using a SNARK that it knows
a proof for a function-specific scheme, for the validity of its answer. The security
of the hybrid scheme can be shown by a reduction to the security of our scheme
based on the knowledge property of the SNARK (via a standard composition argu-
ment [BCCT13]). The advantages of using such a hybrid scheme may be multiple.
For example, the proof size is constant and independent of the size of the query (this
follows from the succinctness of the SNARK), which is not always guaranteed with
an ADS (see, for example, our construction from Chapter 3). Moreover, the hybrid
scheme might be much more efficient than simply using a generic solution in terms of
server computation. This saving is due to the server using the SNARK only to certify
a small computation (involving only the small verification circuit of the ADS scheme).
Moreover, most of the server’s work, when answering the query, is certified using the
efficient function-specific scheme that is tailored to the particular problem at hand,
resulting in less overhead for the server compared to the generic solution alone. This
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approach has already been explored in existing works, e.g., in [ZPK14] the authors
combine a custom-made ADS for path queries in graphs, with a SNARK prover to
increase the class of supported computations. This proof “bootstrapping” process
can be seen as a special case of the composition technique of [Val08, BCCT13], which
has since been implemented for SNARK composition in [BCTV14, CFH+15].
Another way to achieve a “best-of-both-worlds-result”, that balances generality
and efficiency, is via the design of composable ADS constructions. At first thought,
this seems counter-intuitive, as the goal of an ADS scheme is to target a specific
problem and build an optimized solution. On the other hand, a composition approach
essentially mandates that the proven statement from one part of the computation can
be used as the input for proving the next part. However, this goal is not unachievable;
indeed, our constructions from Chapters 3 and 4 are of this flavor. The former reduces
the problem of proving complex set operations to that of proving a series of simpler
ones, while the latter decomposes a multi-dimensional range query to multiple 1–
dimensional ones. More recently, this technique has also been applied in the context
of more general SQL queries in [ZKP15].
A final direction in this area, that has been explored to a smaller extent, is that
of customized fusions of function-specific and general purpose schemes. For example,
one way to do this is to integrate a particular ADS with a SNARK system, resulting in
a construction that is general-purpose but, more importantly, it is much more efficient
than other general-purpose schemes for the particular type of computation associated
with the underlying ADS. This approach has been explored in [KPP+14] that utilizes
our set encoding technique from Chapter 3 with the SNARK of [GGPR13, PHGR13]
to build a SNARK that is based on set circuits, a natural generalization of arithmetic
circuits. The result is a general-purpose VC scheme that is significantly more efficient
than the implementation of [PHGR13] for computations that involve set operations.
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6.2 Other open problems
One important advantage of SNARK-based VC schemes is that they can be easily
modified to ensure that the proof reveals nothing about the dataset beyond what is
directly inferable from the result itself. This property is known to as zero-knowledge
and it is particularly useful in cases where the server contributes to the computa-
tion with a (possibly sensitive) dataset of his own. With all existing SNARK-based
schemes, this property can be achieved almost for free with a simple proof randomiza-
tion technique. On the other hand, existing function-specific schemes do not have this
property and there is no similar straight forward way to modify them. One notable
exception to this is a recent line of works [GOT15, GOP+15, GGOT15, GNP+15],
that propose the notion of zero-knowledge ADS schemes that achieve the same level
of privacy as SNARK-based solutions. In particular, [GOP+15] extends our construc-
tion from Chapter 3 in a privacy-preserving manner, albeit for a single operation.
Devising new private function-specific VC schemes is an open and challenging prob-
lem that may require the development of novel cryptographic tools.
Another interesting problem has to do with the type of assumptions upon which
the security of VC schemes is based. All SNARK-based schemes need to rely on
non-falsifiable assumptions for security, as proven in [GW11], which is not neces-
sarily true for ADS schemes. However utilizing such assumptions can yield more
efficient solutions (see, for example, out construction from Chapter 3 and [ZKP15]).
It is worth exploring alternatives techniques and possibly relaxing the security or in-
teraction requirements of the model, in order to develop new constructions for both
types of schemes. Two possible relaxations, that may yield better solutions, focus
on proving security in the random oracle model or devising interactive protocols,
i.e., constructions where client and server participate in a multi-round interaction to
validate the integrity of the result.
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